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vAbstract
This Ph.D dissertation aims at answering two questions, which are closely
related to each other:
1. How do politicians decide about the independence they give to regu-
latory agencies?
2. Is there a link between the amount of independence which an agency
enjoys and the way in which it performs its tasks?
The first question investigates the factors that lead politicians to delegate in
the field of competition policy. The second question concerns, more broadly,
the relationship between costs and benefits of delegation. This disserta-
tion focuses on national competition authorities (NCAs) in the EU member
states, being antitrust one of the few really “European” policies, enforced in
the same way in all the countries by the European Commission and by the
NCAs.
The main empirical analysis (Chapter 3) tests a theoretical framework,
based on both original hypotheses and previous contributions. In order to
measure formal independence, an index based on several features of agency
autonomy has been developed. The results confirm the two original hy-
potheses advanced in this work. On the one hand, the degree of indepen-
dence of NCAs is influenced by political polarisation and by the presence of
big firms in the national economy (the higher the polarisation, the higher
the negative impact of big firms on independence). On the other hand, in-
dependence is related to EU membership: the longer the country has been
member of the EU, the more independent the NCA is. These findings have
been “cross-checked” with a series of interviews with expert and members of
competition authorities in France, Italy, and Greece (Chapter 4). In Chapter
5, the hypothesis of a relationship between independence and performance
has been tested. According to the results of this statistical analysis, greater
formal independence leads competition authorities to investigate more cases
and to issue more decisions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agen-
cies
The widespread creation of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) in the
last 30 years is an extraordinary and puzzling phenomenon on many levels.
Particularly in advanced market economies, from 1980 onwards we have ob-
served an «explosion» of IRAs in a wide variety of policy-making sectors (for
an overview, see Jordana et al. 2011). Thatcher (2002: 126) distinguishes
«agencies regulating the operation of markets» from agencies «responsible
for promoting ‘public interest’ goals other than competition». The first in-
clude «utility regulators, general competition authorities and financial bod-
ies», whilst the second group «includes agencies for the environment, safety
(at work or of food, for instance), and racial and gender equality».1 Whilst
the United States has had a system of administrative agencies set up since
the beginning of the Twentieth century (see Eisner et al. 2000), European
countries have undergone this change only in a relatively recent period. In
Europe, the creation of administrative agencies has occurred predominantly
between the mid-Eighties and the mid-Nineties (Gilardi 2005b: 86).
1 Although in principle the contributions reviewed in this chapter apply to all IRAs, this
introduction is mainly focused on the first group of agencies, above all because competition
authorities are a sub-group of the agencies regulating markets.
1
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2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
As the United States and the European countries differ with respect to
the periods in which they established IRAs, they also diverge with regard
to the political framework in which the creation of independent agencies
took place. In the United States the establishment of independent agencies
coincided with an age of increasing regulation: the great majority of the
agencies were created between the end of the Nineteenth century and the
middle of the Twentieth century,2 and their main function was to counteract
the laissez-faire ideology that had characterised the US economy since the
creation of the country. In Europe, converesely, IRAs have developed in what
is commonly regarded as the de-regulation and privatisation era. Levi-Faur
(2005: 18) shows that independent regulators were created when the states
abandoned the direct control of important economic sectors such as energy
and telecommunications at similar. This process has been identified as the
«rise of the regulatory state» (Majone 1994) or as the emergence of a «post-
regulatory» state (Scott 2004): market liberalisation has been accompanied
by a proliferation of rules and authorities in charge of enforcing them (Vogel
1996).
The explanations proposed for this phenomenon have been varied. From
a chiefly economic perspective, the creation of IRAs has been accounted for
as a necessary step in the «market-making» process (Héritier and Schmidt
2000). The characteristics that led to the establishment of state monopo-
lies in some sectors were not only their importance for the security of the
countries, but also the existence of market failures due to economies of
scale and scope, non-redeployable assets and broad range of users (Levy
and Spiller 1996a: 2-3). These features are likely to create contracting
problems that produce an inefficient allocation of the resources in the eco-
nomic system (see Williamson 1988; North 1990). Moreover, there were
also political reasons for the state intervention, namely the need to «satisfy
[...] requirements of universal access, security, continuity, and affordability»
2 The first independent agency was the Interstate Commerce Commission, established in
1887. The Food and Drug Administration was created in 1906, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion in 1914, the Federal Communication Commission in 1934, the Security and Exchange
Commission in 1934, the Federal Aviation Administration in 1958, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency in 1970, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 1977.
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1.1. THE DIFFUSION OF IRAS 3
(Héritier and Schmidt 2000: 554). Public utilities also employed an im-
portant percentage of citizens, thus setting up a form of «informal welfare
state» (Schwartz 2001).
Even though deregulation and privatisation had allowed private actors
to access new markets, the structure of these markets remained as it was,
and all the features that called for state ownership turned out to call for
market-making and market-regulation by the state. If public monopolies
had become undesirable, then private monopolies were certainly worse (be-
cause the monopoly profit does not serve any public interest in such case),
and further net losses for the ultimate users of privatised services had to be
avoided.
Independent authorities have been seen as a functional prerequisite for
market-opening, liberalisation and privatisation of important economic sec-
tors (Tenbücken and Schneider 2004; Levi-Faur 2005; Grande 1994). Lib-
eralisation in sectors like telecommunications and energy has habitually fol-
lowed regimes in which only one national state-owned firm existed. Al-
though the property of these state-owned incumbents has been, partially
or completely, privatised, the state still remained an important actor with
a relevant market power and an absolutely dominant position in some sec-
tors. IRAs were the institutional instrument devised in order to grant fair
conditions to both potential competitors and ultimate users. As Tenbücken
and Schneider (2004: 247) argue with regard to the case of telecommuni-
cations,
«[t]he central dilemma of the transition from a monopoly situa-
tion to that of stable and functioning competition in telecommuni-
cations entails guaranteeing new network administrators and service
providers fair access to the market and controlling the dominant posi-
tion of the former Public Telecommunications Operator (PTO) on the
market. [...] Hence, the need to ensure competitive markets for new
entrants and for consumers alike was the major reason behind the cre-
ation of new regulatory bodies and the implementation of new regula-
tory rules [...]».
Other scholars have developed a more general approach that takes into ac-
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4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
count the characteristics of the political systems, the incentives that politi-
cians face, and the problems of credible commitment that they have (see
Moe 1990; Levy and Spiller 1996b). The most eminent contribution in this
field comes from Majone, who has repeatedly (1994; 1996; 1997; 1998)
focused on the credibility that the state would acquire by establishing IRAs:
in a global economy, in which investors are free to move capitals from one
country to another very easily, it is crucial that economic regulation is del-
egated to institutional actors that cannot be directly influenced by govern-
ments and parliaments (see below, Section 2.6). For modern states, «the
possibility of achieving policy objectives by coercive means is severely lim-
ited; credibility, rather than the legitimate use of coercion is now the most
valuable resource of policy-makers» (Majone 1996: 13). IRAs are tools both
rigid enough to ensure that no abrupt changes are adopted by the legislators
in the short-run, and flexible enough to allow the continual redefinition of
long-term objectives. As Majone (1996: 14) summarises:
«[...] because a legislature cannot bind another legislature, and a
government coalition cannot tie the hands of another coalition, pub-
lic policies are always vulnerable to reneging and thus lack long-term
credibility. Hence, the delegation of policy-making powers to indepen-
dent institutions is a means whereby governments can credibly commit
themselves to strategies that would not be credible in the absence of
such delegation».
If not only the conditions for fair competition and efficient market function-
ing have to be created, but also to be enforced in the long-run, then per-
manent, public and independent agencies are the best-suited instrument,
because the making and the protection of such conditions requires some
characteristics that only these bodies possess: the need to balance private
and public interests, especially when this entails the distribution of relevant
costs and benefits, requires the establishment of stable bodies that can accu-
mulate expertise and best practice models as time passes. Moreover, given
the fact that the tasks assigned to these agencies are often very complex,
they must be equipped with sufficiently sized staff that can be constantly
devoted to these activities (Selznick 1985: 364).
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1.1. THE DIFFUSION OF IRAS 5
Not all scholars, however, are fully satisfied with a purely «economic»
explanation of the creation of IRAs. In particular, some of them have at-
tempted to conceive of a more encompassing and sociologically-oriented
approach. Without claiming to be exhaustive or complete, I want to briefly
summarise the concepts brought forward by these contributions. Some
scholars have emphasised the role of policy learning (Sabatier 1988; Eis-
ing 2002; Meseguer 2005), stressing the importance of the exchange of
information in supra-national organisations, cross-national corporate en-
tities, peer-to-peer meetings (Lazer 2005), where some countries propose
successful strategies and others «watch and learn». Rather than the result
of a «struggle among groups with different resources and values/interests»
(Sabatier 1988: 157), policy change would be due to the actors’ «incentives
to learn more about the magnitude of salient problems, the factors affecting
them, and the consequences of policy alternatives» (Sabatier 1988: 158).
In the field of economic regulation, it has been hypothesised that the rise of
the regulatory state has been «the consequence of a process of learning from
failed experiments with more interventionist policies» (Meseguer 2005: 68).
The idea of policy learning entails a rational process through which an actor
observes and compares different possibilities and, assessing the success or
failure of previous experiences, takes a decision. A very similar concept is
that of lesson drawing (Rose 1991; Majone 1991).
The notion of policy learning and lesson drawing is different from that of
emulation, imitation, policy transfer, which occur when the adoption of sim-
ilar policy and institutional choices are not rationally driven (for a general
overview of diffusion processes, see Elkins and Simmons 2005; McNamara
2002; Simmons et al. 2006). As Meseguer (2005: 73) points out:
«Governments may imitate what peer countries do simply because
they are peers, or governments may imitate what apparently successful
countries do simply because they are high-status countries that are
considered to know best».
In most cases, rational and non-rational processes may coexist, as well as
voluntary and coercitive institutional changes. International organisations
are often places where ideas are spread and best-practices illustrated, but
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6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
the pressure they exert on the members resembles in some cases an indirect
coercion (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 11).
Whatever the reason(s) for this fast and widespread diffusion of IRAs,
their «mushrooming» is a fact. As has been shown, the causes of this sud-
den increase have been investigated in a relevant number of works that
have yielded valuable results, but much research still has to be done. In
particular, studies on IRAs have been either very general, including many
different types of agencies and trying to account for their creation in a
very all-embracing way (see for example Majone 1994, 1996; Gilardi 2002,
2005a; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005; Levi-Faur 2005), or focused on partic-
ular sectors of public policy. In the latter case, most contributions have been
devoted to telecommunications (see for instance Grande 1994; Levy and
Spiller 1996b; Levi-Faur 1999, 2004b; Tenbücken and Schneider 2004; Ed-
wards and Waverman 2006). In this dissertation, I will focus on a particular
type of independent agencies regulating the operations of market, competi-
tion authorities, and on a particular feature of theirs, formal independence.
The reasons for these choices are explained in the following sections.
1.2 Why competition policy?
Competition authorities are a particular type of IRA. They do not regulate
or supervise one sector of the economy, nor do they simply grant the en-
joyment of some particular rights. Their role lies in the middle between
these two. On the one hand, their activity certainly belongs to the category
of «economic regulation», and they have many tasks in common with sec-
toral agencies: they are meant to prevent economic actors from acquiring
dominant positions in the market, or from adopting anti-competitive prac-
tices. On the other hand, these tasks are not restricted to a sector (like the
telecommunications or the energy market), their mandate is broader and
more general, and it can be said that they safeguard rights that we consider
«fundamental» in our societies.3
3 Another aspect which distinguishes competition authorities is that their activity is fo-
cused only on ex-post regulation, market supervision in particular – although they have a
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1.2. WHY COMPETITION POLICY? 7
Competition enforcement refers to the implementation of competition
(or antitrust4) law. By this term, we mean a series of national and (in the
case of the European Union) supra-national norms that prevent any supplier
of goods or services from adopting commercial practices which are likely to:
a) restrict the other suppliers’ right to compete for a greater share of the
market; b) impose on the consumers prices that are higher than if they were
the result of a fair competition. Examples of anti-competitive practices are
(Karagiannis 2007b: 20):
• horizontal agreements aiming at price-fixing or market-sharing (so
called cartels);
• non-price horizontal collusion (such as collusive tendering or adver-
tising restrictions);
• vertical agreements aiming at price-fixing;
• non-price vertical agreements (such as exclusive or selective distribu-
tion agreements);
• abuses of dominant positions (excessive pricing, predatory pricing,
predatory investments, boycotts, raising rivals’ costs, etc);
• horizontal or vertical mergers which are likely to create a distortion in
the market.
role of «policy advisor» of politicians in competition-related matters, their advice is not bind-
ing for the parliament and the government. Most other sector agencies, instead, are mainly
focused on ex-ante regulation, such as determining end-user prices or drafting technical reg-
ulations for firms conducting business in a particular sector.
4 The term antitrust is commonly used in the US. As a matter of fact, this branch of the
law was born in the US with the Sherman Act (1890), which was (literally) an anti-trust
legislative act. It gave the federal government the power to investigate and punish «every
contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations» (15 U.S.C. §1). This legislation
has been expanded and broadened in scope through the decades, and now it includes many
other trade-related practices, such as price discrimination, exclusive dealings, mergers that
can restrict competition, abuse of dominant position. In the US, however, the term antitrust
has remained predominant, whilst in the rest of the world this category of the law is known
as «competition law». In this book, the two terms will be used interchangeably.
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8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Competition law was born in the United States with the Sherman Act (1890),
and it was later expanded by the Clayton Act (1914). Together with the
adoption of the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was es-
tablished. In the US, competition enforcement is shared between the FTC
and the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice, established in
1933. The Sherman and the Clayton Acts are still today the main pillars
of the US antitrust law.5 These acts have inspired the adoption of similar
pieces of legislation in many other countries of the world. After the US, the
area of the world which has to the greatest extent developed competition
law is the European Union (EU) and its member states. Regarded since the
Sixties as a prerequisite for the creation of an integrated market between
the member states, competition law has been consistently promoted by the
European Commission (EC or «the Commission» henceforth), both at the
European level and in the legislation of its member states (see McGowan
2005).
What makes competition law so important? Generally but also funda-
mentally, competition law aims at finding a balance between private prop-
erty rights and public interest (Peritz 1990), in order to avoid that some
people’s freedom turn into «coercion, impositions on others» (Amato 1997a:
2). From this point of view, there would be also general agreement on the
argument that protecting competition is fundamental for every democracy:
competition is nothing but «economic» democracy, and there cannot be real
political democracy if the economic power resides in the hands of few. De-
spite the general agreement on these principles, in little more than one cen-
tury there have been numerous oscillations and endless debates on the true
nature of the «public interest», and on what competition law should actu-
ally allow and prohibit, as well as by which means and rules it should be
promoted by the state.
After being introduced in the US at the end of the Nineteenth century,
antitrust law grew in both size and scope throughout the first half of the
5 Other pieces of legislation which are worth mentioning are the Robinson-Patman Act
(1936), which banned price discrimination, and the Celler–Kefauver Act (1950), which
amended and strengthened the Clayton Act.
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Twentieth century. The new bills that were adopted increased the num-
ber of forbidden practices and broadened the application of the previous
acts. This expansion gradually led to a sharp reaction in the academia,
which was framed by a group of scholars belonging to the so called Chicago
School (see Stigler 1955, 1966; Posner 1969; Bork 1978; Landes and Pos-
ner 1981). According to this group of scholars, amongst whom there were
both economists and lawyers, antitrust enforcement had gone far beyond
its original aim. By sanctioning a number of supposedly harmful practices,
the competition regulators and the courts had neglected that antitrust law
should be meant to primarily protect the consumers: therefore, only be-
haviours which reduce the consumers’ welfare should be prohibited. Bork
(1978: 406), for instance, argued that practices such as vertical agreements
and discriminatory prices should be allowed, as long as they do not damage
the end users.
Concurrently, in the last thirty years, competition enforcement in the US
has been influenced by these theoretical disputes. Although the Chicago
School’s approach has been contested (see Hunt and Arnett 2001) and the
actual antitrust enforcement has been sometimes found to have had incon-
sistencies and unexplained effects (Sproul 1993), there is general agreement
on the basic theoretical premises of antitrust law − i.e. that monopolies and
cartels are mostly inefficient and costly for the community (Posner 2001: 9
ss.), and competition enforcement is important because it is meant to pro-
tect the market from such distortions. Practices or situations that cause a
net loss for the society (or for a relevant part of it) must, thus, be discour-
aged. The inner implications of competition law are intrinsically linked to
the concepts of freedom and democracy. As Amato (1997a: 2-3) sharply
points out:
«[p]ower in liberal democratic societies is, in the public sphere,
recognized only in those who hold it legitimately on the basis of law,
while, in the private sphere, it does not go beyond the limited preroga-
tives allotted within the firm to its owner. Beyond these limits, private
power in a liberal democracy (by contrast with what had occurred, and
continues to occur, in societies of other inspirations) is in principle seen
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to be abusive, and must be limited so that no-one can take decisions
that produce effects on others without their assent being given».
In sum, economic power and economic freedom cannot coerce or hinder
others’ economic freedom. In turn, the state, in order to grant that every-
one’s economic freedom is not abused by anyone, must in some cases adopt
restrictions on private properties and rights. As we can see, the state faces
two limits: on the one hand, it cannot let anyone destroy other people’s
freedom; on the other, in doing so, it cannot destroy the same freedom that
it aims to protect. Every country must reach a certain balance between these
two boundaries (Amato 1997a: 3 ss.).
The instruments that free-market countries have employed for this pur-
pose are what we call competition authorities.6 They are public bodies with
a specific expertise and the task of enforcing antitrust law, which usually
enjoy a certain degree of independence from the legislative and executive
bodies. They have the power to conduct investigations on alleged violations
of competition law, and they can impose sanctions on the economic actors
who do not comply with it. As is true for all IRAs, the position of compe-
tition authorities in the classical scheme of division of powers is not very
clear: although they are separated from the legislative and the executive
powers, they do not belong to the judiciary power, and their functions are
a mix of legislative production, administrative implementation and judicial
enforcement.7
1.3 Why competition authorities in the EU?
Today, every member of the European Union has a national competition
authority (NCA). The first country to establish this was Germany, in 1954,
6 The US Department of Justice publishes on its web site (http://www.justice.gov/atr/con
tact/otheratr.html) a list of 86 countries having an antitrust enforcer. Not all these countries
can be considered democracies.
7 In the US, where the division of power doctrine is particularly important, the question
of «where IRAs stand» has been very much debated (see e.g. Rogers 1937; Cole 1942; Arpaia
1956; Miller 1986; about the Italian case, see Longo 1996; Patroni Griffi 1996).
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and in 2007 Luxembourg was the last,8 whilst most EU members estab-
lished their competition enforcer during the Nineties. Although the Euro-
pean Commission has always been a strong promoter of competition law,
and although (because of the Commission’s action) the member states have
had to gradually introduce the principles of free market and competition in
their legal systems, no European legislative act has ever formally required a
member of the EU to establish an independent competition authority. It is
true that the countries which acceded to the Union in the 2000’s were evalu-
ated, among other things, on the basis of their compliance with competition
law (see EC Council regulation 1267/1999, Annex I), but all these countries
had already established competition authorities before joining the EU.9
European Council regulation 1/2003, which establishes how EU com-
petition law must be applied by the member states, takes for granted that
every country has a «competition authority»: though it does not explicitly
require the existence of such a body, the application of the regulation would
be practically impossible without this being the case. EC regulation 1/2003
certainly does not specify whether the competition authorities must be in-
dependent from the political bodies and to what extent. Therefore, the
member states are completely free to set for their agencies the degree of au-
tonomy they prefer. Another crucial provision of this act states that all the
national competition authorities (and the national courts) must apply arti-
cles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU)10 (art. 5, EC Reg. 1/2003).
The two articles in question represent the core of the EU antitrust law.
Article 101 (ex art. 81 of the Treaty of the European Community) prohibits
8 Until 2004, Luxembourg did not even have a national law on competition. The Loi
du 17 mai 2004 relative à la concurrence has established a Conseil de la concurrence and
an Inspection de la concurrence, a department of the Ministry of Economy which assists the
Conseil in the investigations on suspected infringements of competition law.
9 Hungary, Poland and Slovakia established a competition authority in 1990, Bulgaria
and Czech Republic in 1991, Lithuania in 1992, Estonia in 1993, Slovenia in 1994, Malta in
1995, Romania in 1997, Latvia in 1998. According to what a member of the DG Competi-
tion affirms (Interview of 23 June 2010), the Commission, when assessing the compliance
of the candidate states with the principles of competition, mainly looked at whether the
competition authorities in these countries were functioning.
10 Called «Treaty of the European Community» before the Lisbon Treaty.
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«all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of under-
takings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the internal market». This norm covers
both horizontal and vertical agreements, as well as practises such as price
fixing and trade discrimination. Article 102 (ex art. 82 of the Treaty of the
European Community) forbids «any abuse by one or more undertakings of
a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of
it», as well as unfair commercial practises that may derive from this kind of
abuse.
The provision contained in article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 is meant to
ensure that the application of EU competition law is uniform in all the mem-
ber states. In order to grant this uniformity, member states cannot adopt an
antitrust legislation which is in contrast with the EU treaties and the reg-
ulations implementing them. Accordingly, national competition authorities
cannot refuse to use their powers when a violation of articles 101 or 102
is concerned, and they cannot take decisions running counter to a decision
already adopted by the Commission on the same subject (art. 16, EC Reg.
1/2003).11 To reinforce this rule, the Commission is given several instru-
ments of control and intervention:
• whenever a national competition authority initiates an investigation
on an alleged infringement of articles 101 or 102 TFEU, it must inform
the Commission within 30 days (art. 11.3);
• whenever a national competition authority intends to conclude an in-
vestigation with a decision «requiring that an infringement be brought
to an end, accepting commitments or withdrawing the benefit of a
block exemption Regulation», it must inform the Commission within
30 days (art. 11.4);
• the Commission has the power to begin an investigation on any case
11 The same article also states that «[national competition authority] must also avoid
giving decisions which would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission in
proceedings it has initiated».
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involving a violation of EU competition law, either if the national
agency is not acting or if it has already started a proceeding (art.
11.6).
Even if the power to «avocate» a case has never been publicly used so far,12
its mere existence is a strong incentive for the national authorities to enforce
competition law according to the Commission’s previous rulings.
Having said that, it is evident why national competition authorities in
the EU member states represent a stimulating case study. They are public
bodies whose functions and tasks are almost completely determined outside
the countries13 (by the EU legislation, which the member states can control
and influence only in a very marginal way), and, by contrast, whose insti-
tutional shape is entirely settled by the national legislator. The states have
delegated at the European level a great power to determine what these pub-
lic bodies must do, whilst retaining a complete discretion in deciding on
every organisational feature of theirs.
Two aspects are equally interesting to explain in this process. The first
regards the almost complete delegation of powers, in the field of compe-
tition, towards the Commission. Why is this policy area so crucial that
divergence at the national level is not admitted? This question has been
dealt with by Karagiannis (2007b), who analyses the development of EU
competition law and concludes that antitrust policy is a field in which the
member states, France and Germany in particular, have managed to reach
an equilibrium between effectiveness and reciprocal commitment (2007b:
325). By subjecting competition enforcement by the DG Competition to the
rule of collegiality within the Commission, the member states have made
sure that every antitrust decision could be bargained between commission-
ers. In this way, competition enforcement at the EU level has remained
sensibly weaker than it would have been if a European competition author-
ity had been created. On the other hand, by managing to create a network
12 In practice, the allocation of cases between the Commission and the NCAs takes place
within the European Competition Network, and mainly in an informal way.
13 Even before Regulation 1/2003 was passed, some scholars had argued that NCAs acted
somewhat like decentralised agencies of the Commission (Merusi 2000).
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together with the national competition authorities (by Regulation 1/2003),
the DG Competition has acquired considerable autonomy from the Commis-
sion (Karagiannis 2007b: 308).14
In this dissertation, rather than expand on the EU long-term strategy and
working method, I will focus on the other aspect of this institutional devel-
opment: the puzzling lack of any top-down uniform strategy at the national
level. Discretion at the national level could be explained as a compensation
for the full supra-national delegation, as if it was meant to work as a sort of
safety valve to be used in case of an «emergency». Nonetheless, one must
ascertain exactly how this discretion is used by the member states. How
much autonomy do they give to competition agencies? How do they regu-
late the procedures that these authorities must follow? How do they select
the civil servants that sit in these bodies? How stringent are the checks and
balances they impose onto their activities? These and other issues relate
to the broader question of the independence of these agencies, which is the
ultimate subject of this dissertation.
1.4 Why independence?
As said, every member of the EU has a competition authority. Besides setting
up the rules regarding the intervention and cooperation of national regula-
tors and the Commission, EC Council Regulation 1/2003 has also estab-
lished the creation of the European Competition Network (ECN),15 which
is composed of the national competition authorities and the Commission.
Although the Network does not have autonomous powers or competences,
it serves as a forum for discussing allocation of proceedings, uniform ap-
plication of antitrust law, particularly relevant cases, strategies and «best
14 Some could claim that it was also in the interest of the member states to create a
network in which members of the NCAs could somehow «control» the Commission.
15 Regulation 1/2003, (15): «The Commission and the competition authorities of the
Member States should form together a network of public authorities applying the Com-
munity competition rules in close cooperation. For that purpose it is necessary to set up
arrangements for information and consultation».
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practices».16 In this respect, the member states seem to have reached a
great uniformity in the implementation of competition law. But what about
the institutional autonomy that each competition authority enjoys with re-
spect to the national political bodies? As Regulation 1/2003 is completely
silent with regard to this, countries are free to determine the degree of in-
dependence that they deem most appropriate for their regulators.
It is interesting to look at the degree of formal independence from a po-
litical science perspective, because there is an evident contradiction between
what policy makers (and also scholars) affirm about independence, and the
reality that we observe. Policy makers often justify the establishment of
IRAs by referring to their functions. But if the functions of all the competi-
tion authorities in the EU member states are the same, why do they differ
so much with respect to their independence? Clearly, there are reasons that
politicians do not recognise, or that they recognise but do not speak of.
The existence of differences with regard to this aspect indicates that not
all the countries perceive the role of competition authorities in the same
way. Some countries allot a degree of autonomy that places these competi-
tion authorities amongst the most prestigious public bodies and makes them
almost impermeable to any political influence. In other countries, competi-
tion authorities represent little more than simple bureaucratic departments.
It is puzzling that the member states set up these bodies to perform exactly
the same functions in such greatly differing manners.
As said, politicians (as well as scholars) usually account for formal in-
dependence as if it were entirely induced by the functions that a body per-
forms, or by the role it has in the political and economic system. Inde-
pendence is often regarded as an intrinsic prerequisite for bodies that deal
with the enjoyment of quasi-constitutional rights. Competition authorities,
in particular, do not have strictly «regulatory» competences; they rather de-
cide on concrete cases, applying only the law (Amato 1997b: 647): this
characteristic makes their functions almost judiciary, and entails that they
must be, to a relevant extent, independent (see also Predieri 1997; Merusi
16 See the «Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Author-
ities» (2004b).
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2000). Linked to this argument is the claim that independent regulators
are meant to «shield market interventions from interference from captured
politicians and bureaucrats» (OECD 2002: 95), in order to attract private
investments and create a business environment that cannot be influenced
by political fluctuations. In this line of reasoning, independence is treated
as a normative prerequisite, not as a feature that can vary.17
Another argument that is often made is that these public bodies have
been mostly established when countries were shifting from a state-controlled
economy to a full free-market economy. In this transition, there still existed
former state-owned monopolists which retained a great share of the market
and which often controlled the basic infrastructure of a specific business.
Competition authorities were expected to prevent the state from taking ad-
vantage of this «conflict of interests» (see Clarich 2004).
The theoretical explanations advanced in the political science literature
to account for bureaucratic independence will be extensively reviewed in
Chapter 2. For the moment, it suffices to note that the reasons commonly
offered in the political discourse seem to lack an adept explanation concern-
ing the pronounced differences that we observe between the EU member
states vis-à-vis their competition authorities, as they do not appear to di-
verge substantially in the functions they perform and in the law they apply.
In each of these countries, there is a political arena that might influence
economic regulation, and from which antitrust agencies can provide a sort
of guarantee of non-interference. All of these countries have also experi-
17 If IRAs, and competition authorities in particular, are established with the purpose of
«convincing» economic actors that they can trust a country, then independence must be both
from the politics and from other economic interests. As Wilks and Bartle (2002: 151) argue,
«Political independence is intended to reduce improper lobbying and the
pursuit of party political advantage. It is a guarantee of impartiality, fairness,
and consistency which is typically seen as essential if the public is to have
confidence in an agency. [...] For economic regulation, political independence
may also be seen as a proxy for independence from business. Since business
can mobilise massive financial and political pressures, politicians are especially
susceptible to business lobbying. The real argument for the independence of
competition agencies is to insulate them from the unholy alliance of politicians
and business».
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enced the shift from an economy mainly controlled by the state to a more
free-market economy.
For these reasons, the first purpose of this dissertation is to explain the
differences in the degree of formal independence of competition authorities.
But there is another aspect related to independence to which not enough
attention has been devoted so far, namely whether independence has an im-
pact on how these agencies perform their tasks. Whilst the first research
question addresses an empirical puzzle and aims at resolving it, the second
embraces a more normative point of view and seeks to find out to what
extent the delegation of powers is justified by an improvement in terms of
policy output.
Modern democracies, parliamentary systems in particular, are organised
as «chains of delegation» (Strøm 2000; Strøm et al. 2003) in which the
citizens, «those authorized to make political decisions», «[...] condition-
ally designate others [...] to make [...] decisions in their name and place»
(Bergman et al. 2000: 257). But delegation clearly does not stop at this first
step: some power is delegated from the parliament to the government, the
government itself delegates the implementation of specific policies to the
ministers, ministries themselves have their own bureaucracy, and so forth.
At first sight, IRAs seem nothing more than another link in the same chain,
ultimately connected to the voters. But their peculiar condition, their inde-
pendence, supposedly insulates them from political control, and thus from
the voters’ control.
Delegation of powers entails some accountability for the agent towards
the principal (Bergman et al. 2000: 257). Delegation is not absolute and
irrevocable, but rather conditional to the task that the principal commits to
the agent. Delegation has an aim, and if the aim is not fulfilled, the principal
has the right to rescind the contract. Common examples of accountability
mechanisms are the elections, in which the citizens can reward or punish
political parties for how they performed. Another is the vote of no confi-
dence, by which a parliament dismisses an executive that does not act in
accordance with its preferences. By the same token, as in a hierarchical re-
lationship, the minister can remove a bureaucrat from an office, and every
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principal in general can assign a task to another agent, if this does not satisfy
her demand.
How do IRAs fit this model? Any delegation contract may have clauses
that make it not automatic for the principal to revert the relationship, once
it has been established. An employer can rarely directly fire an employee:
as institutions, contracts are «sticky» and usually do not allow for abrupt
changes. Indeed, they are built precisely in order to secure relationships
and make them more stable. However, this is seldom the case when the gov-
ernment is concerned. Ministers can be changed whenever the parliament
wants, and in cases in which the agent cannot be changed, as in ministerial
bureaucracy, still the control and the decision about what to do is firmly in
the hands of the political principal.18
Independent IRAs seem to lack both the possibility for the principal to
easily change the «agent» and the possibility to determine the policy that
the agent carries out. Why does this happen? To state plainly: legislators,
to whom a considerable power is delegated by the voters, voluntarily take
some of this power away from themselves.
As Moe (1990: 221) has persuasively argued, «[p]olitics is fundamen-
tally about the exercise of public authority and the struggle to gain control
over it». As in the field of economics, the assumption is that the actors aim
at maximising their income, we can assume that in politics actors want to
maximise their power, simply because power is the means by which they
can obtain every other desired outcome.19 This assumption, obviously, does
not exclude delegation of powers, but helps us understand that delegation
is reasonable only when the net benefit outweighs the net costs: a «gross»
loss of power (like any delegation is) is a «net» gain only under certain cir-
cumstances. For instance, it is a net gain if the time saved by delegating
is employed in other activities that bring other goals about. Similarly, the
18 In the language of Principal-Agent modelling, the principal can always redesign the
contract.
19 This assumption is analogous to that enunciated for the first time by Mayhew (1974) as
regards the re-election goal. In Mayhew’s theoretical framework, congressmen aim, above
all, at being re-elected, because the pursuing of every other goal is subject to the fact of
staying in power.
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advantage of delegation can consist in a better informed decision producing
an outcome that the principal would not have achieved with her knowledge
alone.
When the delegation of powers, the «transfer of political property rights»
(Majone 2001: 114), is so wide as in the case of some IRAs, the question
arises whether the final outcome is a net gain or a net loss for the legislators,
and consequently for the voters. Higher levels of delegation should be corre-
lated with better agency performance. If there were no correlation between
independence and performance, there would be a lack of any evidence that
independence serves any purpose. To mitigate this conclusion, one might
argue that their function is mainly symbolic, that competition agencies af-
fect the «state of the world» by just being there, like surveillance cameras
that deter thieves from stealing. In this case, the «net impact» of delegation
to IRAs should be measured by testing that, ceteris paribus, countries with
a more independent competition authority are able to attract more invest-
ments.
In summation, the second research question consists in testing whether,
in the case of antitrust agencies, independence brings an added value in how
the state regulates the economy. If this were not the case, we should con-
clude that the great transformation that has taken place in many countries
has given an ineffective answer to the objective needs that the countries
faced. The most benevolent conclusion would then be that independent
agencies have not brought the added value that we hoped they would have
been able to produce. The concept of «performance» is certainly very diffi-
cult both to define and to measure. Answering the second research question
will require to choose a definition that is restricted enough to be a meaning-
ful indicator of performance, and broad enough to be applied to the activity
of all the competition authorities included in this analysis.
1.5 Conclusions and summary of the book
In this introductory chapter, I have illustrated the rationale that guides the
choice on the subject of this dissertation. I have explained why competition
Guidi, Mattia (2012), Explaining and Assessing Independence: National competition authorities in the EU member states 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/46429
20 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
regulation is a fundamental policy for every democracy, and why it cannot
be analysed or understood without comprehending the functioning of the
bodies that are entitled to enforce it. I have then discussed why the case
of national competition authorities in the EU member states is particularly
thought-provoking, and why its analysis can yield especially interesting re-
sults. Finally, I have stated the two research questions to which I aim to
answer in this work.
Far from being the mere application of laissez-faire principles, antitrust
enforcement is rather a constant «taming» of capitalism. Its main objective is
to ensure that both suppliers and consumers are not harmed by agreements
between firms that restrict access to the market and keep prices inefficiently
high. Whilst in the US this branch of legislation has arisen between the
end of the Nineteenth and the beginning of the Twentieth century, in the
European countries it has developed mainly under the pressure of the Eu-
ropean Commission, as a prerequisite for the creation of a common market
between the EU member states. Between the 1980’s and the 1990’s, this
supra-national pressure was combined with a worldwide wave of liberalisa-
tion. This overall change, however, has not brought about a simple with-
drawal from the control of the economy by the state, but rather the creation
of new rules and new public bodies entitled to enforce them: competition
authorities.
Competition authorities have been established in a large number of coun-
tries, and they have been delegated the power to investigate and sanction vi-
olations of competition law. From a political science perspective, their most
interesting characteristic is their (supposed) independence from the poli-
tics. Like many other Independent Regulatory Agencies created during the
same period, competition authorities have been established with a particular
stress on their decisional autonomy. The rationale behind regulatory inde-
pendence is that the legitimate interests that parliaments and governments
represent must not influence the decisions that IRAs take. Hence, particu-
lar emphasis is put on the length of the appointment of their members, the
difficulty (or impossibility) in dismissing them, the expertise requirements,
and other similar provisions.
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However, these features are not the same for every competition author-
ity: some of them are more, and some less independent. This is somehow
puzzling, when policy makers and experts claim that independence stems
from the tasks that these public bodies carry out. To solve this puzzle,
national competition authorities in the EU member states represent a very
suitable subject. In fact, one could claim that differences in the degree of
independence of different authorities are due to differences in their tasks
or functions. But this claim cannot hold in the EU, where all the national
competition authorities are bound to apply the same antitrust law (following
EC Council Regulation 1/2003). If differences exist between these agencies,
they must be due to institutional, political or economic reasons related to
the countries in which they are settled.
Therefore, there is, first of all, an empirical puzzle that has to be solved:
are all the reasons behind the degree of independence always enunciated
in the political arena? The mismatch between the official public discourse
and what we empirically observe calls for an appropriate explanation. But
once I will have unveiled the real motivations that lead the countries to give
(or not to give) independence to competition authorities, another question
will remain yet unanswered, a question which has actually never been ex-
pressly addressed thus far: does independence make a difference? All in all,
scholars and politicians have until now taken for granted that independence
serves some purposes. In the literature, we find good reasons to believe
that autonomous regulators will improve the credibility of the countries in
which they operate, and that they will be stricter in enforcing rules than if
they were under the direct control of the government and of the parliament.
Provided that this improvement can be measured by empirical indicators, I
will attempt to find confirmation for this commonly accepted albeit conjec-
tural claim.
To summarise, the research questions I wish to answer, using the empir-
ical analysis which will be presented in this dissertation, are:
1. What explains the differences in the degree of independence of national
competition authorities in the EU member states?
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2. Does independence bring an improvement in how these agencies perform
their tasks?
The book will be structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I will present an
overview of the relevant literature in the field of delegation and regula-
tory independence, aiming at tracing theoretical accounts and hypothesis
that can be employed in order to answer both the research questions. In
Chapter 3, I will describe the empirical analysis that I have carried out to
explain the differences in the varying degree of independence of the na-
tional competition authorities in the EU member states. I will explicate how
I measure independence, how I operationalise the hypotheses derived from
my theoretical framework, and will present the outcome of the statistical
analysis performed. In Chapter 4, I will show the result of a series of in-
terviews with experts, members of the parliament and of the government,
as well as members of the competition authorities, that I have conducted
in France and Italy in 2010. Chapter 5 will be devoted to answering the
second research question: I will present the hypotheses derived from the lit-
erature and from my own theoretical framework, and I will test a statistical
model, showing the results of the analysis. In Chapter 6, I will draw general
conclusions about the results of this empirical analysis and I will outline the
possible future development of this research.
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Delegation, regulation, and the
independence of regulators
2.1 Introduction
The concept of delegation of powers is intrinsically tied to the functioning
of modern democracies. As Strøm (2000) points out, modern democracies
are structured as «chains of delegation»: voters delegate to representatives,
representatives delegate to the government, the government then delegates
to bureaucracy. Although substantial differences exist between parliamen-
tary and presidential systems (Strøm 2000: 269), delegation appears as a
distinctive and unavoidable characteristic of both.
Relationships of delegation – first in economics, then in political science
– have been traditionally interpreted and studied via the Principal-Agent
(P-A) model, an approach that, besides being simple and intuitive, can be
adapted to a very broad range of situations. And indeed, P-A model is ca-
pable to grasp most delegation relationships: all those in which the main
problem for the principal is to control and supervise how the agent acts,
and to avoid that she shirks; all those in which the principal finds herself
in the potentially troublesome state of being responsible for something over
which she does not have full control. Relations between an employer and
her workers, or between a minister and bureaucrats, they all fall into this
23
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category. In all of them the main concern of the principal is to make the
agent work in accordance with her preferences.
Unfortunately, in the study of IRAs such a model reveals its weak points:
since politicians treat these agencies as independent, (at least) one of their
aims is to appear somewhat distant from them, or not to be held responsi-
ble for the decisions that they take. And if there is no clear «responsibility
chain», then it becomes difficult to treat the relationship between political
principals and IRAs as P-A relationships. On the other hand, others could
claim that controlling the agent might still be the main concern for the prin-
cipal, and the stress on independence might be nothing but a symbolic state-
ment.
Independence is usually regarded as a positive characteristic for IRAs
(see Section 1.4): they are supposed to judge facts impartially, like tri-
bunals; they are supposed to show that the government will not use its
power to favour «national champions» or state-owned firms. However, it is
quite straightforward that these are not the only motivations that politicians
have in mind when they decide on the amount of independence to be given
to IRAs, and this is evident precisely in the case of competition authorities in
the EU member states. Indeed, as has been said, all these regulators apply
the same law: if their independence were decided only for reasons related
to their tasks, they should all be very similar in this respect. However, since
we do observe relevant differences, we must look for other explanations,
which are not exclusively related to principles of fairness, impartiality and
economic efficiency. The question is very intricate, and only a rigorous and
accurate empirical analysis can help solve this puzzle.
In my opinion, a literature review on independent authorities must in-
vestigate this topic trying to include any contribution that clarifies the ques-
tion of delegation to IRAs – although this literature undoubtedly suffers
from a lack of systematisation and coherence. It can be easily noted that
the different theories which will be reviewed in this part of the dissertation
often posit completely different assumptions as regards the actors involved
in the decision-making process, their preferences, and the most likely out-
come of delegation. For instance, the classic theory of «congressional dom-
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inance» (see Section 2.3.1) assumes that the legislature always wants to
control any policy as much as possible, so that delegation would take place
only when it makes control more efficient; other theories that stress the
importance of credibility and credible commitments postulate that, on the
contrary, in some cases politicians gain from giving up control over admin-
istrative agencies; other approaches treat delegation of power as the con-
sequence of institutional features, making it almost independent from the
preferences of the politics. Also with respect to the empirical tests (see Sec-
tion 3.1), some authors prefer to examine only theories that share the same
assumptions, disregarding parts of the literature that do not match, whilst
others combine different approaches, but often without making clear what
distinguishes them from each other.
For this chapter, I will review all the theoretical contributions which
might offer useful insights for answering the questions put forward in the
introduction. To do so, I will necessarily run into conflicting approaches.
Nevertheless, I believe that, as long as the differences will be clearly pointed
out, such a review will help build a coherent albeit comprehensive theoreti-
cal framework, based on the assumption of bounded rationality.
The chapter is organised as follows: first, I will present the so-called
«economic theory of regulation»; then, I will review various insights sharing
the P-A model as common approach; after that, I will introduce explanations
that approach the topic by considering delegation (also) a way to insulate
some policies from further changes or from undesired interferences; then,
I will present the theory, put forward by Majone, that delegation to IRAs,
being characterised by the need of the principal for credibility, is completely
different from any other kind of delegation; finally, I will present other con-
tributions that account for regulatory independence focusing on the institu-
tional set up of the countries, and in particular on the role of veto players.
2.2 The economic theory of regulation
As this chapter seeks to review explanations of delegation, one may question
whether it makes sense to start from a group of contributions that do not
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specifically address the issue of delegation, but rather that of regulation. As
a matter of fact, although they indicate clearly different concepts, the two
terms are closely linked. The debate over administrative agencies was born
in the US together with the discussion about the tasks of these agencies.
Before scholars began to treat delegation as a process that deserved to be
studied per se, the first analyses did not distinguish the administrative status
of the agencies from the reasons for which they were established. Whilst
the first studies on regulation were mainly historical and case-centred (see
e.g. Fainsod and Gordon 1941; Kolko 1965; Purcell 1967) the Seventies
brought more systematic contributions, specifically addressing the question
of why regulation occurs and what purposes it serves. Following Mitnick
(1980: 79), we can make a distinction between «Public interest» and «Pri-
vate interest» theories of regulation. The first views regulation as a means
for achieving some general purposes, assuming that at least some prefer-
ences of the politicians are in a «genuine and terminal» way favourable for
the public interest (Mitnick 1980: 91). In this framework, regulation is gen-
erally seen as the output of a cost-benefit assessment (Wilson 1974) or as
an incentive to provide «certain services in quantities and at prices that a
free market would not offer» (Posner 1971: 41). «Private interest» theories,
instead, share an actor-centred approach which treats both public and pri-
vate actors as utility-maximisers. These theories have brought the concepts
and tools of economics into political science, and for this reason they can
generally be labelled as «economic» theories of regulation.
The first of these was illustrated in an article by George Stigler, published
in 1971 with the title «The Theory of Economic Regulation». In this article
the author argues, with the support of empirical data, that economic regula-
tion is often promoted by the actors operating in a specific market with the
purpose of imposing restrictions on competitors, especially new operators
trying to enter that market. Stigler (1971: 8) shows, for example, that the
weight limits imposed on trucks in different states of the Union were pos-
itively correlated with the number of trucks owned by farmers (measuring
the strength of this group of interest) and with the length of average railroad
haul (measuring the competitiveness of the railroads against the trucks, and
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so the lack of interest in keeping the limit low). The author also points out
that the introduction of administrative requirements for exerting a certain
profession was positively correlated with the presence of many competitors
working in a specific field, again arguing the importance of strong and deter-
mined interest groups in promoting limitations on free market. The author
argues that these benefits, enjoyed by some economic actors, «gratify» the
regulator in the form of financial support for re-election.
Stigler’s «capture» theory has been extended and refined by other schol-
ars, in particular Sam Peltzman and Gary Backer. The former (1976) points
to the fact that legislators do not always pass regulation that favours and
protects big business groups, in this way developing the argument that reg-
ulation (intended as protectionist regulation) does not only have benefits
but also costs for whoever passes it. In Peltzman’s view, policies that im-
pose relevant losses on consumers/voters are perceived by them as implicit
taxes; hence, they represent a net cost for the politician. Becker’s (1983)
contribution refines and extends this approach by introducing the concept
of «deadweight losses», i.e. all the costs that legislators do not re-capture in
other forms and that they tend to minimise for this reason. Becker’s inter-
est is mainly focused on competition among pressure groups rather than on
regulation itself, but his findings are noteworthy as they shed more light on
the complex relation between legislators, electors and economic groups.1
Although it might not seem so, these contributions are particularly stim-
ulating for the subject of this dissertation. All these authors have pointed
out the risk that highly organised economic groups may benefit from sectoral
regulation, extracting rent from barriers to entry and other privileges, and
paying back the regulator with various benefits. Such a behaviour is known
in the literature as regulatory capture. One may note that these authors have
not made distinctions between politicians and regulators, implicitly arguing
that the latter do not enjoy real independence from the political principals.
Therefore, there would seem to be no point in trying to test a theory which
explicitly neglects IRAs on IRAs. Nevertheless, theories are sometimes more
1 For an overview of the economic theory of regulation and its main implications, see
Peltzman et al. 1989.
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far-reaching than their creators think they are. The concept of regulatory
capture remains useful even if we assume that regulation is carried out by
agencies which enjoy a certain degree of discretion. In the case of IRAs, the
«capture game» would have three players (legislators, firms, regulators) in-
stead of two (legislators and firms). Rather than economical support for re-
election, capture could consist of other forms of compensation, such as the
«revolving doors» phenomenon: regulators who gratified regulatees during
their office could be rewarded and hired by companies when their appoint-
ment expires.
The question that arises in such a framework is that of the preferences of
the actors and the risks for the effectiveness of the regulatory activity. If reg-
ulators can be captured, politicians might prefer not to give them too much
independence, because this could enhance the possibility that regulators be-
come responsive only towards the regulatees. This possibility is discussed
and analysed by Laffont and Tirole (1991). Assuming that that the legislator
(the parliament) is a sort of benevolent dictator aiming at maximising the
public welfare, and that the inefficient regulation is produced by the agent’s
(the regulator’s) shirking, the authors design a system by which the agent
has an (economic) incentive not to take full advantage of her informational
asymmetry. A more realistic approach would probably lead us to assume
that the legislators themselves can be captured; the degree of autonomy
that they confer on the IRAs, in this case, might indicate how much they
aim to influence the regulatory output.
2.3 The positive theory of delegation and the Principal-
Agent model
The P-A model was formulated in the early Seventies in economics (see Ross
1973) and rapidly came to be a powerful tool for political science analysis,
especially in the study of bureaucratic control and the role of IRAs (see
e.g. Mitnick 1974; Goldberg 1976). Generally speaking, we can employ
a P-A model every time that there are two parts and «one, designated as
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the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, des-
ignated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems» (Ross
1973: 134). Following Lupia and McCubbins (2000), we can indicate three
main assumptions of every P-A model:
1. there may be information asymmetry between the agent and the prin-
cipal; in particular, the agent is usually assumed to be better informed
than the principal;
2. the principal and the agent may have divergent preferences;
3. the principal is able to design a contract that minimises the possibil-
ity for the agent to diverge from the principal’s preferences (so-called
agency losses).
With respect to information asymmetry, it is quite straightforward that the
agent has much more chances to be better informed on what he or she does
and on what the «state of the world» is. On the one hand, the agent has the
advantage of dealing with «first-hand» information; on the other, she has
more time to collect and analyse it, whilst the principal must mainly rely on
what others (included the agent) let her know.
Considering an over-simplified model of delegation (see Bendor et al.
2001: 242), policy outcomes are yielded by the policy which is chosen plus
a random shock:
X = P + ε
A P-A model assumes that only the agent is capable of observing the
random shock and of choosing the outcome that he or she prefers, whilst
the principal only observes the final result. Hence, delegation is convenient
for the principal every time that this helps her obtain a result which she
would not pursue otherwise, because of her lack of information. More in
general, this is one of the core reasons for the existence of bureaucracy:
politicians have preferences for outcomes but do not know what technical
decisions must be taken; they are «unsure about the substantive details of
their most desired policy» (McCubbins et al. 1987: 261).
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As regards divergent preferences, it must be noted that if principal and
agent had the same preferences, there would be no agency losses, since the
agent would choose the principal’s ideal point, and information asymmetry
would not cause inefficiencies. In as much, the second assumption approx-
imates the reality most accurately. Assuming an exclusively utility-seeking
agent, he or she will be interested only in his or her income – hence the risk
of shirking and collusion, and the tendency to maximise the budget (see
Niskanen 1971; 1973) – and by definition will not have any substantive in-
terest in pursuing the principal’s goal. But even hypothesising an agent who
is also policy-seeking, this agent would be very likely to select objectives and
priorities differently from the principal.
Finally, for what concerns the possibility of offering a contract which
minimises agency losses, this assumption follows from the acknowledge-
ment that such a relationship implies a hierarchical control over the agent
by the principal. Hierarchy does not imply mere supervision, but also the
possibility to submit to the agent a scheme of incentives and disincentives
related to his or her activity. If an agent does not have any incentive to com-
ply with the principal’s preferences, he or she will be very likely to shirk.
But if the agent is offered a contract according to which he or she obtains
more when reducing the principal’s losses, the agent will tend towards the
principal’s ideal point, and both the parts will be better off.
An interesting part of the literature on delegation (which will not be
treated in detail because of its mainly theoretical and normative aim) tackles
this question by formulating abstract models of delegation that show how
agency losses such as collusion and shirking can be foreseen and minimised
by the principal. For every potential loss there is always a contract that
produces a second-best solution (see e.g. Tirole 1986; Aghion and Tirole
1997; Laffont 2000; Laffont and Martimort 2002).
In general, in every P-A model there is a trade-off between the aspects
identified by these assumptions: information asymmetry is a drawback, but
it reflects the advantage of being able to obtain a certain result without
need for caring about the practical implementation of a policy; divergent
preferences can be minimised and controlled by the choice of the agent and
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of the contract which is offered to him or her. As Bendor et al. clearly put
it, the principal’s problem can be summed up with this question: «Is the
gain produced by delegating the decision to a more informed party worth
the loss produced by having someone with different preferences make the
choice?» (Bendor et al. 2001: 242).
2.3.1 Bureaucratic or congressional dominance?
As said, departing from the P-A model, a series of influential studies de-
veloped in the US between the Seventies and the Eighties. The label that
is usually assigned to these contributions is known as «congressional dom-
inance». All the scholars who adhered to this paradigm departed from a
rejection of the popular and common-sense theory that Congress is actually
unable to control the bureaucracy. The view they opposed was nothing but
the logical continuation of Weber’s reasoning about the tendency of bureau-
cracy to become more and more specialised and independent, and less and
less accountable towards the politics.
Weber (1978 [1922]: 957) notes that the main characteristic of modern
bureaucracy is that it is stable, and it uses standard procedures in order
to produce policy output and store information. Although the bureaucrat’s
power derives from an initial delegation (so that the bureaucrat formally
depends on the appointment of the principal), such delegation is in practice
very difficult to revert:
«When the principle of jurisdictional “competency” is fully carried
through, hierarchical subordination − at least in public office − does
not mean that the “higher” authority is authorized to simply take over
the business of the “lower”. Indeed, the opposite is the rule; once an
office has been set up, a new incumbent will always be appointed if a
vacancy occurs».
All in all, Weber’s claim is that control over bureaucracy is practically im-
possible:
«The power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always
great, under certain conditions overtowering. The political “master”
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always finds himself, vis-à-vis the trained official, in the position of a
dilettante facing the expert. This holds whether the “master”, whom
the bureaucracy serves, is the “people” equipped with the weapons of
legislative initiative, referendum, and the right to remove officials; or
a parliament elected on a more aristocratic or more democratic basis
and equipped with the right or the de facto power to vote a lack of
confidence [...]» (1978 [1922]: 991).
Even though Weber does not use the terminology of modern political sci-
ence, the notion of informational asymmetry is already present in his anal-
ysis. Such asymmetry derives from the amount of information that the bu-
reaucracy collects and stores, and it becomes particularly severe in demo-
cratic systems, where the political principals are constantly being replaced
by voters, whilst the bureaucrats remain stable in their office. A similar con-
cern is also expressed by Dahl (1967: 23), according to whom «in pluralistic
democracies the tendency is to find ways by which [...] policies can be made
by smaller groups of like-minded people who enjoy a high degree of legal
independence».2
These intuitions were extensively developed in the US during the Sev-
enties (Lowi 1969; Niskanen 1971, 1973; Niskanen 1975; Wilson 1975),
as they appeared to be supported by strong evidence. Indeed, oversight
hearings or congressional investigations seldom occurred, the appointment
of the heads of the agencies was carried out with scarce interest, and the
Congress, even at the committee level, seemed to pay little attention to
the consequences of the choices taken by the agencies (see Weingast and
Moran 1983: 766-770). Moreover, since bureaus, agencies and any sort of
public offices had both grown (in number and size) and seen their funds
regularly increase, it seemed reasonable to conclude that this had happened
because bureaucrats had succeeded in gaining power and discretion vis-à-vis
the Congress and in maximising their budget.
Accordingly, the starting point of Niskanen’s pioneer research is that bu-
reaucrats are primarily interested in maximising the budget that the political
authority sets for them. As the author himself points out (1971: 36):
2 Emphasis mine.
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«Most of the literature on bureaucracy [...] has represented the
bureaucrat either as an automaton or as maximizing some concept of
general welfare, the latter usually considered to be identical with the
objectives of the state. For a positive theory of bureaucracy, though,
the beginning of wisdom is the recognition that bureaucrats are people
who are, at least, not entirely motivated by the general welfare or the
interest of the state».
The consequence of this assumption is that, according to Niskanen, bureau-
crats aim at maximising their budget (1971: 38):
«[a]mong the several variables that may enter the bureaucrat’s util-
ity function are the following: salary, perquisites of the office, public
reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau [...]. All of these
variables [...] are a positive monotonic function of the total budget of
the bureau during the bureaucrat’s tenure in office».
In sum, the combination of the bureaucrats’ tendency to want to maximise
their budget and the Congress’ difficulty to control them led many scholars
to conclude that bureaucratic control was so difficult to attain that, at some
point, for the legislature it was not even worth trying to do so.
Conversely, what congressional dominance theorists (cf. Fiorina and Noll
1978; Weingast and Moran 1983; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Fiorina
1986; McCubbins et al. 1987; North and Weingast 1989; Calvert et al. 1989;
Ferejohn and Shipan 1990) claim is that Congress acts as a principal with
agencies, setting up a system of incentives that leads agencies to act in ac-
cordance with the legislators’ preferences. If congressmen do not often ac-
tively intervene, the reason lies in the fact that they do not need to do that:
agencies already follow the right track, and a direct intervention becomes
necessary only when big deviations take place (Weingast and Moran 1983;
McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).
This system of incentives, as Weingast and Moran (1983: 769) point
out, is made of three main tools. The first is budget allocation: every year,
many agencies compete to get funds for their activity, and for the legislators
it is quite easy to «punish» those which did not comply with their prefer-
ences by assigning them less money than they need or expect. The second
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instrument that politicians can employ is passing legislation that restricts or
hinders an agency’s activity, as well as new norms that impede some project
in which the agency has a strong interest. The third tool, perhaps the most
powerful, is the faculty to appoint the head and the other members (if any)
of the agency: the parliament will tend to appoint an agent whose prefer-
ences are as close as possible to its own. Furthermore, if reappointment is
possible, an agent who wants to be designated again will not have any in-
centive in openly opposing the principal. The different implications of the
congressional dominance approach are discussed in the following sections.
2.3.2 Police patrols, fire alarms and blame shifting
A «classical» article explaining delegation as a product of a deliberate choice
of the legislators is McCubbins and Schwartz’s (1984) «Police Patrols versus
Fire Alarms». Here the authors argue that what has been regarded for a long
time as a lack of interest or ability, is actually a very refined oversight tactic.
According to McCubbins and Schwartz, there are two kinds of oversight,
which they name as «police patrol» and «fire alarm». The first – «police pa-
trol» oversight – consists of those activities in which «Congress examines a
sample of executive agency activities, with the aim of detecting and remedy-
ing any violations of legislative goals and, by its surveillance, discouraging
such violations», and it is direct, active and characterised by a high level
of centralisation. «Fire Alarm» oversight, instead, occurs when «Congress
establishes a system of rules, procedures, and informal practises that enable
individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine administrative
decisions (sometimes in prospect), to charge executive agencies with vio-
lating congressional goals, and to seek remedies from agencies, courts, and
Congress itself» (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984: 166).
The authors claim that scholars often make the mistake of considering
only the first kind as real oversight, because in that case there appears to
be some «activity». On the contrary, they not only show that «fire alarms»
are by any means a supervision over the implementation of legislation, but
also that they can be more effective than police patrols. The drawbacks of
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«police patrol» oversight, according to the authors, consist in the fact that
congressmen (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984: 168)
«[...] inevitably spend time examining a great many executive-
branch actions that do not violate legislative goals or harm any po-
tential supporters, at least not enough to occasion complaints. They
might also spend time detecting and remedying arguable violations
that nonetheless harm no potential supporters. For this they receive
scant credit from their potential supporters».
Instead, by a more decentralised oversight, legislators set rules in such a way
that enables them to receive signals and intervene only when their direct
action is needed. A police-patrol procedure tends to miss many complaints
that may arise but would not find a way to reach the people to whom they
are addressed. According to the authors, another major advantage of the
second procedure is that it gives the Congress the opportunity to «spell out
its goals more clearly» (1984: 172), remedying the unavoidable generality
of legislation. As legislative goals are continuously reshaped and redefined,
«fire alarms» permit the legislative to receive information on new instances,
adjustments or proposals of change. Moreover, fire-alarm oversight can be
also employed in order to protect constituencies that are very important for
congressmen, but usually poorly organised.
McCubbins and Schwartz conclude arguing that (1984: 174-175):
«Although Congress may, to some extent, have allowed the bureau-
cracy to make law, it may also have devised a reasonably effective and
noncostly way to articulate and promulgate its own legislative goals −
a way that depends on the fire-alarm oversight system. It is convenient
for Congress to adopt broad legislative mandates and give substantial
rule-making authority to the bureaucracy. The problem with doing
so, of course, is that the bureaucracy might not pursue Congress’s
goals. But citizens and interest groups can be counted on to sound
an alarm in most cases in which the bureaucracy has arguably violated
Congress’s goals. Then Congress can intervene to rectify the violation.
Congress has not necessarily relinquished legislative responsibility to
anyone else. It has just found a more efficient way to legislate».
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Another potential advantage deriving from the setting up of a system of
decentralised agencies is constituted in the possibility for the legislator «to
take as much credit as possible for the net benefits enjoyed by his potential
supporters» and «to avoid as much blame as possible for the net costs borne
by his potential supporters» (1984: 167). Such an attitude has been labelled
in the literature as «blame shifting». The idea is that politicians try to avoid
responsibility for unpleasant consequences of their choices or for policies
which they deem necessary but whose political costs they are not willing
to sustain. This view is indeed popular (Fiorina 1982; Schoenbrod 1993;
Goodman 1998; Hood and Rothstein 2001) and appealing, because it tickles
our imagination by seeming to offer a scientific background for something
that we often ponder.
However, blame-shifting has always been treated as an assumption rather
than as a hypothesis worth testing. This is to be observed even in the
most famous and most cited article on blame-shifting, the first in which
the concept is employed in a model of explanation of the behaviour of the
US Congress (Fiorina 1982). In this article, Fiorina criticises the ways in
which both historians and economists had dealt with regulation. Historians,
he says, aiming at naming the people and the interest groups which have
pushed for regulation in a certain moment, tend to analyse documents, let-
ters or speeches, not being always able to place them in a coherent scheme
of preferences. On the other hand, economists, Fiorina says, focus on ex-
post acknowledgement of which groups have benefited from a certain reg-
ulation framework (see e.g. Stigler 1971). In the author’s view, one must
actually pay attention to the calculation made by legislators when passing a
law. This is why, in his model of choice between legislative or administrative
control (i.e. between «command and control» enforcement or delegation
to administrative agencies), Fiorina first assesses what value congressmen
maximise when legislating.
From both the «public choice» set of assumptions and the particular con-
figuration of the American electoral system (he acknowledges the contribu-
tion of Mayhew 1974), Fiorina maintains that every member of the Congress
calculates, for every regulatory decision, if the net costs borne by her elec-
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toral district outweigh the net benefits or vice versa. If costs outweigh ben-
efits, then the legislator will go for administrative enforcement, i.e. for the
creation of an agency. If the balance is opposite, «command and control»
enforcement will be preferred because it will give the legislator the opportu-
nity to claim direct responsibility for the advantage enjoyed by the electoral
district (1982: 41).
A positive aspect of Fiorina’s model lies in its clarity and in the fact that
it provides an explanation that is simple but adaptable to many policy ar-
eas. On the other hand, it also presents some lacks of specificity. For in-
stance, it considers only the benefits for the voters of a district, disregarding
the importance of lobbyists, especially in a system like the American one.
Moreover, it also makes the strong assumption that the electorate behaves
as a unified actor in each district and that it is not organised into pressure
groups. Nonetheless, these critiques could certainly be faced by recognising
that there is always a trade-off between denotation and connotation, and
that Fiorina clearly wanted to conceive a very general model.
For what concerns the testability of the model, however, some problems
may arise. For example, Fiorina refers to «costs» and «benefits» in general,
but these categories can include various types of decisions: in the most
straightforward conception, such a definition makes us think of redistribu-
tive policies, where some districts give more money than they receive. But
is this the only case in which delegation occurs? It does not seem to be
so. First, delegation takes place in many policy fields where there is no re-
distribution. Second, even admitting that almost every policy entails some
redistribution, this does not necessarily comes to be as a from-district-to-
district one. Third, what could be said of countries where districts do not
exist? May not the blame shifting hypothesis apply to them as well?
Such an approach could be framed in a more general fashion by sim-
ply referring to constituencies instead of districts. Politicians might want to
shift the blame for policies which are unpopular in the eyes of their voters,
and claim credit when their constituencies (or one of them) benefit from a
policy that they have carried out. From this perspective, the spreading of
IRAs could signal an increase of unpopular choices being made by the gov-
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ernments. Another way of formulating the blame shifting hypothesis could
be that of spelling it out as a trade-off between potential costs and poten-
tial benefits: the higher the cost/benefit ratio is, the more delegation will
likely be able to take place. To rephrase more simply, politicians might want
to shift blame in policy fields where if things go well response is low, and
if things go bad negative response is highly probable. Unfortunately, these
attempts to re-define the blame shifting theory suit only for explaining dif-
ferences between policies or sectors, and they fail to identify a distinction
between authorities of the same sector but in different countries – that is
exactly the case of the present analysis. For the purpose of this dissertation,
the blame shifting theory will be tested by identifying «losers» and «win-
ners» from a competition policy perspective. Depending on the countries,
we should have more independent competition authorities where the losers
from competition policy are more numerous.
2.3.3 Uncertainty and «deck-stacking»
Another popular theory about delegation to regulatory agencies has been
devised by McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987), and has become famous
because of the term «deck-stacking», coined by the authors to identify a way
in which legislators employ authorities. To formulate their theory, the au-
thors depart from the assumptions of uncertainty and information asymme-
try. The need for creating agencies arises from the difficulty that politicians
have in translating their constituencies’ requests into substantive policies.
As has been noted in Section 2.3, legislators may know the results that they
want, but they may not be able to determine which measures are necessary
for pursuing them. Bureaucracy in general, and agencies in particular (as
they are supposed to be highly specialised in their policy field), can serve the
purpose of producing these results, but they must be controlled, in order for
them not to deviate from the objective of their principal(s). The authors
maintain that an agency, if not properly supervised, might tend to shirk its
tasks. In their words (1987: 244):
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«Procedural requirements affect the institutional environment in
which agencies make decisions and thereby limit an agency’s range of
feasible policy actions. In recognition of this, elected officials can de-
sign procedures to solve two prototypical problems of political control.
First, procedures can be used to mitigate informational disadvantages
faced by politicians in dealing with agencies. Second, procedures can
be used to enfranchise important constituents in agency decisionmak-
ing processes, thereby assuring that agencies are responsive to their
interests. [...] By controlling processes, political leaders assign rela-
tive degrees of importance to the constituents whose interests are at
stake in an administrative proceeding and thereby channel an agency’s
decisions toward the most substantive outcomes that are most favored
by those who are intended to be benefited by the policy. Thus, polit-
ical leaders can be responsive to their constituents without knowing
or needing to know, the details of the policy outcomes that these con-
stituents want».
On the track of McCubbins and Schwartz’s (1984) theory about «fire alarms»
oversight, the authors argue that the Congress can use many legislative and
administrative instruments to ensure that the agency will comply with its
duties. These instruments include (McCubbins et al. 1987: 255-264):
• incentives to gain relevant political information; agencies, before taking
decisions or enacting certain measures, must announce them to the
Congress, which becomes then capable to intervene or make propos-
als;
• the requirement that the procedures must be public, so that also the
constituencies can check them and ensure some responsiveness by the
agencies;
• evidentiary standards; agencies must present evidence in support of
their decisions;
• deck-stacking; legislators, via administrative law, can facilitate some
constituencies in accessing the agency, by requiring it to hear them in
some circumstances, or by designing procedures that make it difficult
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for some groups to influence the process, etc.; with these tools, the
coalition that created the agency for a specific purpose is sure that it
will not be able to seek the favour of another set of interest groups or
that, if the «balance of power» will change, the new equilibrium will
have to be defined taking into account the initial mandate;
• decentralised enforcement by the courts; imposing that every decision
of the agency can be subjected to judicial review is another way to
make sure that no major deviations will take place without a different
political input.
As can be noted, like all the other «congressional dominance» theories, this
one assumes that the legislature is capable of controlling IRAs and reducing
agency losses. A similar argument is also developed by Fiorina (1986), who
distinguishes between courts, which are «faithful» enforcers of the law, and
agencies, which are «biased» enforcers, and are meant to ensure that the
result of a political equilibrium is maintained. Nonetheless, McCubbins et al.
add one more point, by hypothesising that control may somewhat last even
when a coalition falls. Although this theoretical argument does not lead to
any hypothesis about the degree of independence (or discretion) that the
agency is given, it is very helpful in listing the checks that politicians can
impose on the authority.
2.3.4 The ally principle and the trade-off between expertise and
control
A corollary of the P-A model is the so-called «ally principle». If the principal
faces the above mentioned problems of information asymmetry and possi-
bility that the agent have divergent preferences, one of the tools that he or
she can employ in order to reduce her losses is the appointment of a person
whose preferences are as close as possible to hers.
Considering a principal and a set of possible agents a having single-
peaked preferences over outcomes in a one-dimensional space, the principal
will choose the agent whose ideal point (xa) is the closest to hers (xp),
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minimising the following function:
−(xp − xa)2
Obviously, this representation of the model is over-simplified, because
here the only decision that the principal can take is whether to delegate or
not. If the principal delegates, then he or she acquires for sure the ideal
point of the agent, who observes the random shock (ε) and chooses a policy
that leads to that outcome. If the principal does not delegate, and passes
the policy, the outcome (given ε) will not be exactly what he or she desires.
In real world decisions, two assumptions of this stylised model do not
hold: first, the preferences of the agent are not exogenously formed, but part
of the decision to delegate; second, the principal never delegates entirely,
but rather to a certain extent. As regards the first distinction, it is crucial
to discriminate between models in which the ultimate decision is taken by
the legislators (and the behaviour of the agent is mainly a consequence of
this decision) and models which are based on a game-theoretic approach
(in which the preference are exogenous to the game and the equilibrium
is yielded by how much information the agent is forced to reveal). The
«deck-stacking» theory that I have just reviewed (and all the congressional
dominance theories in general) explicitly embraces the first «vision», whilst
a more orthodox P-A approach would better fit the second.
With regard to the other distinction – what is the optimal extent to which
to delegate, if any – it is worth analysing the contribution of Bawn (1995).
Most authors that we have seen until now model the discretion conferred
on the agent and the problem of control as if they were analytically distinct:
they consider the expertise of the agent and the better information that he
or she can gather as a reason that pushes the principal to delegate, but they
do not explicitly link these two aspects. Bawn, instead, summarises their
relation as a trade-off. Since delegating to an agency with no independence
is equivalent to legislating the policy itself (Bawn 1995: 68), to take ad-
vantage of the benefits of agency the principal must give some leeway to
the agent. As if the two actors were exchanging their goods, the principal
offers discretion and wants expertise, whilst the agent offers expertise and
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wants discretion. This transaction does not become a «game», because the
relationship between the two remains hierarchical: it is still a decision of
the legislative in which the output of the transaction must be foreseen and
anticipated.
Bawn builds a model of administrative delegation by distinguishing be-
tween intrinsic technical uncertainty and procedural uncertainty. The first
is due to «incomplete knowledge of natural processes (e.g., dispersion pat-
terns from a smokestack) and economic responses (relocation of industry)»
(Bawn 1995: 64); it is defined as «intrinsic» because the aim of the legisla-
tor is to reduce it by having recourse to an agent. The second is related to
the administrative procedure that is chosen, and it grows as the discretion
given to the agency grows. A major contribution of Bawn’s analysis lies in
the fact that it keeps together two aspects that are too often treated sepa-
rately: the decision on whether or not to delegate, and the decision on how
much to delegate. In Bawn’s model, the final decision is taken depending
on the ratio between technical and procedural uncertainty (the more the
first exceeds the second, the more discretion will tend to be given), and
the ratio between drawbacks and advantages of delegation (shirking and
improvement of technical knowledge).
Thus, giving independence without exerting control has no practical util-
ity – this had already been shown in many ways – but neither is it possible
to control the agent without lessening him or her capability of being useful.
What we can deduce from this model is, first and more generally, that del-
egation is not necessary to the same extent in every policy field, but only
where a reasonably high specialisation is required. Second, we can denote
that the principal should choose agents who have a low relative tendency to
shirk – this is probably why the statutes that establish IRAs so often require
that their members be long-careered civil servants, academics, (former) ju-
diciaries, etc. In other words, people that politicians believe they can trust.3
The hypothesis that can be drawn from this theory is that more indepen-
dence will be given where/when more expertise is needed.
3The importance of the appointment is also discussed by Calvert et al. (1989).
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2.4 Delegation and political uncertainty
From some points of view, I was tempted to treat this theory together with
the «deck-stacking», because they reach a very similar conclusion. Neverthe-
less, it must be recognised that their foundations lie on different grounds,
and these distinctions are worth analysing.
The hypothesis that I label as «political uncertainty» is drawn from the
works of Moe (1984; 1990; 1995). These contributions are actually a broader
reasoning about institutions, their genesis and their role. Moe finds in
what he calls «the New Economics of Organization» (a name by which he
means both P-A and transaction-costs approaches in political science) a ten-
dency to analyse politics, and consequently its institutions, as if it were eco-
nomics. Scholars like Weingast, McCubbins, Fiorina and others explicitly
regarded bureaucratic institutions (and agencies in particular) as solutions
to collective-action problems – be they «between the legislature and the
agency, between legislators and their constituents, or among factions within
the enacting coalition itself» (Moe 1990: 224).
Yet, Moe argues, institutions are also «weapons of coercion and redis-
tribution. They are the structural means by which political winners pursue
their own interests, often at the great expense of political losers» (1990:
213). According to the author, solving collective-action problems is only
one of the two main purposes that institutions serve, and the other is in fact
to redistribute power among political actors, usually from the losers to the
winners – both temporary, of course. Moe argues that «positive theorists»
have intentionally neglected one side of the story, because they have em-
ployed analytical tools created and developed by economists for studying
phenomena which are peculiarly economical – i.e. which pertain to volun-
tary exchanges between autonomous actors. However, Moe argues, politics
are a different matter. Politics lack the main basic precondition of every
economic transaction, that is property rights. In the author’s words (1990:
219):
«At bottom, the difference [between politics and economics] is that
political actors cannot simply engage in market exchange, as economic
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actors can; they must make decisions under majority rule, which is in-
herently unstable as a result of the insurmountable transaction prob-
lems of striking durable contracts. Political actors therefore face trans-
action problems that economic actors do not − problems that are “fun-
damentally political in origin” [...] because of their anchoring in ma-
jority rule».
Positive theorists are right, according to Moe, in claiming that political insti-
tutions help overcome instability and grant greater efficiency in policy im-
plementation. But majority rule also implies that whoever has the majority
has the right to pass binding norms for everyone (1990: 221):
«The unique thing about public authority is that whoever gets to
exercise it has the right to tell everyone else what to do, whether they
want to do it or not. When two poor people and one rich person make
up a polity governed by majority rule, the rich person is in trouble. He
is not in trouble because majority rule is unstable. Nor is he in trou-
ble because the three of them will have difficulty realizing gains from
trade. He is in trouble because they will use public authority to take
away some of his money. Public authority gives them the right to make
themselves better off at his expense. Their decisions are legitimate and
binding. They win and he loses»
This is something that cannot happen in economics. Analysing legislators
and bureaucracy as though they were part of one public firm in which the
former are the boss and the latter is the agent is limited because it ignores
that, unlike in economics, in politics property rights are not secure, and the
incumbent boss can easily be replaced by another. This is the other «side of
the story».
Moe introduces the concept of «political uncertainty» stressing that, as
political authority by definition does not belong to anyone, one of the politi-
cians’ main concerns is to protect the decision that they take when they
govern, to preserve the institutions they create, to insulate them from fur-
ther attempts to change or redefine their function. Here the author’s and
McCubbins et al.’s conclusions look quite alike: both state that legislators
want agencies to carry on exactly the task that they have been established
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for. Nevertheless, their differences regard not only – as has already been
explained – the underlying motives, but also the question of whether there
is control or not and what is the effect of such measures. Regarding the
«nature of being» question, McCubbins et al. maintain that what seems a
lack in oversight is rather a very sophisticated form of control, whilst Moe
seems to get back to the pre-Eighties literature on bureaucracy, claiming that
agencies are really insulated from political control; the incumbent accepts
to bind him or herself on condition that also his or her successor will be
bound (Moe 1990: 227-228):
«[Legislators] can fashion structures to insulate their favored agen-
cies and programs from the future exercise of public authority. In doing
so, of course, they will not only be reducing their enemies’ opportuni-
ties for future control; they will be reducing their own opportunities as
well. But this is often a reasonable price to pay, given the alternative.
And because they get to go first, they are really not giving up control −
they are choosing to exercise a greater measure of it ex ante, through
insulated structures that, once locked in, predispose the agency to do
the right things. What they are moving away from − because it is dan-
gerous − is the kind of ongoing hierarchical control that is exercised
through the discretionary decisions of public authority over time».
For what concerns the effect, whilst McCubbins et al. basically argue that
the set of checks enacted by the legislators manages to reach an efficient
outcome, in which both the preferences of the Congress and the right of
the citizens to receive adequate services are satisfied, Moe contends that
there are no guarantees that institutions created in such a way will also be
effective – because effectiveness is not the reason for which they are set up.
Moe’s hypothesis has been tested by Gilardi (2005a; 2005b) with regard
to its impact both on the establishment of agencies as well as on their inde-
pendence, and the impact has been proved to be statistically significant and
positively related to independence. Nonetheless, the indicators employed
to explain the effect on regulatory discretion are questionable 4, and in any
case, a further test of this hypothesis on a different data set can increase the
4 As Gilardi himself recognises (2005a: 154). See also Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2.
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confidence in its explanatory power.
2.5 Alignment between legislative and executive
Another important contribution to the study of delegation is the work of
Epstein and O’Halloran, particularly their influential book «Delegating Pow-
ers» (1999). The theory which the authors advance and test out in this
work is, from many points of view, tightly linked to the positive theory of
delegation. Firstly, the «environment» which the authors study is the same:
the US Congress and its relations with the other branches of government,
namely the Presidency and the various administrative agencies. Second, like
in all the positive theory of delegation, the focus is on the legislators and on
their benefits-costs calculation regarding whether it is convenient or not for
them to devolve powers. On the other hand, one aspect that utterly distin-
guishes the authors’ method from other positive theorists’ is their use of P-A
approach. Whilst positive theorists force the original model – a two-actors
game where the principal can mainly choose among agents with different
preferences – by making the role of the agency practically non-existent, or at
least completely absorbed by the incentive-driven administrative rules that
the Congress imposes on it, Epstein and O’Halloran employ a more strict
version of the model,5 assuming that the Congress can only choose whether
to delegate or not, and, if so, then to whom. The authors’ theory also relies
on the «ally principle» assumption (see Section 2.3.4), as legislators tend to
delegate to the body whose preferences are closest to theirs. On the con-
trary, a feature of the model which does not conform that much to the P-A
approach is the little importance given to control mechanisms. In the au-
thors’ theoretical framework, agency losses cannot be minimised by using
a set of incentives, but are rather seen as a hold-up6 problem (Epstein and
5In fact, they refer to theirs as a model based on Transaction Costs Economics (TCE),
but nonetheless they explicitly state that P-A is a «building block» of the TCE model. As
Karagiannis (2007a: 3) persuasively argues, the authors’ attempt to combine two approaches
which rely on contradictory assumptions leaves them open to criticism.
6The hold-up problem is a situation, described by TCE literature, in which one firm de-
cides to move close to another one, for instance because it needs the raw material produced
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O’Halloran 1999: 47)
The authors carry out a detailed analysis, collecting information on 257
relevant legislative acts passed by the Congress from the end of the second
world war to 1990, and calculate for each act how much discretion is given
to the executive power (considering both the government and other agen-
cies).7 The two most important findings of the authors, for what concerns
this dissertation, are that:
1. in case of divided government (when the President’s party does not
hold the majority of the seats in the Congress), the legislative tends to
impose more constraints on the executive branch in general;
2. in case of divided government, delegation to agencies which are not
part of the federal government increases.
Epstein and O’Halloran’s analysis is extremely detailed, and it yields very
solid and convincing results. Still, those who aim at applying their method-
ology to European countries, and to IRAs in particular, might find some ob-
stacles on their path. First, theirs is a one-country case study. Even though
nothing impedes the application of the authors’ logic to European cases,
some clear differences between the US and most European countries should
be carefully considered. The two most relevant ones are the form of govern-
ment – the US represents a presidential system, whilst the great majority of
European countries are parliamentary systems – and the party system – two
dominant parties, with little ideological and territorial cohesion in the US,
by it. But the producer could then exploit the proximity of the other firm to raise the price
of the raw material. The first firm would then be held-up. The concept has been developed
by Joskow (see Joskow 1985).
7The discretion (di) associated with a certain act i is defined by Epstein and O’Halloran
as:
di = ri − ci
where:
r = delegation ratio, i.e. the number of provisions in a law which contain delegation to
the executive branch over the total number of provisions;
c = r · f = relative constraints, where fi is the number of constraints imposed on the
executive in a law over the total number of existing constraints.
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versus multi-party systems with stronger cohesiveness throughout Europe.
Yet also other aspects, such as the importance of congressional committees
and the role of lobbies in the legislative process, should be taken into ac-
count.
Furthermore, Epstein and O’Halloran’s analysis is not focused on ex-
plaining either bureaucracy nor independent agencies: theirs is a theory of
legislation; they aim to show why and how much the Congress delegates
depending on certain specific factors. The question concerning to which
bodies the legislative delegates only has secondary importance.
That said, the interpretation of the second finding remains undoubtedly
fascinating: is such a tendency only related to divided government in a
presidential system or does it suggest a pattern which could be translated
in the language of parliamentarianism? Apparently, it could be generalised
as though delegating to IRAs were a way for the parliament to subtract the
implementation of legislation to the executive. However, discovering the
parliamentary equivalent of divided government is not an easy task.
2.6 Need for credibility
The theory that will be analysed in this section differs widely from the ones
that I have dealt with until now both in terms of the motives as well as
the effect. In the positive theory of delegation, politicians are treated as ra-
tional self-interested actors who maximise their chances of being re-elected.
Within this framework, delegation is a means to solve information-gathering
and agenda-setting problems. Scholars of this field reject the common-sense
judgement that bureaucracy is largely independent and uncontrollable, by
claiming in fact that the Congress, although it only rarely intervenes in a
direct manner, exerts its control via legislative provisions and administra-
tive rules: delegation would not be an abdication but rather a very refined
way of exploiting the advantages of agency relations. As regards Moe, we
have seen that he criticises this approach for being partial and for disre-
garding the question of power allocation that is always at stake in modern
democracies. Yet, Moe does not discuss the assumption of self-interest in
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the politicians’ behaviour; he just claims that they pursue another objective,
and that this goal does not necessarily match with efficient policy outcomes.
Finally, Epstein and O’Halloran’s approach is probably closer to the first in
that it keeps the focus on the Congress as the body which is ultimately re-
sponsible for every decision; on the other hand, they do not seem to take on
the question of how much the legislators manage to control agencies.
The theory that identifies in the need for credibility the main reason
for delegating has been devised and put forward by Giandomenico Majone
(1996; 1997; 1998; 2001), although some of its elements can be traced
in previous works by other scholars (see Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro
and Gordon 1983, 1984; Arrow 1985; Rogoff 1985; Giavazzi and Pagano
1988; Shepsle 1991; North and Weingast 1994; Weingast 1995). Majone’s
argument can surely be generalised in the field of delegation to IRAs, al-
though the author has conceived his theory as mainly directed towards the
explanation of supranational delegation to the European Union.
The author’s major innovation in the study of delegation lies in his as-
sumption about control. In all the contributions listed up to this point, all
the authors assume that politicians aim to control bureaucracy and agen-
cies as much as possible. When some discretion is left to the bureaucrat,
this happens because the politician actually increases his power (and his
chances to stay in power) by doing so. In all the previous approaches (as
it is common in the US literature), politicians are self-interested, they max-
imise their own utility. Majone, instead, does not claim either that control
is ineffective, nor that it is impossible, or necessary in order to bind future
incumbents. Instead, he claims that it is undesirable, and that the aim of the
politicians who establish an IRA must be to give it discretion intentionally.
Thus, the perspective is completely overturned: lack of control is not a loss
(or the lesser of two evils), but a resource.8
8 The argument of credibility has been advanced also in other forms. Giavazzi and
Pagano (1988) for instance, writing about inflation-prone countries which entered the Euro-
pean Monetary System, claimed that the politicians ruling these states practically «tied their
hands», because they accepted to pay a high cost if they were not capable of maintaining a
reasonable inflation rate. A similar argument has been proposed by Lohmann (2003), who
argues that, creating central banks, politicians also create «audiences» towards which they
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To focus on the author’s reasoning, we must direct our attention to the
previous economics literature on central banks and their capability to grant
a stable inflation rate (see Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon
1983; Rogoff 1985), towards which the author recognises his debt. The cor-
nerstone of his argument about credibility and credible commitment is con-
stituted by the concept of «temporal inconsistency». Following Kydland and
Prescott (1977), Majone argues that temporal inconsistency occurs «when a
policy which appears to be optimal at time t0 no longer seems optimal at a
later time tn» (Majone 1996: 2). As the author points out (1996: 4):
«[...] in a democracy political executives tend to have short time
horizons − shorter, for example, than their counterparts in the pri-
vate sector − so that the efficacy of reputational mechanisms [...] is
more limited in the political sphere. It is also well known that in any
situation of collective choice there are many possible majorities, and
that their respective preferences need not to be consistent. Because
political property rights are attenuated − a legislature cannot bind a
subsequent legislature and a majority coalition cannot bind another
− public policies are always vulnerable to reneging and hence lack
credibility».
Politicians tend to change their policy preferences over time, either because
elections yield government alternation or because incumbents, in order to
gain popularity, shift from previous commitments. Despite what politicians
may think, economic actors often anticipate these decisions, which thus pro-
duce two unwanted consequences:
• the objective that the incumbent aimed to achieve is no longer pur-
sued;
• economic actors will expect that such a behaviour will be repeated
in the future, and will not trust politicians when they will commit to
some other objective; in other words, their credibility will be damaged.
The example of monetary policy is illuminating with respect to this argu-
ment. Even though increasing the monetary supply can yield positive ef-
are responsible and which can monitor their future actions.
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fects in the short term, the ultimate consequence of such a policy is the rise
of inflation. Since it does not take much time to «learn the game», if the gov-
ernment tries again to have recourse to this means, everyone will already
know that prices will go up, and this will produce an anticipated increase of
inflation without even the initial positive effect. Or, all else equal, greater
and greater increases of the monetary mass will be needed to get the same
result, leading to an inefficiently high inflation rate (see Barro and Gordon
1983). To sum up, contrarily to the initial intentions of the politician, the
long-term effect of his or her policy will be a diminution in social welfare
(see also Bendor et al. 2001: 261).
The solution that Kydland and Prescott propose is to have fixed rules that
leave no room for discretion to the incumbent. But, Majone argues, since
regulation consists of applying general rules to concrete cases, a certain
amount of discretion is unavoidable (Majone 1996: 3):
«Because regulation consists in applying general rules to particular
situations, regulatory discretion is unavoidable. But there are other
methods for increasing policy credibility. Especially important in the
present context is the delegation of policy-making powers to institu-
tions which, by design, are not directly accountable to voters or to their
elected representatives; in other words, delegation to non-majoritarian
institutions»
IRAs cannot be bound to follow too detailed provisions, and even if they
could, it would not be practically possible for anyone to design rules that
apply to any situation. Yet, there is another resource that IRAs may pro-
vide and that can be exploited to solve the credibility problem, according to
Majone. The author puts forth the example, illustrated in Table 2.1, of the
so-called «trust-game» (Kreps 1990: 100; Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 261).
Let us suppose that there are two actors A and B, playing a game in
which A must first decide whether to trust B or not. If A does not trust,
no transaction takes place and the pay-off for both the players is 0. If A
trusts, B can either honour her trust or abuse it: in the first case, both gain
10; otherwise, B gains 15 and A only 5. If the game is played only once,
it is very likely that the players will end up in the trust/abuse box, but if
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honour abuse
trust 10, 10 5, 15
not trust 0, 0 0, 0
Table 2.1: The trust game
we suppose that N interactions occur, then B has two options: gaining 15
in the first game and 0 for the future, or honouring A’s trust and gaining
N · 10. If N · 10 > 15, then cooperation is mutually convenient.
Let us imagine that A is a generic investor and B the state. A problem of
temporal inconsistency would arise, for instance, if the state first promises
not to increase inflation, and then it does so anyway. Actors who have
invested in the country’s currency will find that the value of the currency
they bought has decreased, and their pay-off will be less than they had
expected. The country has probably fulfilled a short-run objective, but in
the future it will be more difficult for it to attract investments, since fewer
investors will trust it.
In Majone’s view, if some public policy is taken away from the voters-
parliament-government circuit, the incentive in pursuing short-term goals
should decrease. The independent actor, indeed, does not have any incen-
tive to «cheat», because its objective is actually to maximise its credibility.
The example often brought forth for the explanation of such a self-binding
commitment is that of Ulysses and the sirens (see Elster 1979). However,
this is only partially true. Whilst Ulysses is tied to the mast and cannot move,
the state that delegates remains sovereign and can overrule delegation at its
discretion. Conferring some powers and discretion to an authority makes it
more difficult to go back (Shepsle 1991: 249), but it does not impede it.
In more recent works of his (La Spina and Majone 2000; Majone 2001),
Majone makes another important argument with respect to the classical def-
inition of «agent», as it has been considered in the previous literature. The
author argues that the relationships between elected politicians and agen-
cies to which very much discretion is given cannot be analysed within the
P-A framework, because some of them resemble much more fiduciary than
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agency relations. Bringing as examples various provisions of the EC treaty,
Majone claims that in some policy domains the European Commission acts
as a trustee of the member states, and not as their agent: although it pur-
sues general objectives that the national governments have assigned to it, it
has nearly absolute leeway as regards both the agenda-setting and the effec-
tive decision-making. In such situations, according to Majone, the delegate
(no more agent, but trustee) benefits from a complete transfer of «political
property rights» (Majone 2001: 114; see also Moe 1990).
2.7 Veto players
Although it has already been employed in many research areas, the con-
cept of veto players has been developed quite recently in political science.
In contrast to the theories reviewed in the previous sections, this theoreti-
cal framework does not focus on the preferences of the actors, but on the
costs of decision-making. Aiming at explaining variations in stability and
responsiveness of the political system in different countries, it focuses on
the number of actors involved in a change of the status quo, predicting that
the higher this number is, the more difficult it is to find an agreement be-
tween the actors − and, consequently, to pass a new law. As concerns the
issue of delegation, as in all the previous theories, the preferences of the
actors are assumed from the P-A approach: politicians employ delegation as
a second-best solution, to solve problems wherein disadvantages outweigh
the potential loss of control over the policy outcome.
The invention of the concept of veto players is to be credited to George
Tsebelis (1995; 2000; 2002), who defines them as actors whose agreement
is necessary for a changing of the status quo (i.e. for passing a new piece
of legislation). There can be institutional and partisan veto players. The
former are those who are established by the constitution of a country; in
the US, for example, both the Chambers of the Congress must agree on the
same text and then the President must sign the bill. It only takes one of
these three bodies not to give its consensus to the new law, and it will not
be passed. Partisan veto players, instead, are those who are generated by
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the political game inside institutional veto players: they exist although they
are not produced by legally binding rules. For instance, if in a legislature
there is a single-party majority, then there is only one political veto player;
but if the parliamentary majority is composed of three parties, the number
of political veto players increases accordingly (Tsebelis 2002: 79).
From Tsebelis’ point of view, for instance, Italy and the USA do not differ
very much in this respect, because both have a high number of veto players
and so tend to have high political stability (2002: 4). It must be noted,
however, that veto players produced by the party system can very easily
disappear or lose power: they are much less «resistant» than veto players
established by the constitution. Tsebelis’ core argument is that the greater
is the number of veto players, the more difficult is to build a coalition that
can support a change of the status quo. Therefore, systems with many veto
players should produce more stable policy outputs.9
But how is this reasoning linked to the creation and the conferring of dis-
cretion on IRAs? Actually, the theory tells us that more veto players should
be associated with fewer policy changes, or with greater difficulty in legis-
lating. To apply the theory to a practical case, then, it is necessary to argue
how the ability of a country to legislate relates to delegation. In this respect,
two hypotheses have been devised (and tested) in the literature.
The first relates the presence of veto players to the issue of credibility,
discussed in the previous section − this theoretical framework is actually a
more rigorous articulation of Majone’s theory of credible commitment. Ac-
cording to that hypothesis, states need independent agencies because they
9 Tsebelis does not take sides regarding whether responsiveness or stability is to prefer
(2000: 443):
«For some (mainly political scientists), the variable [how easy it is to
change the status quo under different institutional arrangements] is called
responsiveness of the political system. The argument is that political systems
ought to be able to adapt to new conditions, and therefore change existing
policies when the situation requires it. For others (mainly economists), the po-
litical system ought to be able to credibly commit that it will not alter the rules
of the game and interfere in the arrangements that private actors are making.
The first are interested in policy change, the second want “rules rather than
discretion.”».
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might change their policy preferences, and this would reduce their credibil-
ity. So, IRAs should be more necessary for countries which tend to change
their policy preferences very frequently. The argument is that a limited num-
ber of veto players make the policy output at time t1 very likely to differ from
the policy output at time t0. As a consequence, in policy fields where sta-
bility is an added value, IRAs can mitigate uncertainty and shield unstable
countries from risks related to this problem. Some scholars in the field of
regulation analysis (Spiller 1993; Levy and Spiller 1994) have argued that
veto players perform the same function as independent authorities, assur-
ing investors that the regulatory environment will not be subject to abrupt
alterations. Henisz (2002) comes to the same conclusion as regards infras-
tructure investments, pointing out that the presence of many institutional
actors limits the possibility of a policy change. Gilardi (2002; 2005a) has
found some evidence for this hypothesis in his works, proving that the pres-
ence of veto players acts as a disincentive (making IRAs not necessary). In
his analysis of regulatory independence in some European countries, and
across different sectors, he claims that the effect of the presence of veto
players on the independence of the regulators is negative.
The second hypothesis about the effect of veto players on the indepen-
dence of IRAs argues the opposite. Studying the independence of central
banks, some authors (Moser 1999; Keefer and Stasavage 2003) have ad-
vanced and proved that a greater number of veto players is more likely to
be associated with more independent bodies. The rationale behind their ar-
gument is that economic actors need not only be assured that the central
bank is free to pursue its policy, but also that politicians will not overrule
its decisions. If there are no checks and balances, for the legislative it is
easy to reverse a decision of the central bank, and thus delegation of pow-
ers – for however extensive it may be – is not effective: countries with fewer
veto players are less credible even if they set up formally independent agen-
cies. On the contrary, if there are many veto players, it will be difficult to
overrule a central bank’s decision, and therefore delegation can be fruitfully
used. This theory does not explicitly argue for a direct causal relationship
between veto players and independence; it rather states that having a sys-
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tem with important checks and balances is a precondition for successful
delegation.
Similar conclusions have been drawn also having recourse to another
explanation. Hallerberg (2002) claims that in principle politicians are will-
ing to control the central bank, because they can use it to support their
expansive policy in pre-electoral periods. Nevertheless, monetary policy,
unlike fiscal policy, cannot be targeted to specific interest groups, nor can
it be fragmented to produce different effects in different domains: it is like
a monolith. Actors agree on keeping the central bank under the authority
of the political power only if they can reasonably control the output of its
decisions. But with many veto players, Hallerberg argues, this will be hard
both because of the intrinsic characteristics of monetary policy and because
of the difficulty of gaining an agreement among many actors with different
preferences. According to Hallerberg’s findings, countries with a federal-
ist structure and multi-party governments tend to have more independent
central banks.
Summing up, we have:
• one test on IRAs that asserts the existence of a negative relation be-
tween veto players and regulatory independence;
• one test on central banks that contends the opposite – and it does so
using a theoretical argument that could be generalised and applied
also to other independent agencies (i.e. that credibility must be ac-
companied by the guarantee that overruling the IRA’s decision will be
problematic);
• one test on central banks that also claims the existence of a positive
relation between veto players and independence – with both a policy-
specific argument (the intrinsic characteristics of monetary policy) and
a general one (the more the veto players, the more difficult an agree-
ment between them).
As can be seen, the literature is not clear on the role of veto players. De-
pending on which of the above cited theories is closer to reality, we might
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find that their impact on the independence of competition authorities is ei-
ther positive or negative, or in fact that it is not significant, either due to the
intrinsic characteristics of competition policy, or because the veto players
framework is not able to explain the adoption of socially efficient reforms,
as Lindvall (2010) argues.10
2.8 Europeanisation, learning, emulation
The last set of theories that I take into account embraces a different per-
spective, namely the possible effects of the European Union membership
on the independence of the national competition authorities. Even though
such an approach might appear to deviate from the assumption of bounded
rationality, this is not the case. Like the theories that have been reviewed
so far, this one links delegation to some cost-benefit assessments. The fact
that each country finds itself in a particular environmental condition when
it takes the decision to delegate, and that this condition affects its decision,
does not make such determination irrational. I assume not that countries
take some decisions unintentionally or automatically, but that they simply
respond to incentives which are brought about by certain characteristics of
the environment.
Although no explicit argument has been made about a relation between
the EU membership and the independence that a country confers on its
regulatory agencies, the literature on «Europeanisation» is well-established
and can help formulate a hypothesis with regard to this phenomenon. The
term is employed to identify different processes «by which domestic pol-
10 Lindvall’s argument is that veto players theory (as formulated by Tsebelis) does not
take into account «side payments». Tsebelis simply predicts that more veto players will pro-
duce more stability and fewer reforms, but empirical studies on welfare state reforms have
demonstrated that «significant reforms have occurred both in countries with few veto play-
ers and in countries with many veto players» (Lindvall 2010: 360). According to Lindvall,
if the reform increases the social welfare, the coalition that passes it will always be able to
offer a compensation to the social group which would otherwise oppose the reform (2010:
368-69). If this is true, then the veto players theory fails to explain socially-efficient reforms.
With regard to the subject of this dissertation, if the establishment of an independent compe-
tition authority makes the country better off in general, then we should find no correlation
between the number of veto players and the independence of the authority.
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icy areas become increasingly subject to European policy making» (Börzel
1999: 574). Héritier (2001: 3) defines Europeanisation as «the process of
influence deriving from European decisions and impacting member states’
policies and political and administrative structures». A broader definition
is given by Radaelli (2003: 30; see also Featherstone 2003), according to
whom the concept of Europeanisation refers to:
«Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institution-
alization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms,
styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are
first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and
politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, iden-
tities, political structures, and public policies».11
Accordingly, the object of this study can be seen as a EU-driven phenomenon:
the establishment of national competition authorities in the EU member
states has much to do with the creation of the single market and the promo-
tion of a European competition policy by the European Commission. Most
of the Europeanisation literature focuses on how the EU obliges the member
states to pass some reforms, or it gives them incentives to adopt certain poli-
cies; this literature also analyses the different responses that member states
generate (see Héritier 1997; Kassim et al. 2000; Verdier and Breen 2001;
Levi-Faur 2004a; Knill 2007). The Europeanisation framework is also com-
patible with the divergence observed among NCAs, as it has been repeatedly
shown that Europeanisation does not imply convergence among the member
states (Héritier and Knill 2001; Kassim 2003: 88; Radaelli 2003: 33).12
However, it is difficult to identify which acts or decisions at the EU-level have
produced an impact on the domestic choices regarding the independence of
national regulators. Since there is no rule that prescribes a certain level of
independence for NCAs (and not even their creation!), we should hypoth-
esise that the Commission’s influence is exerted through informal channels
− which are complicated to observe and to identify.
11 For other definitions and meanings of Europeanisation, see also Featherstone and
Radaelli (2003), Olsen (2002) and Levi-Faur (2004b).
12 This does not mean that convergence is not possible. See for instance Harcourt (2003).
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Even though Europeanisation, as defined above, is a chiefly top-down
process, the implementation and adaptation of EU policy at the domestic
level does not exclude innovation driven by mutual exchanges of knowledge
and expertise between the member states. The fact that the same policies
need to be adopted in several countries has led some states to copy «features
of the coordination systems of others that are considered successful» (Kas-
sim 2003: 102). Another consequence of Europeanisation is cross-national
learning: in many policy fields, national decisions may be influenced by the
presence of elites that have «become accustomed to the process of working
together and learning from each other» (Goldsmith 2003: 128). Two main
mechanisms of exchange are possible: there can be a mutual «learning»,
favoured by the presence of many key political actors in the same arena
(Eising 2002; Meseguer 2005; Radaelli 2008), or there can be emulation,
triggered by the existence of a common «epistemic community» and by psy-
chological proximity between the members (Simmons et al. 2006; see also
McNamara 2002). Whilst the concept of «learning» suggests a rational de-
sign, that of «emulation» entails a more sociological and non-rational moti-
vation (see Section 1.1). Both mechanisms, though, in contrast to top-down
Europeanisation, imply convergence amongst the actors who learn or copy
from each other.
At first sight, both these approaches (top-down Europeanisation on the
one hand, learning or emulation on the other) seem to have problems in
accounting for different degrees of independence of NCAs. The first has a
practical disadvantage. If there has been (and there still is) an influence
of the Commission on the member states’ choice regarding the autonomy
of NCAs, it is an informal influence. Therefore, it is difficult to identify.
The second approach has a mainly theoretical problem: how can a theo-
retical framework that aims at explaining increasing similarities among the
members of the same organisation account for differences between the EU
member states? A third problem, which is common to both approaches, is
that there appears to be no connection between the establishment of compe-
tition authorities and the countries’ EU accession dates: Western-European
countries (with the exception of Germany) have created independent com-
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petition regulators many years after they joined the Community; in most
Eastern-European countries, instead, competition authorities were estab-
lished far before joining the EU, without having had any apparent connec-
tion with their accession.13
Should we then conclude that this branch of the literature is not useful
as to the first research question of this work? I deem that it is not, at least for
what concerns the top-down Europeanisation framework. Even though there
can be problems in identifying the underlying mechanisms, it is possible to
measure the «exposure» of member states to the EU influence. Competi-
tion policy has always been at the core of European integration, and the
impact on the member states’ legal systems has been more evident in this
field than in any other (McGowan 2005; see also Schmidt 1998; Levi-Faur
1999): most countries have adopted an antitrust legislation and established
a competition authority only because the EU law evolution and the creation
of the single market obliged them to do so. As I will argue in the next chap-
ter (see Section 3.5.1), on the one hand there can be incentives for older
EU members to give more independence to their antitrust enforcers; on the
other, a greater autonomy of the competition authorities could be due to
the fact that older members have been «exposed» to the influence of the
Commission in this field for a longer time.
2.9 Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, I have reviewed various theories that might be
useful in explaining why some NCAs are given more independence than
others. To provide some clarifications, these theoretical frameworks are
summarised in Table 2.2. I recognise that such an extensive and heteroge-
neous literature may disorient the reader, and even give rise to criticism.
One might say that the hypotheses and theories that have been presented
do not share the same theoretical framework, and that they come in account
for delegation from very distant starting points.
13 Be it enough to mention that the last EU member state to establish a competition regu-
lator was a founder member: Luxembourg.
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Table 2.2: Summary of the theories presented in Chapter 2
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Scholars like Fiorina and McCubbins are mainly concerned with proving
whether the Congress manages, or not, to control the agencies that it es-
tablishes. Moe, instead, approaches the topic from a more «institutionalist»
viewpoint, arguing that the main function of institutions is to redistribute
power. Epstein and O’Halloran somewhat combine the previous attempts
to explain delegation, but still remain in a purely cost-benefit perspective,
where the content of the policy does not help account for the degree of dis-
cretion conferred on the agency. Majone, in contrast, relies on an almost
normative argument, when he claims that politicians delegate because they
want the state to be credible and know that they would not be able to grant
this credibility; Majone’s politician appears to be very distant from a merely
utility-maximiser actor. All the theories that link regulatory independence
with the presence of veto players assign great importance to «environmen-
tal» factors, whereas all the others are more actor-centred.14 Finally, the
Europeanisation literature certainly has even less connection with all the
other approaches, as it is based on mainly sociological assumptions. It goes
without saying that I treated all of the above-mentioned theories because I
deem that in any one of them there is something that may contribute to a
comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon addressed by this work.
As stated at the very beginning of this chapter, no one can deny that
the literature on the creation of agencies and on bureaucratic discretion is
extremely fragmented. Having recognised that, I faced two possibilities: ei-
ther I could keep following the trend, focusing on one part of the literature
and disregarding others, maybe because they do not fit the ideas I have in
mind; or I could aim to trace a common path between apparently different
traditions, hopefully trying to combine them, where possible. In this disser-
tation I have chosen for the second option. In the next chapter, I will present
my own theoretical framework, and at the same time I will try to test the
theories that I have traced in the literature. To do so, I will need to turn
these theories into testable hypotheses, and to find empirical indicators that
will allow me to assess their impact on the independence of competition
14 The contributions of McCubbins, Fiorina, Epstein and O’Halloran, focusing exclusively
on the American case, cannot take into account environmental factors.
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authorities.
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Chapter 3
Measuring and explaining
formal independence
This chapter will be devoted to the testing of the theories and hypotheses
which have been reviewed in the Chapter 2. There are some reasons for
which such a test is necessary: first, only some of these theories have been
tested; second, some tests have given contradictory responses with regard
to the effect of the explanatory factors; third, no theory has been verified
on a sample including only competition authorities, although these have
characteristics which distinguish them from other IRAs.
I will first briefly review previous attempts to explain regulatory inde-
pendence. Then I will discuss how independence can be measured: what
indicators should form an index of independence, what is not satisfactory
in the indices developed by other authors, how I have devised my own in-
dependence index. Finally, I will empirically test a theoretical framework
based both on original hypotheses and on previous contributions: I will list
the hypotheses derived from this framework and I will describe their oper-
ationalisation; then I will analyse the data and illustrate the most relevant
findings.
65
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3.1 Previous empirical tests on regulatory indepen-
dence
As I pointed out previously (see Sections 2.4 and 2.7), the most important
contribution in the study of the independence of IRAs has been made by
Gilardi (2002; 2005a), who has tested some of the theories presented in
Chapter 2 on a dataset containing IRAs of different sectors in Western Euro-
pean countries. The hypotheses tested concerned the effect of:
• need for credibility
• political uncertainty
• veto players
on the formal independence of IRAs. According to his statistical analyses,
these three hypotheses significantly explain the independence of the agen-
cies: need for credibility and political uncertainty are positively correlated
with independence, while the presence of veto players is negatively corre-
lated. A similar analysis has been carried out by Elgie and MacMenamin
(2005), who have tested similar hypotheses on a population including all
the independent agencies in France. According to their analysis, the two
variables that influence agency independence are:
• the need for credibility (similarly to Gilardi’s finding)
• the complexity of the policy delegated.
A more recent article (Wonka and Rittberger 2010) has presented a similar
analysis on 29 EU agencies, confirming again the credibility and the political
uncertainty hypotheses.
These tests represent an important starting point for the purpose of ex-
plaining the independence of NCAs in the EU. However, these analyses can
be improved and complemented in two ways: first, by employing better em-
pirical indicators; second, by adding other hypotheses that these authors
have not considered. Changes (or at least careful reconsiderations) are sug-
gested by the fact that the same hypotheses are operationalised differently
Guidi, Mattia (2012), Explaining and Assessing Independence: National competition authorities in the EU member states 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/46429
3.2. INDEPENDENCE INDEX: WHAT FEATURES TO INCLUDE? 67
in the papers mentioned above, and that the indicators used are not always
convincing (see this chapter, Section 3.5.2).
The sample chosen for this statistical analysis contains the whole pop-
ulation of the national competition authorities of the European member
states. I made this choice because, to my knowledge, all previous analy-
ses of regulatory independence have been carried out on economically ad-
vanced countries’ authorities, mainly the US and Western European coun-
tries’ (see Gilardi 2002, 2005a; Elgie and McMenamin 2005; Edwards and
Waverman 2006). Whilst one can understand that these countries have
longer-established political institutions and more available data, excluding
states that have experienced a more recent transition to democracy and free
market is not easily justifiable. Rather, I find it extremely important to take
into account also countries that, despite a fast and mainly exogenously-
driven path to liberalisation, have created competition authorities and have
designed them according not only to what Brussels bureaucrats told them,
but also to their national background. Moreover, including all the member
states of the EU allows me to draw conclusions that are valid for all the 27
EU countries.
The theories presented in the previous chapter will be tested using an
OLS regression model. The dependent variable will be an index of statu-
tory independence built from a survey collected among all the 27 national
competition authorities. For the independent variables, specific empirical
indicators will be selected in order to test their effect.
3.2 Building an index of independence: what fea-
tures to include?
When it comes to the practical problem of measuring independence of Eu-
ropean national competition authorities, the complexity of the issue imme-
diately emerges. What is independence? And from whom or what are these
agencies independent? Is it a feature that must be drawn from laws and
statutes or from how agencies actually work?
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I consider independence as the condition of being able to take decisions
without interference from other people or bodies (see Elgie 1998: 55; Koop
and Hanretty 2009: 5). In the present case, I want to focus on the indepen-
dence of national competition authorities from the national political bodies,
namely the parliament and the government. I take into account only formal
(or statutory) independence – what is written down in laws and statutes –
and not de facto (or actual) independence. This last point deserves some
clarifications. Although attempts have been made (see Maggetti 2007), it is
still very arbitrary to assess which characteristics do really shape de facto in-
dependence, and it is also difficult to distinguish between, on the one hand,
permanent features of an agency’s behaviour which do not find any justifica-
tion in the statutes and, on the other, contingent conditions or perceptions.
It must be also considered that attributes which in one country are not due
to formal requirements might be prescribed by the law in another country.
By focusing on formal independence, I certainly restrict my capability to
encompass whatever is related to regulatory discretion, but I believe that I
gain in precision, accuracy and comparability of the results. Finally, formal
independence is particularly interesting because it is a variable that parlia-
ments can modify by drafting a new legislation, whereas features of de facto
independence are often embedded in the customs and traditions of a coun-
try. If the aim of a study like this is not only to account for variations, but
also to indicate political decisions that can produce a better regulatory per-
formance, then it is crucial to assess the causes and the impact of legislative
provisions.
Many different indices have been devised to measure formal indepen-
dence of regulatory agencies (including central banks), and there is no com-
mon agreement on what should be included in such indicators. If we go
through the (not very extensive) literature in the field, we see that an index
of independence can contain just data on how the head and the board of the
authority are appointed and on the powers that the agency has (Elgie and
McMenamin 2005); it can exclude the powers but include data on the re-
lationship between the authority and the political bodies (Cukierman et al.
1992; Gilardi 2002; Koop and Hanretty 2009); it can be formed by a mix of
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these elements plus data on sectoral competences (Edwards and Waverman
2006).1 It follows from this brief overview that, with the lack of a commonly
recognised approach, building an index entails making some choices.
After close scrutiny, I have found that Gilardi’s (2002) index, which is
mainly based on the one of Cukierman et al. (1992), is the most comprehen-
sive and accurate, and also the most suitable for this data set.2 Therefore,
I have used it as a starting point to devise my survey, which has been filled
in by all the 27 national competition authorities of the EU member states.
Relying also on the work of Koop and Hanretty (2009), I have supplemented
it with additional questions. A complete list of the questions asked in the
survey can be found in Appendix 1.
3.3 Building an index of independence: how to weigh
items?
Devising a list of items which are more or less likely to be related to inde-
pendence is only the starting point for assessing the independence of national
competition authorities. The most important (and most problematic) step is
the «translation» of 32 characteristics in one single value. Performing such
an operation entails the following assumptions:
1. independence is an abstract feature that subsumes and encompasses a
certain number of concrete features;
2. all the features drawn from the questions of the survey are in principle
related to independence.
In the language of measurement theory, we can say that independence is a
latent trait that all the concrete features (items) share to a different extent.
Obviously, it is very unlikely that all the items be related to the latent trait
in the same way: some characteristics might contribute to independence
1A good summary of the main attempts to measure agency independence can be found
in Koop and Hanretty (2009).
2 The index developed by Edwards and Waverman (2006), for instance, is specifically
designed for telecommunications agencies.
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more than others; some items might contribute so little that they can be
neglected. As we can see, building an index requires a careful consideration
of how much relevance is to be assigned to the different indicators that
compose it.
Surprisingly, this issue has been generally neglected by all the authors
who have dealt with this kind of measurement. For example, Cukierman,
Webb and Neyapti, in their study on the independence of central banks, use
weights that they consider «most plausible» (Cukierman et al. 1992: 361),
without explaining in detail why they do so.3 Gilardi, in his works on the
independence of IRAs, recognises that such a problem exists. However, he
then argues that «combining variables is unavoidably arbitrary» and decides
to «cut this Gordian knot in the simplest way, by attributing the same weight
to each variable» (Gilardi 2002: 880).4 In my opinion, assigning a weight
to an item on the basis of no objective criterion is arbitrary, and not easily
defensible. For this reason, it must be attentively examined whether ways
to discriminate between the items exist. And if the response is affirmative,
then it makes more sense to untie the knot (instead of cutting it).
In order to find out how items can be weighted in a less arbitrary manner,
I employ latent trait analysis. By this definition, statisticians mean methods
of analysis (such as Factor analysis, Mokken scaling, Item Response mod-
els) which aim to discover a certain number of latent variables in a data set
and to assess how the items relate to it. Latent trait models were originally
applied in educational and intelligence testing, where scholars are inter-
ested in determining which questions are more difficult than others, which
responses discriminate more in terms of the latent trait (e.g. intelligence),
which questions’ high scores imply high scores in another question, and so
forth. There are no indications to say these techniques cannot be employed
also in political science questionnaires, and indeed they are widely used.
Whenever we have many questions that we regard as related to one or few
3The authors explain that, in their analysis, the index with the weights chosen by them
and another index with equal weights give similar results.
4However, this is not completely true. Gilardi in fact groups items according to the aspect
of independence that they measure, and then builds his index computing the mean of each
of these categories.
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dimensions, we face the same problem described above, and are able to use
this techniques to address them.
Data and measurement theory helps us find out which is the right method
to use. Jacobi (1991: 16-22), following Coombs (1964), distinguishes be-
tween four kinds of data, according to a) whether variation is only among
one set of objects or between two sets and b) whether between the «respon-
dents» and/or the items there is a dominance relationship or a proximity
relationship. In the case of the present work, we have variation between
two sets of objects: NCAs and the features to which the questions of the
survey refer. As regards the second distinction, we want to know how high
competition authorities score for every response, in other words to what ex-
tent they «dominate» them. Therefore, we have what Jacoby calls «Single
stimulus data»: we assume that all the items manifest a certain amount of
the latent trait.
Due to the assumption that it is possible to order items from the least
to the most difficult, single stimulus data are usually analysed with scaling
methods: Guttman scales, Mokken scales, Rasch scales, Graded response
models. These models can be either dichotomous, if the item can take only
two values, namely 0 and 1, or polytomous, if the items can take more than
two values. In this respect, in almost all the questions of the survey there
are more than two possible answers. Therefore, a polytomous latent trait
model is needed. This reduces the choice to factor analysis or a graded re-
sponse model. Between the two methods, however, we are bound to choose
the first, because it is the only one which allows us to calculate scores −
that is, values that summarise how the single observations (the competition
authorities) perform with regard to the factor. If we assume that the first
factor, the main latent trait, represents formal independence, factor scores
gives us an indication of how independent each authority is.
As concerns how suitable factor analysis is for single stimulus data, Ja-
coby argues that it is (1991: 47), although this claim is quite debated. It
could be enough to mention that Jacoby himself proposes factor analysis as
the appropriate method to deal also with a different kind of data, and it is
not completely clear how the same method can fit data which have an ut-
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terly dissimilar structure. Beyond this, it has been shown that, when in the
data there is an evident dominance relationship, factor analysis can yield in-
accurate results, showing multiple dimensions where there is only one (Van
der Eijk 2007). However, in this analysis my aim is not to map the structure
of the dataset; I rather assume that the structure is already known, and look
at the first factor only. Moreover, (un)fortunately data and measurement
theory is a branch of statistics where orthodoxy is weaker than in others:5
although I do not think that the method I use to build the index is impecca-
ble, it seems to be significantly more accurate than those used by others in
similar contexts.
Alternatively, I could have produced different independence proxies ac-
cording to different «dimensions» of independence – e.g. political, organ-
isational, decisional. In this case, only the items relating to a particular
dimension would have been used to derive the indices. Such an approach
could have some advantages. It would allow one to assess in which dimen-
sions a country prefers to grant independence to the NCA. Moreover, one
could test whether some factors have an impact on one type of indepen-
dence but not on others. However, for this study I preferred to use a single
indicator, for two main reasons. First, I believe that, although independence
can be disentangled into several dimensions, these dimensions are closely
interlinked. For a member of a NCA, having decisional autonomy means
nothing if he or she can be removed from office rather easily. Second, using
a single indicator I am able to compare the findings of this analysis to those
of similar studies which have been carried out by other scholars.
3.4 The independence index
As argued in the previous section, the hypothesis of one-dimensionality of
the data suggests that only the first factor should be retained after the factor
analysis. This assumption is corroborated by the difference between the
explanatory power of the first factor and that of the others. The first factor
5 Thanks to Mark Franklin for pointing this out.
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has an eigenvalue of 7.26 and it explains 21.37% of the variance.6 On the
whole, factor analysis shows 12 factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.
However, the difference between the first and the second factor is 3.35,
whilst for all the factors from the second to the twelfth is 0.25 on average.
If we reject (theoretically) that this data set may have 12 dimensions,7 we
can confidently conclude that the first factor is the main latent trait we are
interested in: formal independence.8
In Table 3.1 we can see the factor loadings (i.e. the correlation with the
factor) for each item derived from the survey.9 The correlation can be ei-
ther positive or negative, meaning that some features which are expected to
bring independence to the authorities turn out to be negatively correlated
with the «independence factor» (and with most other items). It is easy to
note that the items differ very much between each other as to their corre-
lation with the first factor. Some of them indicate a high level of indepen-
dence (for instance, the length of the appointment, both for the authority
head and for the members of the board); others have almost no importance
in this respect (the control of the budget and on the personnel, whose cor-
relation coefficients are close to zero); a few are negatively correlated with
6 Factor analysis has been performed on a data set including all the variables drawn from
the survey, using the principal-component factor method. Since there were some missing
values (and factor analysis by default deletes all the observations with missing values), I
needed to impute them using multiple imputation. The original dataset contained 99 missing
values out of 1053 values (9%). However, it must be considered that 8 authorities had 9
missing values each because they do not have a board – therefore, they could not answer
the questions of the survey which regarded the board. If we exclude these 72 «inevitable»
missing values, the missing values due to a lack of answer were only 27 (2.5%). The Multiple
Imputation command (in PASW 18) has generated five imputed data sets. To obtain the
matrix for factor analysis, I have calculated the mean across these five replications for every
value in the data sets.
7 If there were multiple dimensions, according to Van dei Eijk (2007), factor analysis
would not detect them correctly.
8 I have also tried to calculate the independence index using the same method as Gilardi
(2002): I have sorted the items according to five aspects (head of the authority, board of
the authority, administration and management of the authority, relationship of the authority
with other public bodies, competences of the authority) and calculated the mean for every
category. Then I have computed the mean of the five categories. This index is correlated at
0.87 with the factor scores.
9 Since only one factor had been retained, no rotation was performed. The scores were
calculated using the standard regression method.
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the factor. The item «Obligations vis-à-vis the parliament» is one of these
strange cases. One would expect an authority which has a few or no obli-
gations towards the parliament to be very independent − and this was the
expectation when the survey was designed. However, this item is negatively
correlated with the «independence factor»: this suggests that, whilst inde-
pendent NCAs have few or no obligations towards the executive, they are
very much accountable vis-à-vis the parliament. Being accountable towards
the parliament is apparently a sign of independence. Most likely, this relate
to the fact that the two kinds of accountability are alternative: countries
prefer to choose either one or the other10. Their factor loadings tell us that
independent NCAs are more likely relieved of obligations towards the gov-
ernment, rather than of obligations towards the parliament.
Figure 3.4.1 shows the formal independence of the 27 national compe-
tition authorities. At first sight, we do not notice clear distinctions in the
order of the agencies. For instance, although among the highest-scoring
authorities there are the Italian, the French and the Spanish ones, there is
no absolute dominance of Western European countries among the most in-
dependent agencies (also Hungary and Romania perform quite well in this
respect), nor are there other evident cleavages. This suggests that to explain
the differences in the formal independence they are given, we need to con-
sider multiple factors and the interactions between them. For the moment,
let us just note that the two oldest European competition authorities, the
German Bundeskartellamt and the British Office of Fair Trading, are placed
in the right-hand part of the graph, among the least independent agencies.
Also the Scandinavian authorities do not appear to have a high formal in-
dependence. Given the fact that these countries are commonly considered
as an example in this field, these results appear puzzling. Nevertheless, we
must not forget that it is formal independence that we are measuring here.
One may argue that countries where the bureaucracy has a good reputation
of fairness and impartiality need not give much independence to their agen-
cies. These considerations will be taken into account in the formulation of
10 In fact, their coefficient of correlation is -0.21.
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Items Factor loadings
Head of the authority
Fixed term of office 0.54
Length of the appointment 0.71
Who appoints the head? 0.52
Explicit provisions on the dismissal 0.31
Possible to dismiss the head? 0.53
Explicit provisions on incompatibility 0.70
Is there incompatibility? 0.29
Possible to renew the appointment? 0.58
Independence as a requirement 0.20
Board of the authority
Is there a board? 0.40
Fixed term of office 0.60
Length of the appointment 0.71
Who appoints the board? -0.17
Explicit provisions on the dismissal 0.09
Possible to dismiss the board? 0.40
Explicit provisions on incompatibility 0.60
Is there incompatibility? 0.12
Possible to renew the appointment? 0.50
Independence as a requirement 0.27
Relationship with parliament and government
Explicit mention of independence 0.51
Decisional autonomy 0.39
Financial autonomy 0.41
Organisational autonomy 0.31
Obligations vis-à-vis the government 0.22
Obligations vis-à-vis the parliament -0.60
Overturning body -0.18
Source of the budget 0.62
Control on the budget 0.01
Internal organisation 0.53
Personnel 0.00
Other prerogatives
Powers in case of overlapping competences 0.19
Possibility to set up rules of procedure 0.64
Possibility to adopt interim measures 0.28
Possibility to impose sanctions 0.12
Table 3.1: Factor loadings of the items derived from the survey
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Figure 3.4.1: Formal independence of the 27 national competition authori-
ties (standardised values).
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the model.
3.5 Empirical test
To be tested, the theories listed in the previous chapter must be translated
into hypotheses that fit this particular population of IRAs. As a matter of
fact, whilst some of those hypotheses can more easily be applied to every
context (the veto players hypothesis, for example), others express more ab-
stract cause-effect relationships, and must be adapted to the specific pol-
icy field in which delegation takes place. Suffice it to mention the blame-
shifting theory, which implies that politicians want to avoid being blamed
by the actors who lose in a certain policy process; but to test if such blame
is shifted or not, one needs to assess in advance who would win and who
would lose.
Adopting a policy-domain centred research design, as I do, generally im-
plies a different strategy as regards to the formulation of hypotheses, com-
pared to cross-sector analysis. Cross-sector analyses let us test certain hy-
potheses, but also prevent us from testing others. Simply put, in order to
verify the effect of a factor across different sectors or policy domains, it is
necessary to assume that this factor can be identified by the same indicator
in all of them. Where this condition is not met, hypotheses cannot be tested.
Taking again the example of blame shifting, it is highly plausible that blame
is avoided from different actors in different policy domains; and this is a
kind of situation that makes it impossible to have the same indicator across
various sectors, and ultimately to test the theory.
What has been said with respect to cross-sector analysis applies also to
the analysis that I carry out here. Also comparisons between countries in
the same policy sector do not let us test certain hypotheses. If we consider
all the theories that point to uncertainty, lack of information, or need for ex-
pertise11 as the factor that triggers delegation, we see that there cannot be
variation among the cases that I have. Looking at the literature, we clearly
11As Bawn’s theory of delegation (Section 2.3.4).
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find that uncertainty is always associated with the information needed to
enact a policy. Thus, it may well vary among sectors, but not among coun-
tries – unless one hypothesises that members of the parliament or ministers
of a country are subject to some factor that makes them less informed (or
less capable to get informed) on a certain policy. As a consequence, some
of the theories reviewed in the previous chapter will not be tested in this
statistical analysis, even though they might still turn out to be useful when
discussing the results and draw general conclusions from this study.
3.5.1 Theoretical framework and hypotheses
In spite of the evident differences they have, all the theories and hypotheses
listed in the previous chapter maintain the assumption that delegation ulti-
mately depends on a choice made by the legislators. Also in the theoretical
framework presented here, are the actors whose preferences are analysed
to draw testable hypotheses the lawmakers. Henceforth, by the terms «leg-
islators», «lawmakers» and «politicians» I will refer to members both of the
parliament and of the government. As a matter of fact, especially in the
countries studied here, it is impossible to attribute political decisions either
to one body or to the other: in all the EU member states (except Cyprus),
the government must have the confidence of the parliament, and thus dis-
tinguishing between the two makes little sense.
The first hypothesis that I propose stems from the economic literature
on regulatory capture (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983; Peltzman
et al. 1989, see Section 2.2). This literature has emphasised the risk that or-
ganised groups of firms may «capture» the regulators and obtain favours by
sharing with them the rent created by an inefficient regulation. The work
of Stigler, Peltzman and Becker represents politics as an activity in which
politicians maximise the utility that they can obtain from different interest
groups (firms, consumers, workers). Any attempt to adapt these theories
to the study of IRAs shall consider that capture and utility maximisation in-
volve two different albeit closely linked actors: the bodies that firms may
want to capture are the agencies, but the actors who maximise their util-
Guidi, Mattia (2012), Explaining and Assessing Independence: National competition authorities in the EU member states 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/46429
3.5. EMPIRICAL TEST 79
ity are the politicians. What is the possible causal link between these two
occurrences?
Let us maintain that, in the field of competition policy, national politi-
cians try to maximise the utility of two groups, consumers and big firms (I
say big firms because only if a company has a relevant market share will its
activities be likely to arouse the interest of the competition authority). We
can posit that these two groups have opposed preferences about the inde-
pendence of the competition authority: the first want it as independent as
possible, the latter want it to be controlled by the politics as much as possi-
ble. Since EU countries do not sensibly differ with respect to the weight and
the influence of the consumers, but they do with regard to the weight of big
firms in the national economy, I will focus on the latter, as they are the real
«variable» in this case.
Big firms do not like to deal with a very independent competition author-
ity, because they are those which have most to lose from strict competition
enforcement. Since big firms have, by definition, a relevant share of the
market, they are more likely than other firms to be charged of dominant po-
sition, and they cannot acquire other companies or merge with them with-
out being carefully scrutinised by the authority. Because of their size, every
decision they take is likely to affect the market, so competition agencies will
always «keep a close eye» on them. Coming to the core question of this
chapter, does the independence of NCAs make a difference for big firms in
this respect? I hypothesise it does: in every occasion wherein the authority
intervenes or might intervene, it is easier for big firms to deal with a regu-
lator that can be influenced by the parliament and the government. Indeed,
they often present good arguments to convince politicians to protect their
interests, for two reasons. First, in most European countries, they have links
with the political system that date back to when the economy was mainly
regulated by the state. Second, big firms can claim that a decision will force
them to reduce the number of the employees, or to move the production
to other countries. And, if the firm has many employees and/or strategic
assets, these threats can turn out to be very convincing.
In regards to the argument that big firms might be more interested in
Guidi, Mattia (2012), Explaining and Assessing Independence: National competition authorities in the EU member states 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/46429
80 CHAPTER 3. EXPLAINING FORMAL INDEPENDENCE
colluding with the authority rather than with politicians, we must notice
that occurrences like the «revolving doors» are not likely to happen in com-
petition regulation. In the regulation of specific economic sectors, where the
IRA deals with a handful of firms, it may occur that regulators and regula-
tees develop «special relationships» which facilitate the migration from one
side to the other. But competition authorities regulate the whole economy:
they deal with hundreds of firms, and it is neither feasible nor convenient
for their members to set up such relationships. Moreover, NCAs do not have
the «sectoral expertise» that many big firms often need.
If the presence and the weight of big firms has such an effect, then it can
be hypothesised that their number affects the politicians’ attitude towards
the independence of NCAs:
HYPOTHESIS 1(A) («CAPTURE»)
The greater the weight of big firms in a country, the less independence is likely
to be conferred on the competition authority
On the other hand, the influence of powerful economic interests might
also have an opposite effect, if blame-shifting motivations prevailed. The
previous hypothesis assumes that the legislators are not genuinely inter-
ested in competition enforcement, and that they choose to create a very
independent regulator only if there are not many big firms in the country
which could be harmed by such an agency. But it could also be to the con-
trary: politicians could be really committed to ensure that antitrust norms
be strictly enforced in their country. In this case, they would very likely want
to shift the blame that may arise from those who are mostly jeopardised by
competition enforcement.
Competition policy is generally regarded with favour by the voters (i.e.
the consumers), because its main aim is to grant better quality and bet-
ter prices to them. If we ask ourselves who wins and who loses from this
policy, we conclude that the potential «losers» are usually big enterprises
which are prevented from increasing or consolidating their market power
or dominant position, or whose collusive behaviours are sanctioned by the
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authority. If blame-shifting appears in competition policy, the actors whose
criticism politicians would most like to avoid, would be that of big compa-
nies. As Wilks and Bartle (2002: 157) state, «[w]hen powerful companies
and industrial interests come clamouring to politicians or bureaucrats it is
immensely helpful to assert agency independence just as they would assert
judicial independence». If this were the most realistic hypothesis, the rela-
tionship between the number of big firms and the independence of NCAs
should be positive: more firms would mean more potential blame; higher
risk of blame would result in greater autonomy for the competition author-
ity. Therefore, an alternative formulation to the previous hypothesis could
be stated as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1(B) («BLAME SHIFTING»)
The greater the weight of big firms in a country, the more independence is
likely to be conferred on the competition authority
Another important incentive for the legislators comes from the EU mem-
bership and from the role of the European Commission («the Commission»
henceforth). As has been said in Section 2.8, competition policy has always
been one of the core policies of the EU. Since the Treaty of Rome (1957),
antitrust principles have always been promoted and enforced by the Com-
mission, which has undoubtedly had a propulsive role in encouraging the
member states to accept policies that were initially at least unfamiliar to
most of them.
The powers of the Commission and of the national authorities in this
field are defined by the above mentioned Regulation 1/2003, which entered
into force on 1st May 2004. Since this law does not prescribe the degree
of independence that national agencies ought to enjoy, member states are
free to set for them a level of autonomy that they prefer. However, this law
contains provisions that may affect this choice. Indeed, authorities are not
given an exclusive competence on national cases: the Commission (in prac-
tice, the Directorate-General for Competition12) can initiate a procedure for
12 The Directorate-General for Competition is headed by the commissioner responsible
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the adoption of decisions, if a national agency has not acted on a case. And,
even if the agency is already examining a particular case, the Commission
can initiate its own investigation, after having consulted with the agency. In
any case, the decision by the Commission to begin a proceeding «relieve[s]
the competition authorities of the Member States of their competence to
apply» Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty (Reg. 1/2003, art. 11.6).
An intervention by the Commission might be particularly undesirable for
a member state. First of all, if the Directorate-General for Competition initi-
ates a case for the inactivity of the national agency, the final decision is very
likely to be tougher for the national firms than if the agency had dealt with
the case. As the Commission has always promoted the adoption of competi-
tion legislation among the member states, it will be a stricter enforcer, more
so because it does not have to pay a political price for its decisions. Second,
and more importantly, the Commission’s intervention will be considered an
informal sanction for the national authority and national politicians. Es-
pecially in countries which have been members of the EU for a very long
time, politicians want to avoid being openly reprimanded by Brussels, par-
ticularly when this could damage their country’s reputation and credibility
in this important field.
Older members of the EU have been «exposed» to the principles of com-
petition for a longer time than their newer counterparts, and in as much,
they could have been affected by a «rebounding Europeanization». As Mc-
Gowan (2005) puts it, «the member states created a European competition
regime, which in turn has influenced both directly and indirectly the devel-
opment of national competition rules whose application can now be utilised
through ‘uploading’ to inform European decision-makers, which in turn in-
fluences the national authorities, and so the process continues» (McGowan
2005: 999-1000; on Europeanisation in economic regulation see also Héri-
tier 1997, and Schmidt 2001). Obviously, these Europeanisation «rebounds»
do not necessarily turn out to strengthen and make stricter the enforcement
of a policy: there are many cases in which the application of EU directives
for competition, and acts as a EU competition authority − even though all its decisions are
subject to the vote of the other commissioner and of the President of the Commission.
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or the implementation of regulations has been hindered, delayed, or weak-
ened by the member states. Explaining why, in some policy fields, the Com-
mission manages to break through the member states’ reserve, whilst it does
not succeed in others’, would be a more than interesting issue to investigate.
Unfortunately, in this analysis there is no room for answering such a ques-
tion. It is fair enough to acknowledge that in the field of competition policy
the Commission has progressively increased the scope and the relevance of
its powers. As a consequence, all the EU member states must now apply to
the same (European) law regarding competition enforcement, and, with the
creation of the European Competition Network (ECN), NCAs have become
de facto branches of the DG Competition. Higher independence from the
national politics means a closer relationship with the Commission.
If the decision on the independence of competition authorities has been
influenced by this continuous process of Europeanisation, we should expect
countries which have joined the EU earlier to have agencies with greater au-
tonomy. First, because they assign more importance to competition enforce-
ment; second, because they want their authorities to have a better reputa-
tion vis-à-vis the Commission. Therefore, with respect to EU membership,
we can hypothesise that:
HYPOTHESIS 2 («EUROPEANISATION»)
The longer a country has been a member of the European Union, the more
independence is likely to be conferred on the competition authority
Along with these two hypotheses, three other ones, related to issues of
credibility, will be tested. The motivation is twofold: on the one hand, as
has been shown (see Sections 1.1 and 2.6), credibility is deemed to be one
of the major reasons for establishing independent agencies; on the other, all
of these three hypotheses have been found to significantly affect agencies’
independence in other empirical analyses (Gilardi 2002; 2005a; Elgie and
McMenamin 2005; Wonka and Rittberger 2010).
The third hypothesis implies that politicians may want to insulate some
choices that they have made from the threat that their successors would
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weaken, modify or revert them. If an independent competition authority
is set up to reassure investors that the regulatory environment will not be
changed abruptly, governmental instability and polarisation are an obvious
problem for any country. If government alternation is frequent in a coun-
try, and the ideological distance between the coalitions is wide, investors
might not trust that country: they could prefer to put their money to use
elsewhere, and that country would be damaged by its lack of credibility. To
compensate for this potential deficit, politicians need to show that, even if
the elections are won by parties or coalitions which oppose competition law,
antitrust enforcement will be preserved, because it is not directly relational
to the government. As I have already pointed out (Section 2.6), giving inde-
pendence to a competition authority does not prevent any incumbent from
reducing the autonomy of the agency (or even dissolving it). However, it
works as a deterrent, making such a decision more costly than it would be
if there were no institutional independence from the politics.
As we will see in the next section, government instability and ideological
distance between executives are indicators that economists and political sci-
entists usually employ to measure political uncertainty. The assumption is
that both negatively influence the credibility of a country. Hence, the third
hypotheses can be formulated as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 3 («POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY»)
The higher the government instability and the ideological distance between the
executives, the more independence is likely to be conferred on the competition
authority
But credibility is also a matter of perceptions. We have seen that, accord-
ing to Majone, delegation to an independent body is a means to resolving
problems of temporal inconsistency, which occur when the legislators are
not trusted by the economic actors. It follows that, in order for the politi-
cians to solve such problems, there must be a relevant transfer of «political
property rights». If this should not be the case, the authority would not
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be trusted by the economic actors and its mere creation would not be a re-
source. Therefore, we expect that, if states delegate because of their lack
of credibility, they will tend to give much independence to the regulator, so
that it appear as though it is easily influenced by the government.
Majone’s theory does not consider credibility as a characteristic that
states would possess in general, but rather that they do so with regard to
specific policy domains. For instance, if a state has abused the trust of the
economic actors so that they no longer believe the government when it says
that it will control inflation, more discretion should be given to the central
bank. The lack of credibility pertains to a certain domain (monetary policy),
and it is solved by giving more independence to the authority which regu-
lates that domain (the central bank) other than the government. Without
a doubt, identifying the domain in which NCAs enhance the credibility of
a country is not as easy as in the case of monetary policy. Nevertheless, I
believe this theory can be applied to competition authorities as well, and I
try to advance a plausible hypothesis formulation.
Let us think of what is a good environment for investments. In spite of
having stable majorities and governments (the case of the previous hypoth-
esis), a country could still be perceived as an unfavourable environment for
private investments, due to a variety of reasons: high levels of corruption,
inefficient judiciary system, the presence of organised crime. These are all
indicators that international investors will observe very carefully. Giving in-
dependence to the competition agency can be one of the ways in which to
remedy or to mitigate these perceptions, if the body to which some functions
are committed is perceived to be more credible than the government.
This formulation fits Majone’s «credible commitment» argument quite
well. It represents a case in which the legislators, for whichever reasons,
are unable to sort out structural weaknesses of the system. They know that
this failure is likely to damage the credibility of the country and to discour-
age investments. Therefore, they establish a very independent competition
authority as a «shortcut» to compensate their lack of credibility.
According to this formulation, we are then able to hypothesise that:
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HYPOTHESIS 4 («CREDIBLE COMMITMENT»)
The worse the perceptions of the investors about the regulatory environment,
the more independence is likely to be conferred on the competition authority
Veto players can also influence the credibility of a country. As shown
above (Section 2.7), there is no consensus amongst scholars concerning the
actual role played by veto players in the process of delegation to IRAs. While
some authors claim that the relationship between the presence of veto play-
ers and the independence of regulatory authorities is positive, others affirm
the opposite. The rationale of the two rival hypotheses is also entirely dif-
ferent. Since I have no particular expectation regarding the plausibility of
either, I formulate this hypothesis as two rival ones:
HYPOTHESIS 5(A) («VETO PLAYERS AS STABILISERS»)
The greater the number of veto players in a country, the less independence is
likely to be conferred on the competition authority
HYPOTHESIS 5(B) («VETO PLAYERS AS REINFORCERS OF DELEGATION»)
The greater the number of veto players in a country, the more independence is
likely to be conferred on the competition authority
The last hypothesis that I will test is drawn from Epstein and O’Halloran’s
(1999) transaction cost politics theory, which I will adapt to parliamentary
democracy. In every democracy, every law must be pass through parliament.
In the classical scheme of division of powers, the parliament passes the laws,
and the government implements (gives execution to) them. In the US, as we
have seen in the previous chapter (Section 2.5), delegation to IRAs increases
when the President does not belong to the Congressional majority. In such
a case, the assembly prefers to leave the implementation of its legislation
to a body which is as independent as possible from the executive. At the
same time, if the legislative and the government have more similar policy
preferences, the game between them is more cooperative and the Congress
is more willing to leave the implementation to the executive.
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Before translating this hypothesis for European parliamentary democra-
cies, it is necessary to consider that almost all of them will not institutionally
allow the government to diverge from the parliament’s preferences, because
of the requirement of the confidence vote. All the EU member states, with
the exception of Cyprus, have an executive that must be supported by the
parliament. In a classical «Westminster system», divergent preferences be-
tween the parliament and the executive are simply not possible: the party
which holds the majority is also represented in the government. There can
be individual divergences, but these do not affect the form of government.
In such a system, there is no room for testing Epstein and O’Halloran’s the-
ory.
However, there may be a particular configuration of parliamentary de-
mocracy which resembles in some respects the legislative-executive relation-
ship that we observe in presidential systems. I argue that this configuration
exists, and it is represented by minority governments. When an executive
is not supported by a party or a coalition which retains the majority of the
seats in an assembly, those parties which support it
• are less tied to the government (are more independent from it);
• have much more control over the action of the government,
similarly to what happens in presidential systems when there is a «divided
government» situation. Whilst in the case of a «majority government» exec-
utives increasingly dominate their majorities, in the case of minority govern-
ments the executive must gain the confidence of the assembly on every vote.
This also means that the government is held more accountable towards the
parliament, and that the latter tends to exert a more stringent supervision
over the implementation of legislation. This implies that delegation to IRAs,
as a «check» on the activity of the executive, should be greater in scope in
countries which have minority governments, compared to others in which
parties do not form minority governments.
The sixth hypothesis can then be stated as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 6 («MINORITY GOVERNMENTS»)
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The more often a country experiences minority governments, the more
independence is likely to be conferred on the competition authority
3.5.2 Data and operationalisation
In this section, I will describe the operationalisation of the explanatory vari-
ables. With regard to the indicators that I will use, it must be made clear
that the availability of information for the dependent variable forces me to
adopt a particular research design. Since all the knowledge about the for-
mal independence of competition authorities in this thesis is drawn from the
responses to the survey (sent in October 2009 and collected by the end of
that year), for this variable I have only values for one point in time. There-
fore, I am unable to analyse the data as if they were a time-series, looking
at how changes in the explanatory variables influence formal independence
through time. On the other hand, neither I can assume that the situation
of an authority in the year 2009 is caused by the effect of the explanatory
variables in that exact year.
Everyone can recognise that institutions are, by definition, «sticky»: they
are often yielded by agreements between different actors that crystallise a
balance of power. They shape the expectations and the behaviour of many
actors. For these reasons, institutions are not usually easy to change and
often evolve following slow and incremental tracks. It can be also noted
that most (if not all) the indicators employed in the statistical analysis of
this thesis are very stable through time: this confirms the assumption that
they represent rather constant characteristics of the countries. Hence, it is
better to conceive of the explanatory factors as exerting their effect over
more extensive periods of time. For this reason, I have collected the values
for the independent variables as mean values across preceding periods of
time.
Attention should also be paid to the fact that the formal independence
of NCAs in 2009 is not necessarily the same as that which was conferred
upon the agencies when they were created. Some authorities have not un-
dergone any changes since their establishment, with respect to the degree
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of autonomy, while others were reformed after their creation, some even
shortly before this survey.13
CAPTURE / BLAME SHIFTING. For testing Hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b), an
indicator of market concentration will be employed. Indices of market con-
centration are usually calculated by antitrust agencies within specific sectors
to assess if some firms enjoy a dominant position in that segment of the mar-
ket. However, for the purpose of this analysis, computing a measure like the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index in a number of sectors is problematic for three
reasons. First, there is no database of market concentration from which such
data can be extracted, and this information would have to be collected from
many firms, in many sectors, for 27 countries (provided that it were feasi-
ble). Second, pre-selecting which sectors should be included – and which
ones should not – could be regarded as arbitrary, and it is not simple to think
of reasonable criteria by which to choose them. Third, on condition that a
reasonable choice could be done, there would still be many countries in my
data set for which such sectoral-specific data are not available.
Therefore, a second-best solution must be applied. On the ground that
competition authorities supervise all the economic environment of a country,
and not just one or few sectors, I have concluded that an indicator based on
the number of big companies that operate in the national market could be an
appropriate proxy for concentration. The database from which I have drawn
my indicator is Amadeus, provided by the Bureau van Dijk, which contains
the main financial and business accounts for over 14 million companies all
over Europe – although the version I have accessed includes only data on
large and very large companies.14 To have a measure of the weight of very
big firms, I have split, for each country, the available companies into four
groups, according to their turnover.15 Afterwards, I have calculated the
13 For instance, the Spanish competition authority (Comisión Nacional de la Competencia)
was reformed in 2007, the French Autorité de la concurrence was reformed in 2008.
14This means, however, a total population of over 350.000 firms in Europe. To be con-
sidered «large» or «very large», companies must fulfil at least one of these three criteria:
a) turnover at least equal to 15 millions Euros; b) total assets at least equal to 30 millions
Euros; c) number of employees at least equal to 200.
15The first group includes companies with more than 50 millions Euros of turnover, the
second companies with turnover between 20 and 50 millions, the third between 10 and 20
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Figure 3.5.1: Weight of the biggest companies in each country (standardised
values)
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ratio between the companies in the first group (those having more than
50 millions Euros of annual turnover) and the total number of companies
present in the data set for that country. The market concentration proxy, for
each country (i), is calculated as such
BFi =
1
N
2008∑
y=2005
C1y
C1y + C
2
y + C
3
y + C
4
y
where:
y is the year16;
Cy are the number of companies belonging to each of the four groups
for each year.
EUROPEANISATION. To test the Europeanisation hypothesis, I have simply
calculated how many years have passed starting the year in which a country
joined the European Union until 2009 (when the survey has been collected).
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY. In his works on regulatory independence, Gi-
lardi has operationalised political uncertainty employing a measurement
first conceived by Franzese (2002), the so-called replacement risk. This in-
dicator takes into account two separate values, on the basis of which the
author assumes that politicians feel more or less «secure» about their power.
The first value is called hazard rate (HR), and it is the inverse of the dura-
tion (D) of the government in years (or fraction of years):
HR =
1
D
One might deem that the fact that in a state executives last very little rep-
resents already a great political uncertainty for the incumbent. But Franzese
considers also the political distance, in terms of a left-right scale, between
the governments that alternate. A state might have very short government
millions, the fourth under 10 millions.
16 The segmentation of companies into four groups was available in Amadeus for the years
from 2005 to 2008.
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terms, but if the parties that support the executives remain similar, the fall
of an executive does not mean that all the «political property rights» will go
to a new government with completely different preferences.
I measure political distance by calculating the standard deviation of
the left-right value of each government in a given period. My procedure
is slightly different from Franzese’s, in that he was interested in analysing
time-series data (because he had different values for his dependent variable
through time), whereas I have only the value yielded by my survey. Thus, I
have chosen to include all the governments from 1990 to 2008 in the calcu-
lation. The year 1990 has been included because many countries in the data
set began having regular elections around that year; going backwards would
drastically reduce the number of available observations for many members
of the population.
For the hazard rate, I have computed the mean value in the period, as
follows:
HR =
1
N
2008∑
i=1990
1
Di
This formula considers the actual duration of the government in charge
for every year. For instance, if a government was in its third year in 1990,
that country receives a value of 3 for 1990. If in a single year two govern-
ments take office, that country receive a value of 0.5 for that year, and so
forth.
As regards the average political distance (PD) between governments in
a country (i) in a given period, I calculate it as the standard deviation of the
executives with respect to the left-right axis:
PDi =
√√√√ 1
N
2008∑
y=1990
(LRy − µLR)2
where:
y is the year (from 1990 to 2008);
LRy is the left-right value, on a scale going from 0 (maximum left) to
10 (maximum right), for country i in year y;
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µLR is the mean of this value across the period of interest.
To calculate the left-right positioning of each government I have relied
on the data contained in the ParlGov database,17 which codes all the parties
in parliaments and governments from 1945 to present, for all the European
countries plus Australia and New Zealand. The information includes the
duration of each legislature and executive and, for each party, the left-right
value,18 the number of seats in the parliament, and the number of ministers
in the government.19 I have calculated the left-right position (LR) for each
year (y) using the mean of the left-right positioning of each party that sup-
ported that country’s government in that year, weighted by the number of
seats that it had. The formula for LRy is the following:
LRy =
(
1∑N
x=1 Sx
)
N∑
x=1
LRxSx
where:
LRx is the left-right positioning of party (x) in the government;
Sx is the number of seats that party x retains in the parliament.
For each year, the value has been computed for the government which
was in charge. If in the same year there has been more than one govern-
ment, their mean value is taken.
According to Franzese (but see also Gilardi 2002, 2005), both duration
and political distance should be positively correlated with independence.
This is why they test the product of the two indicators, calling it replace-
ment risk. As regards political distance, the rationale is clear: a political
environment where the executives tend to diverge very much with respect
to their preferences would discourage economic actors from investing in a
certain country. This lack of trust would be compensated by an independent
competition authority that cannot be influenced by political fluctuations.
17http://www.parlgov.org. The project leaders are Holger Döring (European University
Institute) and Philip Manow (University of Heidelberg).
18 The data on left-right positioning included in ParlGov are taken from several sources:
Castles and Mair (1984), Huber and Inglehart (1995), Benoit and Laver (2006), Bakker et al.
(2012).
19The database also contains data on European elections.
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Figure 3.5.2: Average government duration and political distance in the 27
countries (standardised values)
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With respect to the first indicator, government duration, the logic is appar-
ently similar: short executives produce uncertainty, and countries having
this problem should opt for giving independence to the competition agency.
However, I believe that in countries where governments tend to have short
terms, other incentives may prevail for the incumbents: executives with a
short-run perspective might not be able to take decisions concerning the
credibility of the country, and might prefer not to delegate too much if this
means relinquishing some of the limited power that they have. The values of
government duration and political distance for all the countries are shown
in Figure 3.6.2.
CREDIBLE COMMITMENT. For the «credible commitment» hypothesis (Hy-
pothesis 4), the perceptions of the investors about the regulatory environ-
ment are operationalised with the World Bank indicator of «regulatory qual-
ity»,20 which «captures perceptions of the ability of the government to for-
mulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and pro-
mote private sector development».21 In my view, this indicator is more ap-
propriate and reliable than others employed in similar analyses. For in-
stance, Gilardi (2002, 2005), Elgie and McMenamin (2005) and Wonka and
Rittberger (2010) all operationalise the need for «credible commitments» as
a policy-specific factor. Therefore, they distinguish either between the policy
field in which the authorities operate (Gilardi 2002, 2005; Wonka and Rit-
tberger 2010) or according to the circumstance that the agencies regulate
a sector that has been subject to market-opening (Gilardi 2002, Elgie and
McMenamin 2005).
However, such an operationalisation implies that agencies with the same
functions across countries (the case of this analysis) are «equal» and not
comparable. The reason for using a different proxy in this analysis is that
evidently, even in the same policy field, not all countries enjoy the same
credibility in the eyes of the investors. The strength of this indicator lies in
the fact that it is built on the basis of the perceptions of firms and experts,
which are exactly the actors that governments want to reassure, according
20 Data available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
21 See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rq.pdf.
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Figure 3.5.3: Index of perceived regulatory quality for the 27 countries
(standardised values).
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to this hypothesis. The expectation is that the lower is the perceived regu-
latory quality, the higher will be the need for credibility. In order to control
for annual fluctuations, I employ the mean value of the indicator in the pe-
riod 1998-2008.22 The values of the index of regulatory quality for the EU
member states are shown in Figure 3.5.3.
VETO PLAYERS. Measuring veto players is always problematic, as a cer-
tain arbitrariness cannot be completely avoided. However, the main com-
ponents of every veto players’ index rest on Tsebelis’ distinction between
institutional and partisan ones. The indicator that I will employ in this sta-
tistical analysis is the variable checks from the Database of Political Institu-
tions (DPI, see Beck et al. 2001; Keefer and Stasavage 2003). In contrast
to Gilardi, I have used neither Henisz’s Political Constraints dataset (Henisz
2000, 2002) nor Tsebelis’ veto players data. The first has not been em-
ployed because there are some inconsistencies between the data provided
by the author in different articles, although the calculation method should
be the same (thanks to Chris Hanretty for pointing this out). Regarding Tse-
belis’ database,23 the reason is that it contains data only on 14 out of 27
European countries.
The variable checks simply counts the number of veto players. For every
year, it takes values from 1 upwards: the starting value is the number of
institutional veto players; then, this value is reduced if these institutions
have the same political preferences24 or is increased if, for instance in a
parliamentary system, there are more parties in the government coalition.
For this statistical analysis, I have calculated the average value for each
country in the period 1990-2006.25 A representation of the 27 countries
ordered on the basis of their number of veto players is shown in Figure
3.5.4.
22 1998 is the first year available in this dataset.
23 Available at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/tsebelis/veto_players_data.
24In presidential systems, for example, «if elections are conducted under closed-list rules
and the president’s party is the largest government party in a particular chamber, then the
DPI assumes that the president exercises substantial control over the chamber and it is not
counted as a check» (Beck et al. 2001: 170).
25The database contains data for 177 countries from 1975 to 2006.
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Figure 3.5.4: Average number of veto players (standardised values) and
proportion of months with a minority government (standardised values) in
the 27 countries.
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Variables Range Mean St. deviation
BIG FIRMS [0.0673, 0.4716] 0.2204 0.1125
EU MEMBERSHIP [2, 57] 22.96 21.3334
POLARISATION [0.4147, 2.657] 1.297 0.5885
AVG. GOV. DURATION [0.8859, 5] 2.458 1.03
REGULATORY QUALITY [0.1671, 1.717] 1.171 0.3872
VETO PLAYERS [2.375, 6.412] 4.187 1.0409
MINORITY GOVERNMENTS [0, 1] 0.272 0.299
Table 3.2: Explanatory variables (descriptive statistics).
MINORITY GOVERNMENTS. The last hypothesis is going to be tested with
a proxy that measures the frequency of minority governments in a country.
Employing again the ParlGov database, I have checked how many months
each country has had between 1990 and 2008 with a minority government,
and then I have divided this by the total number of months:
MG =
mMG
mTOT
Figure 3.5.4 shows the standardised values of MG for all the countries
of the data set. We can see that, whilst nine countries have had no mi-
nority governments at all within these 19 years, others appear very much
accustomed to them. The former include, amongst the others, Germany,
Italy, United Kingdom, Belgium and Finland. Amongst the latter, we find
the two Scandinavian members of the EU with very high values (Sweden
and Denmark), followed by Spain, Romania and Ireland.
Guidi, Mattia (2012), Explaining and Assessing Independence: National competition authorities in the EU member states 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/46429
100 CHAPTER 3. EXPLAINING FORMAL INDEPENDENCE
Models
Explanatory variables 1 2
BIG FIRMS (log)
-0.631* -0.469*
(0.288) (0.221)
EU MEMBERSHIP
0.82*** 0.834***
(0.174) (0.161)
POLARISATION
0.676*** 0.625***
(0.142) (0.118)
AVERAGE GOVERNMENT
DURATION (log)
0.532** 0.441**
(0.182) (0.142)
REGULATORY QUALITY (log)
-0.375° -0.448*
(0.18) (0.165)
YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT
0.415** 0.36**
(0.131) (0.116)
VETO PLAYERS
0.228
(0.185)
MINORITY GOVERNMENTS
-0.226
(0.161)
BIG FIRMS (log) * POLARISATION
-0.326*
(0.155)
Intercept
0.011
(0.107)
Adj. R² 0.64 0.69
F 6.791*** 9.232***
Method: OLS regression. N=27.
Standardised variables.
In Model 1, the coefficient of the intercept is u 0, with Pr(> |t|) = 1.
Estimators’ significance: *** < 0.001 ** < 0.01 * < 0.05 ° < 0.1
Table 3.3: Multiple regression models
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3.5.3 Method of analysis
The data are modelled with OLS regression.26 In Model 1, the following
equation is tested:
FormalIndependence = β1 + β2 · log(BigF irms) + β3 · EuMembership+
+ β4 · Polarisation+ β5 · log(Avg.Gov.Duration) +
+ β6 · log(Reg.Quality) + β7 · Y ear +
+ β8 · V etoP layers+ β9 ·MinorityGovernments
As can be seen, in this model all the indicators listed in the previous
section are included, together with a variable indicating the year in which
the authority was established. The reason for the inclusion of this control
variable is to ascertain whether there is a time effect, and how it influences
formal independence. All the variables are standardised. For three out of
the nine indicators, (BIG FIRMS, AVERAGE GOVERNMENT DURATION and REG-
ULATORY QUALITY) I use the natural logarithm, as they would not have a nor-
mal distribution otherwise. We observe that all the indicators except VETO
PLAYERS and MINORITY GOVERNMENTS are significantly correlated with the
formal independence of the NCAs. The coefficient of determination indi-
cates that about two thirds of the total variance is explained by the model.
Given that the observations are not so many (27) for this method of anal-
ysis, whilst the number of explanatory variables (8) is relatively high, tests
on multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and on the presence of deviant cases
must be carried out with great attention. Concerning the risk of a selection
bias, it is enough to say that this analysis does not aim at generalising to the
whole population of IRAs or competition authorities in the world. Never-
theless, as regards competition agencies in the EU member states, the whole
population is included in this empirical test: hence, if the analysis points out
significant relationships, they can be considered valid in this area.
Model 1 does not seem to suffer from heteroscedasticity. Constant error
26 The statistical analysis and the graphs presented in this chapter have been produced
with R, version 2.11.0.
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variance has been checked with three different tests: the Breusch-Pagan test
(Breusch and Pagan 1979), the Goldfeld-Quandt test (Goldfeld and Quandt
1965) and the Harrison-McCabe test (Harrison and McCabe 1979).27 None
of the tests have rejected the hypothesis that the model is homoskedastic.28
As regards possible issues of multicollinearity, the computation of the vari-
ance inflation factor for all the explanatory variables suggests that there are
no problems in this respect.29To conclude with the tests for Model 1, also
the presence of outliers and influential cases has been verified. The analy-
sis of the studentised residuals shows that there are no observations with a
Bonferroni p-value greater than 0.05. Therefore, the model is in line with
the assumption of ordinary least-squares regression also with regard to this
aspect.
In Model 2, I have taken out the two indicators that are not significant
in Model 1 (VETO PLAYERS and MINORITY GOVERNMENTS) and I have added
an interaction between BIG FIRMS and POLARISATION. The resulting model
is:
Formal independence = β1 + β2 · log(BigF irms) + β3 · EuMembership+
+ β4 · Polarisation+ β5 · log(Avg.Gov.Duration) +
+ β6 · log(Reg.Quality) + β7 · Y ear +
+ β8 · log(BigF irms) · Polarisation
The reason for testing this interaction lies in the fact that the two vari-
ables define opposite albeit strictly related concepts: the first measures the
condition of uncertainty of the legislator, the second measures the strength
of the counterpart. It is therefore plausible that their effects reinforce each
27 The tests have been performed using the package lmtest in R (Zeileis and Hothorn
2002).
28 The p-value for the three tests is, respectively, 0.82, 0.46, 0.78.
29 The variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than 2.5 for all the variables except BIG FIRMS
(which has a VIF equal to 6). Although it would be preferable that all the VIFs were < 4,
VIFs < 10 are usually not regarded as a concern. Moreover, there seem to be no problems in
the estimation of the coefficients. The variance inflation factor (VIF) test has been performed
using the package car in R (Fox 2009)
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other, as the analysis confirms: according to the results of the regression,
the interaction has a significant coefficient. The impact of BIG FIRMS varies
for different values of POLARISATION; in particular, as the latter grows, the
negative effect of the first grows. Overall, Model 2 has a higher explana-
tory power than Model 1, besides being more parsimonious, as the higher F
statistics points out.
Also Model 2 does not present problems as regards heteroscedasticity30
and multicollinearity31. The analysis of the studentised residuals shows
instead that the Polish competition authority is a potential outlier.32 The
Cook’s distance of this observation is, indeed, greater than 0.5. However,
running the same regression excluding the Polish authority yields very sim-
ilar coefficients; therefore, the model can be meaningfully interpreted.
3.5.4 Discussion of results
As has already been observed, the indicators employed to test Hypotheses
5 and 6 (VETO PLAYERS and MINORITY GOVERNMENTS) are not found to be
significantly correlated with the variation of the formal independence of na-
tional competition authorities. The coefficient is positive for VETO PLAYERS
and negative for MINORITY GOVERNMENTS: even though these estimators
cannot fully be trusted, among the two alternative hypotheses, 5(B) seems
to be more realistic than 5(A); Hypothesis 6, instead, is not only rejected
because not significant, but also because the estimated effect opposes what
was hypothesised. The lack of confirmation for the veto players hypothesis
may be due to the fact that the establishment of an independent competi-
tion authority is a change of the status quo that increases the social welfare.
Therefore, veto players that would oppose such change can be compensated
with a «side payment», as suggested by Lindvall (2010).
Regarding Hypothesis 1, the results show that the weight of big firms
30 The p-values for the three heteroscedasticity tests are, respectively: 0.37, 0.29, 0.37.
None of them is significant at 0.05.
31 The VIF for all the variables is < 2.3, except for BIG FIRMS, which has a value of 4.09
(significantly lower than in Model 1).
32 The observation has a Bonferroni p-value lower than 0.05.
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negatively influences the independence of competition authorities. Hence,
the blame shifting hypothesis is utterly rejected. The data indicate that,
among the two alternative formulations, 1(A) is closer to reality: politicians
seem to care more about the presence of big firms in their country than
about avoiding being blamed for antitrust enforcement. Model 2, in partic-
ular, yields a notably interesting finding: the negative effect of BIG FIRMS on
formal independence changes with the level of POLARISATION of the coun-
try. The results of the interaction help us understand what can be retained
from the mechanism hypothesised in the formulation of Hypothesis 1(A). In
fact, the analysis demonstrates that the capture of politicians does not oc-
cur in every scenario, but rather where politicians are more uncertain about
the preferences of the future incumbent, as if in such a situation they were
«weaker» and more preoccupied with not displeasing big firms − or, at least,
more willing to control the competition regulator, and less willing to give it
complete leeway.
As Figure 3.5.533 and Figure 3.5.6 show, for low values of POLARISA-
TION, the impact of a shift from the first to the ninth decile of BIG FIRMS is
almost equal to zero, but, as political uncertainty grows, the negative effect
of BIG FIRMS becomes more and more pronounced. Simply put, not in ev-
ery European country politicians tend to establish less independent agencies
when they deal with a relevant number of big firms; this happens in a more
noticeable way where the uncertainty about the preferences of the future
government is higher. The data show that where the policy output is stable
(when polarisation is low), big firms do not benefit from any «appeasement»
efforts by politicians; vice versa, if the differences between the coalitions are
greater, the result is as hypothesised.
Hypothesis 2 is also fully confirmed. The EU MEMBERSHIP indicator is
strongly significant in all the models, and the effect on agency indepen-
dence is positive, as hypothesised. Since the indicators for the explanatory
33 The graph in Figure 3.5.5 has been produced in R with the package plotrix (Lemon
2006). Simulated first differences have been obtained using the function sim in the package
Zelig (Imai et al. 2008, 2009). The procedure followed is the one suggested by Brambor et al.
(2006). For a discussion of the logic and the implications of stochastic simulation, see King
(1997: 141 ss.). Expected values have been obtained through bootstrapped simulations.
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Figure 3.5.5: Simulated first differences between expected values of FOR-
MAL INDEPENDENCE for BIG FIRMS at its 1st decile and expected values of
FORMAL INDEPENDENCE for BIG FIRMS at its 9th decile, given different levels
of POLARISATION. Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.5.6: Effect of BIG FIRMS on formal independence for different levels
of POLARISATION.
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variables have been standardised, their coefficients can also be used to com-
pare the magnitude of their influence on the dependent variable. In this
respect, we can affirm that this variable contributes more than any other to
the overall effect. The year of establishment is also positively correlated to
independence in all the models, meaning that agencies created later in time
enjoy greater independence than the older ones.
As concerns the political uncertainty hypothesis, the POLARISATION indi-
cator is strongly significant in both models, proving that, in countries where
executives are uncertain about the political preferences of the future incum-
bents, competition agencies are more independent. The indicator for the
AVERAGE GOVERNMENT DURATION, contrarily to what would be expected, in-
stead has a positive correlation with the formal independence of the author-
ities. At least for the cases presented in this analysis, countries with higher
government instability do not tend to have more autonomous agencies. As
a consequence, the assumption behind the construction of the replacement
risk indicator (that polarisation is positively correlated, and government du-
ration is negatively correlated to independence) is not confirmed in this
analysis. Further investigation is certainly necessary in order to understand
whether this finding signals a general tendency or rather a peculiarity of this
population.
The REGULATORY QUALITY indicator is also found to clearly affect the
independence of national authorities. The variable is significant in both
models, demonstrating a systematic relationship between perceived relia-
bility of the countries in promoting and regulating private investments and
the degree of formal autonomy of their competition agencies.
Table 3.4 summarises the effect of the explanatory variables on the de-
pendent variable for a shift in the former from the 1st decile to the 9th decile.
First differences have been calculated with the following procedure. First,
I have created two groups including all the explanatory variables; then, the
variable of interest was set at a low (1st decile) value in the first group and
at a high (9th decile) value in the second one; all the other variables were
kept constant in both the groups. Then, I have run 1000 bootstrapped sim-
ulations on both the sets of covariates, estimating the expected value of the
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Variables E(Y|X) (1st decile) E(Y|X1) (9th decile) Difference
BIG FIRMS 0.70 -0.56 −32%
EU MEMBERSHIP -0.78 1.22 +51%
POLARISATION -0.74 0.49 +31%
AVG. GOV. DURATION -0.77 0.34 +28%
REG. QUALITY 0.28 -0.41 −18%
Table 3.4: Simulated first differences between expected values of the depen-
dent variable (Model 2).
dependent variable for each of them. The value of FORMAL INDEPENDENCE
that corresponds to the first set (with the variable of interest at its first decile
and all the others at their average) is shown in the first column of the table;
the value corresponding to the second set is shown in the second column.
The third column displays the percentage difference between the high and
the low value.
As can be observed, the most relevant effect is yielded by the variable
EU MEMBERSHIP, for which a change from 5 to 57 years is associated with
an increase in FORMAL INDEPENDENCE greater than 50%. Also BIG FIRMS,
POLARISATION and AVERAGE GOVERNMENT DURATION produce notable dif-
ferences when shifted from a low to a high value: for all of the three in-
dicators, the first difference amounts to about 30%. REGULATORY QUALITY,
instead, has a lower effect on formal independence.
First differences allow us to compare the magnitude of the explanatory
variables’ effect on the dependent variable. All the indicators listed in the
table refer to hypotheses whose coefficients are significant in the statistical
analysis. However, if we want to assess to what extent the legislators are
influenced by the different factors, a closer look to the net impact of the
variables is necessary. In particular, since not all the hypotheses postulate
the same incentives as regards the motivations for delegating, it is worth
assessing what is the weight of the different types of motivations. Exclud-
ing POLARISATION, which has been operationalised as a the condition under
which the impact of big firms vary, we can notice that the importance of
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factors that indicate self-interested motivations (BIG FIRMS, AVERAGE GOV-
ERNMENT DURATION) is greater than that of EU MEMBERSHIP, which signals a
mainly sociological rationale. The indicator that points out a chiefly public-
interest motivation (REGULATORY QUALITY) is the one which has the smallest
impact on formal independence.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have sought to provide statistical evidence for an original
theoretical framework, which combines the well-established literature on
delegation as a means to acquire credibility with new hypotheses focused
on the attitudes of politicians towards big firms and on the constraints and
incentives deriving from EU membership. It is demonstrated in this chapter
that, in polities characterised by high political uncertainty, big firms man-
age to obtain the establishment of a less independent competition authority
from the government. At the same time, this pressure is balanced by the
effects of EU membership: incentives produced by the European competi-
tion legislation (especially Regulation 1/2003), potential reputation issues
as well as time of exposure to «rebounding Europeanization» in the field of
competition, are all factors that lead the legislators to increase the degree of
independence enjoyed by national agencies. In accordance with what was
hypothesised, the results prove that the formal autonomy of competition
authorities is positively correlated with the length of EU membership of a
country.
With respect to the other hypotheses, the findings are more mixed. No
support has been found for neither the hypothesis which states a greater
number of veto players should negatively (or positively) influence the au-
thorities’ autonomy,34 nor for the hypothesis that establishes a link between
minority governments and tendency to delegate more to IRAs. The rela-
tionship between political polarisation and independence of the agencies,
34 If Lindvall (2010) is right, it should be possible to analyse which veto players were not
in favour of giving independence to the NCAs, and how they have been compensated by the
coalition which passed such reform. See Chapter 2, note 10.
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instead, has been confirmed to be positive, while this is not the case for
the government duration variable. According to the results of the statis-
tical analysis, polarisation damages the credibility of the countries, which
respond by establishing more independent authorities. Shorter government
terms, on the other hand, are not associated with more formal autonomy
for the agencies: these tend rather to be more independent in countries that
have more stable executives. This finding suggests that shorter lasting gov-
ernments may rather have a short-run perspective that does not push them
to delegate. Also the perceptions about how a country is able to promote
private investments play an important role: the worse these perceptions are,
the more the agency is independent. At first sight, this relationship could ap-
pear counterintuitive, because it seems to imply that countries which have
a more independent competition authority are, in spite of that, perceived
as a less suitable environment for private investments. Does this mean that
formally independent competition authorities, all in all, are not useful in cre-
ating a good regulatory background? These questions cannot be answered
in the present chapter, but I will address them in Chapter 5, where I will test
the relationship between statutory independence and the way in which the
authorities carry out their tasks.
In general, the statistical models illustrated in this chapter have a rele-
vant explanatory power, and they help shed light on how the decisions on
the institutional independence of these authorities are made. The overall
picture shows that the legislators base their choices on two opposed pres-
sures: on the one hand, big national firms press for a less independent
agency; on the other, obligations deriving from the EU membership, expec-
tations of international investors as well as other credibility issues push the
governments to increase the autonomy of the authorities. In this contrast
between anti- and pro-competition forces, each country finds a particular
equilibrium. If we want to assess how these two tendencies are balanced,
it is possible to claim that the factors pushing towards more independence
prevail. Indeed, the influence of big firms is limited to the cases of high
political uncertainty, while all the other significant indicators suggest that
countries give independence in reaction both to supranational inputs and to
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external perceptions as well as expectations.
An interesting follow-up to this analysis would be to examine in greater
detail how big firms exert their influence on politicians. Beside the expla-
nation formulated in this chapter, it should be ascertained whether some
countries try to «protect» their big firms because of a purely collusive be-
haviour, or if this is instead due to a different way of regulating the econ-
omy: the «varieties of capitalism» approach (Hall and Soskice 2001) can
offer a stimulating basis for discussion on this topic. Moreover, with regard
to the effects of Europeanisation, further research must be carried out about
the role of the EU both as a supranational legislator and as a connector of
political elites. This analysis suggests that, in a field like competition pol-
icy, European countries retain limited decisional autonomy, and that their
differences are mainly explained by the need to comply with internal and
external pressures.
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Chapter 4
A qualitative analysis
The statistical analysis presented in the previous chapter has brought to light
the existence of a relationship between the formal independence of compe-
tition authorities and certain factors, namely the presence of big firms, the
length of a country’s EU membership, the political polarisation and, finally,
the perceived regulatory quality. Although the results are robust and sig-
nificant, it can be useful to look for confirmations and to cross-check the
findings of the quantitative analysis with a qualitative analysis. Aiming at
strengthening the conclusions illustrated above, I have conducted interviews
with members of NCAs, competition policy experts as well as members of
the parliament and of the government.
This choice can be explained and justified with the goal of this part of my
research. The aim of these interviews is not to formally test hypotheses, but
rather to comprehend, in more detail, the dynamics that lead to certain insti-
tutional arrangements, and to receive suggestions on how to operationalise
and test the second research question of this dissertation. Since the impact
of formal independence on the agencies’ performance has not been theo-
rised so far, the knowledge and the expertise of specialists is crucial in order
to develop a theoretical framework and to conceive of plausible hypotheses.
Moreover, talks with members of NCAs were also useful in that they enabled
me to better theorise what kind of relationship links the people’s represen-
tatives to these «boards of experts»: is it a real P-A relationship, with a clear
113
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mandate and instruments of control, or are such elements vague and almost
non-existent? If the latter is true, how can we define such a relationship?
The two main cases that I have selected for this investigation are Italy
and France, for three main reasons. First, it is interesting to observe that the
two countries come from well-established systems of public intervention in
the economy. Understanding how the shift from a state-controlled economy
to a competitive one has happened is a useful insight, and will be especially
useful in order to better understand what role the EU has played in this
respect. Second, with regard to the four variables that the statistical anal-
ysis has highlighted, the two countries suit a most similar systems design
(Mill 1843; Przeworski and Teune 1970), because they are equal (or very
similar) in all the variables except for the perceived regulatory quality. The
interviews can help confirm that this factor explains the higher formal inde-
pendence that the Italian authority enjoys. Finally, both the countries have
a competition agency that has operated for quite a long period of time, with
well-established relationships to the political system as well as a high level
of expertise. The presence of all these factors combined is useful for the kind
of information I need to gather. In addition to these two countries, I have
also had interviews also with members of the Greek competition authority.
I have chosen Greece as a third case because it varies greatly from the two
other countries with regard to all the explanatory variables. Therefore, it
should avert the danger that important causal mechanisms are left out in
this analysis.
In order to complement the analysis, I have also conducted interviews
in Brussels, at the Directorate General (DG) for Competition. Besides act-
ing as the European-wide competition authority, the DG Competition co-
ordinates the European Competition Network (ECN), a forum where the
competition agencies of the EU member states meet to exchange informa-
tion about the practises they adopt and how they organise their activities.
The Network cannot force the countries to adopt rules or behaviours, but it
has gained considerable importance by informally promoting uniform pro-
cedures among the agencies. The interviews with the staff members of the
DG Competition were particularly useful in clarifying the role of the Com-
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mission in the decisions made sorrounding the independence conferred on
the national bodies.
The selection of the interviewees has been guided by the need to cover
as many different positions and points of view as possible. As regards the
establishment of competition authorities and the decisions about their inde-
pendence in the member states, my aim was to hear what both the «princi-
pals» (the politicians) and the «agents» (the members of NCAs) had to say.
Moreover, this information was complemented with expert input, which is
supposed to lie neutral between the two. The decision to interview members
of the DG Competition had two purposes: on the one hand, collecting in-
formation on the involvement of the Commission in national policy-making;
on the other hand, hearing about the position of a counter-actor of both
national politicians and national regulators.
In total, I have conducted 16 semi-structured interviews with members
of the DG Competition and various experts involved in the decision-making
on the competition authority in France, Italy and Greece. Namely, in Brus-
sels, on 23 June 2010, I conducted two interviews with members of the DG
Competition responsible for the European Competition Network. In France,
between the 22nd and 30th of June 2010, I interviewed three members of
the board of the authority, as well as a deputy and one member of the Min-
istry of Economy. In Italy, between the 19th and the 22nd July and on the
4th of October 2010, I interviewed two members of the authority (including
one member of the board), two members of the parliament with a relevant
expertise in this field as well as three academics. Two phone interviews
with members of the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) were also
conducted in July and November 2011.
This chapter is organised as follows. I will first discuss of the nature
of the relationship between representatives and competition authorities, ac-
cording to the observations made by the interviewees. Then, I will present
the clarifications and explanations that I received from the experts on the
explanatory variables employed in the statistical analysis of the previous
chapter. Finally, I will go over the comments and suggestions that the in-
terviewees have given with regard to the second research question of this
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dissertation.
4.1 Accountability of authorities and the role of par-
liament and government
With this qualitative analysis I wanted to examine more in depth the rela-
tionship between the political bodies and the competition agencies. Could
the NCAs be considered agents with a principal? And if the answer is af-
firmative, towards which body would they be accountable and responsible?
This issue is closely related to the first research question that I addressed
in this dissertation. As regards the explanation of why some authorities
are more independent than others, the previous chapter has already offered
some interesting answers. We have seen that countries prefer not to give in-
dependence to the NCAs, if they can help it; independence is a kind of «last
resort» for national political bodies. However, it remains unclear what type
of control they exert, and which body, parliament or government, actually
supervises the activity of the authorities.
Formally, the statute of every authority (the «contract» of a supposed
P-A relationship) is passed by the parliament, so the «principal» should be
identified with the legislators. In the case of France and Italy, the authorities
are also officially accountable towards the parliament, where their members
are heard
• if their advice is asked during the discussion on a law, and
• once a year, for the presentation of the annual report by the president.
The interviews with the members of the authorities and the deputies show
a picture that does not correspond to a typical P-A model. In these, the
relationship with the parliament is described as very weak, and limited to
the occasions mentioned above. The hearings are usually very formal: when
the president presents the annual report, he usually reads a speech about
which there is usually no debate; when the president or the members of
the board are heard during the discussion of some laws, there is little room
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for a real «dialogue». If the parliamentary majority wishes to engage in a
closer collaboration with the authority, it prefers to delegate the task to the
government.1
In all cases, a real control over how the authority performs its tasks
seems to be missing, and this regards both the parliament and the execu-
tive. Asking advice is certainly not a form of control over the agency, but
rather a way to take advantage of its expertise. The parliaments never dis-
cuss the decisions taken by the authorities, and every attempt to evaluate
the agencies’ performance is usually seen as an infringement of their in-
dependence. Members of the Italian competition authority clearly claimed
that they experienced no practical accountability towards the government
or parliament.2
The existence of a P-A model, in principle, implies that all the incentives
for the agent are included in the initial contract, and that the agency would
have no reason for shirking − even though, in practice, a contract could be
incomplete because the principal cannot calculate at the beginning all the
possible «deviations» of the agent. Yet, if the principal really aims to prevent
the agent from shirking, he or she also has other tools that can help: namely,
the principal can threaten to reduce the budget of the agency, or he or she
can have regular hearings of the members.3
Whilst the first seems to be generally used, if nothing else because the
national budget has to be approved every year, the second is not employed
at all in the cases that I have examined. And this is even more striking if one
thinks that the supervision over the agency’s activity should be the natural
consequence of a delegation decision. In the US literature on «congressional
dominance», the oversight carried out by the committees is viewed as the
1 Interviews with members of the Italian and of the French competition authorities, 28
June and 19 July 2010. The interlocutors pointed out that also the authorities prefer to deal
with few people in the government, rather than with many more in the parliament.
2 Interviews with members of the Italian competition authority, 19 July 2010.
3 All the people that I have interviewed in France stressed the importance of the ac-
countability of the authority towards the democratic bodies, and they all claimed that the
condition for accepting that more powers were given to the authority was that it became
more accountable. However, there does not seem to be other tools by which the parliament
and the government control the activity of the agency, except the two that I have listed.
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main tool to steer the agency, and it is successfully employed. Why is this
not the case in France and Italy (and in most European countries)?
The most straightforward answer is that neither the parliament nor the
government really act as principals, and that the relationship between them
and the competition authority is not a P-A relationship. This explanation
would encourage one to look more into theories that identify the reasons
for delegating in this field with other motivations rather than information
asymmetry and efficiency: need for credibility, external pressures, political
uncertainty, as the statistical analysis indicated. Another possible explana-
tion would be that there is a P-A relationship, but the lack of expertise and
knowledge of the field does not enable the parliament to exert its control.
Apparently, there is little expertise concerning competition in the parlia-
ment: very few understand what it is about, and it is thus unsurprising that
no one is interested in scrutinising how the authority works: they would be
unable to do so because of their lack of expertise.4 However, this cannot
be the reason (at least not the only one) for which politicians choose not to
control. Every P-A model assumes that the principal delegates exactly be-
cause he or she lacks expertise, but this does not prevent him or her from
exerting some control. It is assumed that the principal can control the result,
even if he or she is unable to control the process that leads to it. Therefore,
there must some other reason that accounts for this lack of control. Again,
the most reasonable explanation is that these are not P-A relationships in the
strict sense. Majone’s distinction between agency and fiduciary relationships
(Majone 2001) is certainly the starting point for every theory of delegation
processes to IRAs, at least in Europe.
Of course, the sample on which I conducted the interviews is too small
to draw general conclusions on this question. These interviews are rather
useful to identify the main issues upon which to focus. On the one hand,
they have confirmed that in parliamentary democracies the distinction be-
4 Interviews with Italian deputies, 20 July and 4 October 2010, and with Italian expert,
21 July 2010. This had been suggested to me also by the difficulty in finding members of
the parliament that could talk with me. The deputies that I interviewed said that they would
like to exert this control, but that they are too few and their colleagues do not support them
(Interviews with Italian deputies, 20 July and 4 October 2010).
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tween parliament and government makes little sense in practice. Although
the parliament is formally responsible for every delegation act, the author-
ities perceive that, if they want to influence or acquire information on the
legislative process, they must address the executive. On the other hand,
these interviews have reinforced the intuition (brought about by the statis-
tical analysis of Chapter 3) that the relationship between elected bodies and
competition authorities is very difficult to define as a P-A relationship, be-
cause it lacks some constitutive elements of it: a clear mandate, instruments
of control, actual control.
4.2 Hypotheses’ cross-checking
In this section, I illustrate the findings of the series of interviews that I have
conducted as regards the general plausibility and the causal mechanisms of
the hypotheses verified in the statistical analysis.
4.2.1 The role of big firms
In Chapter 3, I found that the higher the number of big firms in a coun-
try, the less independent the NCA is. This hypothesis was derived from the
assumption that big firms prefer to have a competition authority with little
independence, in order to better exert their influence on it through politi-
cians, when needed. This explanation was supported by the evidence that
such a relationship is more pronounced when the political polarisation of
a country is higher, i.e. when the incumbents are less legitimised by their
opponents: it makes sense that «weaker» politicians are more inclined to
meet the big firms’ needs. In the interviews, I have sought to receive confir-
mations for these findings.
In general, all the interviewees confirmed that big firms do lobby when
the legislatures discuss changes on the powers of the authorities or their or-
ganisation. In France, where the competition agency was recently reformed
(in 2009), representatives of big national firms have lobbied members of
both coalitions (not only the right-wing majority). According to a socialist
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deputy:
«people came and explained that [creating a very independent au-
thority] could be dangerous for the French enterprises, and my col-
leagues of the majority have received even more “lobbyists” that came
and explained that this could be dangerous»5
Big firms seem to be particularly concerned about the antitrust powers of the
authorities, rather than about the merger control. The most striking com-
plaints come when antitrust procedures are initiated or brought to an end,
while, during the evaluation of proposals of mergers, firms usually remain
silent.6 In France, when changes in the statute of the Conseil de la concur-
rence were discussed by the parliament, representatives of firms wanted to
be heard, and some of them appeared to be «clearly in favour of a competi-
tion authority that could not work».7 In other words, they wanted it to work
for mergers (when they are interested that the authority carry out its work
quickly) but they did not want it to work for antitrust investigations, be-
cause they were afraid that too much independence (lack of accountability,
from their perspective) would not guarantee fair judgement.
Intense lobbying on the side of big firms was confirmed also by the staff
of the DG Competition. This is another confirmation of how important com-
petition issues are for the firms and how often they lobby when they see
their interests at stake. According to the DG Competition staff, strong lob-
bying occurred in the European Parliament when Regulation 1/2003 was
about to be approved, with respect to the abolishment of notifications and
clearance decisions. These decisions were very useful to the firms, in that
they allowed them to ask for prior approval from the Commission before
starting certain operations. This also prevented the Commission from sanc-
tioning such behaviours at a later stage. Industrial and service associations
made serious efforts to convince the members of the parliament not to pass
5 Interview with French deputy, 29 June 2010.
6 Interview with member of the Italian competition agency, 19 July 2010, and with mem-
bers of the French competition authority, 28 June 2010.
7 Interview with members of the board of the French competition authority, 28 June
2010.
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this change. Despite the fact that they did not succeed, this fact confirms
that competition enforcement is always a salient issue for those that are
more likely to be sanctioned on its basis (about the issue of lobbying at the
EU level, see Dür and Mateo 2012).
One might note that competition is not necessarily something which
firms must be afraid of. In many situations, the economic actors that take
advantage from a decision issued by an authority are more numerous than
those which receive a fine or a punishment. And most firms, not just con-
sumers, profit from a well implemented competition law. The actors that
have reason to be cautious are the very large firms, precisely because they
have more chances to run into antitrust enforcement, given their size and
their market power. The fact that in France and in Italy the interviewees
did not describe an intense lobbying is exactly what I expected, considering
the data available for the statistical analysis: neither country has a particu-
larly high concentration of big firms compared to the total number of firms.8
Further proof of this finding is given by the fact that in Greece, where the
presence of big firms is even lower, the commissioners I interviewed claimed
that, to their knowledge, most enterprises are strongly in favour of the NCA’s
independence, because they perceive it increases their business opportuni-
ties.
4.2.2 EU membership
The «EU membership» hypothesis, for which the statistical analysis has pro-
vided a solid confirmation, was proposed in this dissertation for the first
time. Although several scholars have theorised and demonstrated (see Sec-
tion 2.8) the effect of EU membership on policies adopted at the domestic
level, none has hypothesised the reinforcing effect of EU membership in
the adoption and execution of this policy. It has been shown that countries
which have been part of the EU for a longer time have more independent
NCAs. Obviously, a single test is not sufficient. Especially for this hypothesis,
8 Indeed, France has a higher concentration than Italy, which may explain why the French
interviewees talked more about lobbying than the Italian ones.
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for which there was not much theoretical background, the interviews may
help improve understanding of the causal mechanism behind it. In order
to avoid a self-reinforcing output, I have investigated any kind of process
that could link EU membership and independence of NCAs. In particular, I
have kept in mind the dichotomy, found in the literature, between top-down
influence by the Commission and bottom-up pressure among the member
states.
With regard to the first, it has already been pointed out that EU Regula-
tion 1/2003, which sets the rules for the relationships between the Commis-
sion and the member states in the field of competition, contains no mention
of how independent the national authorities ought to be (see Section 3.5.1).
Hence, the Commission does not have any formal instrument to even sug-
gest the degree of autonomy that national agencies should enjoy. It remains
to be seen whether the Commission and the DG Competition may exert in-
formal pressure on the member states, and how.
The DG Competition was able to provide a clear answer regarding this
point. According to the DG Competition staff, not only does the DG does not
encourage member states to change or to adopt certain standards in this re-
spect, but it also does not recommend any particular solution when member
states are in the middle of a reform process or when they are establishing
their competition agencies. Even in the pre-accession procedures of former
communist countries, the Commission simply required that a competition
authority existed in those countries and that it dealt with a sufficient num-
ber of cases each year.9 The independence of these agencies was not taken
into account and evaluated by the DG Competition.10
Today, the DG Competition exchanges information with various actors
at the national level, and it receives complaints related to the relationship
between authorities and political bodies. There are members of the na-
tional assemblies and of the European Parliament that denounce the govern-
ments’ attempts to influence the agencies, firms dissatisfied with the agen-
cies, members of the national authorities dissatisfied with the pressure of the
9 They wanted to be sure that the competition authority was functioning.
10 Interview with member of the DG Competition, 23 June 2010.
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governments, and so forth. Nevertheless, the DG always refuses to publicly
intervene or to suggest institutional changes.11
On the same point, the answers which I received from experts working in
the member states were noticeably different. It was indeed argued that the
emphasis the DG Competition puts on independence often sounds like an
incentive to enhance the autonomy of the national agencies.12 The national
authorities can «sell» these statements to their political principals as if they
were recommendations. As to the recent reform of the Autorité in France,
members of the competition agency apparently asked for support from Brus-
sels, when the reform process started in France. Thus, they obtained an in-
formal endorsement from the DG Competition, which made it easier for the
authority to receive more independence than before.13 In sum, it is true that
the Commission never openly recommends changes in the institutional rules
or a particular level of independence for the NCAs. However, the interviews
have suggested that, at a more informal level, some contacts take place,
though it is not possible to «prove» them beyond any reasonable doubt.
It is still unclear why this strategy would work better for the member
states which have been in the EU for a longer time, and there are two
possible answers: either because their national political bodies are more
responsive to the Commission’s opinion (as has been hypothesised in the
theoretical framework of the previous statistical analysis, see Section 3.5.1)
or because they often ask for more support from the European Commission.
Even though both the explanations are plausible, from what the intervie-
wees have said on this point (not much, indeed) the first is preferable. In
fact, the second hypothesis implies that obtaining more independence is an
incremental process, whilst this is not always the case: most authorities have
maintained the same degree of independence since they were established
(the Italian authority is a good example of this), but others have received
more formal independence years after their creation (like the Spanish or
the French ones). Moreover, the people interviewed at the DG Competition
11 Interview with member of the DG Competition, 23 June 2010.
12 Interview with member of the Italian competition authority, 19 July 2010.
13 Interview with member of the French Ministry of the Economy, 30 June 2010.
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have confirmed that with some countries (namely the older members) the
contacts are much more frequent and intense than with the others. This
makes it more plausible that it is not a question of «quantity» of requests,
but of «quality» of the response.
Also regarding the second possible account for the «EU membership ef-
fect» (i.e. a bottom-up effect), some confirmations and suggestions were
made on how the process could be explained. All of them point to the
role of the ECN, where the members of the national agencies regularly meet
and exchange opinions on every question related to their activity. If we con-
sider the countries as members of a «social group» (the EU), the existence
of values that are shared and promoted in the group could explain increas-
ing similarities among the members. The ECN encourages the states to in-
crease the uniformity of their institutions, rules and procedures, in a typical
«soft-law» framework. For members of NCAs, approaching the government
with a claim that authorities of other countries have some prerogative or
power that they do not have is apparently a successful strategy.14 But again,
we need not explain the similarities, but the differences between member
states. Why would the older members receive more independence?
Answering this question from this point of view requires one to employ
the concept of «peer pressure».15 Although the tendency to adopt similar
institutions, and in particular to set up competition agencies with more in-
dependence, exists for every country, this process could be more intense for
those that perceive themselves as «peers» − the oldest EU members, in this
case. A confirmation of this interpretation is offered by the French case. Ac-
cording to the interviews, the strongest arguments advanced by those who
sought the Autorité de la Concurrence to be more independent was that
other «peers» had a very independent authority, and so also France ought to
have one.16
I acknowledge that, even after this cross-checking, the causal mecha-
14 Interview with member of the DG Competition, 23 June 2010.
15 Interview with member of the Italian competition authority, 19 July 2010, and with
Italian expert, 21 July 2010.
16 Interview with member of the French Ministry of the Economy, 30 June 2010.
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nisms underlying this hypothesis remain partially unsatisfactory. First, be-
cause the interviews have shown that there is not only one possible mech-
anism, but that there are several. There could also be a combination of
processes, and it is not very easy to distinguish between them, both in the-
ory and in practice. Second, because the sources of information for this (or
these) causal mechanism(s) are rather limited, mostly anonymous, and al-
ways bound to confidentiality. This is an obstacle that no increase in the
number of sources can help overcome. Third, because the behavioural as-
sumptions of these causal mechanisms are quite ambiguous. These explana-
tions do not rely on the «classical» assumptions of self-interested behaviour
or competition among states, but, on the contrary, on concepts like imi-
tation, emulation, and peer-pressure, which are more used in psychology
than in political science. That said, the effect of such processes at the state
level has been studied by several scholars in recent years, especially in the
field of regulation (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Eising 2002; Meseguer 2005;
Radaelli 2008; Schmidt 2008). Therefore, this hypothesis is certainly worth
being analysed and tested in further research.
4.2.3 Political uncertainty
In the previous chapter, the political uncertainty hypothesis, operationalised
with the polarisation indicator, has been found to be highly significant in
all the models, in accordance with the theoretical prediction. However, it
was difficult to confirm this finding in the interviews. In most of them, the
respondents did not mention this factor. Only one Italian expert explicitly
stated that if the political process is perceived as being less legitimate, pro-
moting non-majoritarian institutions is easier.17 Such a statement implies a
wider definition of legitimacy: it does not only mean that the government
is accepted as legitimate by the voters, but also that it is accepted by its
political opponents. When there is higher polarisation, the second kind of
legitimacy is lower, and the delegation of powers to an independent body
can be a solution to enhance reciprocal confidence.
17 Interview with Italian expert, 21 July 2010.
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Still, it remains to be explained why the partakers in this decision-making
process (and that should be aware of the motivations more than anyone
else) are so unwitting about this mechanism. Two reasons can be advanced
to explain this behaviour. First, the level of political uncertainty is some-
thing in which political actors live, and which affects them in a way that is
almost entirely subliminal. It is a stable environmental factor that is not nec-
essarily considered, at least not consciously. Second, there are good reasons
for arguing that it is a factor that does not specifically affect the competi-
tion authorities, but also other bodies which exert functions delegated by
the state. Therefore, people dealing with the specific sector of competition
policy might not notice what is an overall national feature.
4.2.4 Credibility and regulatory quality
Also with regard to the fourth hypothesis, related to the need for credibility
and operationalised with the regulatory quality indicator, I have not received
much feedback from the interviewees. Most did not raise the subject when
talking about the debate(s) held about the creation of the authorities and
their independence. The creation of the Autorità garante per la concorrenza
e il mercato (AGCM), however, was described in a way that could suit the
credibility hypothesis.18 According to this narrative, in 1990 there were
doubts on whether Italy would have been able to fulfil the commitments
that it had made by signing the Single European Act. Creating a very in-
dependent competition authority was a signal to the other member states:
Italy wanted to enhance competition in its national economy, in order to join
the European common currency. The fact that Italy has continued to expe-
rience difficulties in the following years could explain why the autonomy
of its competition authority was never reduced or questioned. The general
lack of acknowledgement of this factor amongst the interviewees might be
due to the same reason mentioned in the previous section: as national cred-
ibility is an environmental factor, it is likely to be ignored by national actors
simply because it affects every economic or political decision in a more or
18 Interview with Italian expert, 21 July 2010.
Guidi, Mattia (2012), Explaining and Assessing Independence: National competition authorities in the EU member states 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/46429
4.2. HYPOTHESES’ CROSS-CHECKING 127
less streamlined manner.
In other interviews it was claimed instead that the need for credibility
would be better indicated by the state control over the economy.19 Credi-
bility would be needed both a) because when the authorities were created
the states were moving from being «managers» to being «regulators» of the
economic system, and b) because national governments continue to control
(directly or indirectly) strategic firms in the national market. If govern-
ments were the only antitrust enforcers, their conflict of interests would
make them not credible in front of the economic actors, international in-
vestors in particular. Granting independence to the competition authority
from the government is a way to acquire this kind of credibility.
One example that was cited to support this claim was that of the US,
where antitrust enforcement is carried out by the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, which is under the authority of the Secretary of Jus-
tice and of the President. According to some of the interviewees, this proves
that the US government, not being involved in the property of national firms,
needs less than European governments to be perceived as distinctly sepa-
rated from the competition authority.20
Such a theory could not be tested among the cases that I had for this
analysis, although I cannot exclude that European countries where the state
ownership of big firms is greater do have a more independent competition
authority. Indeed, operationalising this hypothesis in such a way would re-
quire me to build a consistent index of state control of the economy: it is
probably feasible, but the variety and the complexity of the means by which
governments control national firms suggests that such a test should be post-
poned to a later time. With regard to the scope of this qualitative analysis,
the fact that Italian experts were more willing to talk about credibility prob-
lems indirectly confirms that this factor is more present in this country and
might explain why the Italian authority is more independent than the French
one.
19 Interview with Italian expert, 21 July 2010, and interview with member of the Italian
competition authority, 19 July 2010.
20 See also interview with member of the DG Competition, 23 June 2010.
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4.3 The nature of independence and its impact on
the agencies’ activity
Besides cross-checking the findings of the statistical analysis presented in
the previous chapter, I have also used the interviews also for receiving in-
formation on how independence is perceived by the authorities (and by
politicians). First, I asked the members of the NCAs, the members of the
parliament and the experts how they described the authority in terms of
independence, to see if their assessment matched the independence index
that I have developed. Second, I inquired about whether they thought that
independence was beneficial for their activity, and if there are other factors
that influence the NCAs’ performance. The latter issue relates to the second
research question of this dissertation, i.e. whether formal independence af-
fects the performance of NCAs in EU member states. This series of questions
is certainly not exhaustive in this respect, and it must not be considered
as a pre-test. A careful testing of this hypothesis will be carried out in the
next chapter. Finally, the interviews were mainly meant to secure the possi-
bility of having overlooked any important explanatory variable in the next
empirical analysis.
In order to verify whether my independence index is sufficiently accu-
rate, I have asked how the interviewee defined the authority of its country
with regard to its independence. Italy and France, according to the index,
are countries with two very independent authorities (the first and the third
respectively), whilst Greece has an average value (see Figure 3.4.1). It goes
without saying that, if an expert had expressed that he or she did not think
either the Italian or the French competition authority were independent, a
reconsideration in how their independence was assessed would be needed.
However, there were no such answers. All interviewees in France and Italy
acknowledged that the Autorité de la concurrence and the AGCM are very in-
dependent authorities. Particularly in France, where there had been changes
in this respect the year before the interviews took place, they stressed very
much that the independence of the Autorité had increased, and that now
it was among the most independent NCAs in Europe. On the other hand,
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the members of the Hellenic Competition Commission insisted less on this
aspect: though they claimed the HCC is independent,21 they also claimed
to find it important that an NCA were not an «ivory tower», but that it were
embedded in the social and political environment.
Beyond this question, another issue which was investigated regarded the
real importance of independence, that is the ultimate aim of this research.
Do the interviewees think that independence sensibly affects the way in
which the agencies perform their functions? Or are there other factors that
might have an impact? Moreover, is it possible to evaluate the performance
of the authorities? And how can this performance be measured?
Regarding the first question, this analysis does not provide a clear an-
swer. It was generally acknowledged that in principle independence is a
positive attribute and, therefore, it certainly improves the agencies’ perfor-
mance, as well as their ability to enforce antitrust law. It was claimed that a
certain amount of independence is necessary, given the semi-judiciary func-
tion that competition agencies perform:
«[...] being [the competition authority] an agency that has to de-
cide on the enjoyment of individual rights, it is inefficient in any case
that this is dealt with by a body under political control, which can de-
cide on the basis of political criteria. [...] It is the same reason for
which some tasks are assigned to judges»22
However, this does not explain why some agencies are much more inde-
pendent than others, while all performing the same functions. In France, it
appears that the government and the parliament had decided to increase the
independence of the Autorité because they believed that this would improve
its ability to carry out its tasks.23
However, except for these rather vague statements, most answers pointed
out that formal independence by itself could hardly produce good perfor-
21 One interviewee said it is «very independent» (interview of 12 July 2011).
22 Interview with Italian expert, 21 July 2010.
23 Interview with members of the board of the French competition authority, 28 June
2010.
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mance.24 With regard to factors affecting the agencies’ performance, an
element that was often mentioned as crucial was the annual budget that the
parliament sets for the authority. If the money available for the agency is
insufficient, the agency will investigate fewer cases, it will discover fewer
violations of competition law, and it will probably issue fewer infringement
decisions. All members of the three authorities underlined the importance
of the budget, in a way that signals how, in their view, it is a means to control
the agency and to keep it accountable.25
The interviews reported no general agreement on whether this is a posi-
tive or a negative fact. In France, the negotiation on the budget was viewed
as a positive sign of accountability of the authority towards the parliament
and the government, in a dialogue which ensures that the authority is not
unresponsive towards the elected bodies. In Italy, on the contrary, scepticism
prevailed, and the members of the agency claimed that the constant reduc-
tions in the budget have progressively forced them to investigate and bring
to fruition fewer cases. Whilst in France I was shown the virtuous aspects
of this bargaining, in Italy the experts pointed out its potential arbitrari-
ness. Greek members of the competition authority claimed they were quite
satisfied about the budget they received for antitrust enforcement. First be-
cause, in spite of the harsh cuts faced by all public agencies because of the
economic crisis, the competition authority saw almost no reduction in its
budget. Second, because the HCC’s source of funding does not depend on
the annual budget law, but it is calculated as a share of each capital increase
of joint-stock companies.
Finally, with regard to my intention to measure the authorities’ perfor-
mance, I was warned about how complicated it might be. A rough quan-
tification of the number of investigations and decisions can give an idea of
the amount of work an authority does, but it does not necessarily say how
it enforces competition. Some investigations can take much more time than
24 Interview with member of the Italian competition authority, 19 July 2010.
25 Such statements make us think that theorists of congressional dominance (see Section
2.3) were probably right when they pointed to the budget as one of the tools employed by the
legislature to ensure that the agencies not shirk. However, a formal test of the relationship
between budget and performance will be carried out in the following chapter.
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others; some sanctions can have far more relevant effects on the economy
than others. Also, the authority can engage in a time-consuming inquiry
that in the end does not yield a final decision. All these aspects will have to
be taken into account when I will attempt to measure performance. At the
same time, however, in order to compare the 27 national authorities, I will
also have to neglect some of these distinctions and, to some extent, simplify.
4.4 Conclusions
Although their importance and significance must not be overestimated, these
interviews helped shed light on some questions that the statistical analysis
had left unanswered. From a general point of view, they have confirmed
that NCAs in Europe do not exactly know towards which body they are ac-
countable, and that neither the parliament nor the government really seem
to control them as a «principal» would be expected to do. Regarding the
hypotheses formulated and tested in the previous chapter, the interviews
have confirmed the plausibility of the conclusions that I had drawn, though
they cannot be considered to be conclusive. With respect to the last part of
this dissertation, they have offered useful advice both about the meaning of
independence and about its importance for the agencies’ performance.
As for the role of big firms, the interviewees have acknowledged that
enterprises with a relevant market power try to lobby in order to have a
competition regulator that is as accountable to politicians as possible. In
particular, this concern is greater for the powers concerning antitrust en-
forcement than for those regarding mergers: big firms fear more to be in-
vestigated and punished, given their size and their relevance in the market.
For what concerns the EU membership hypothesis, the interviews have con-
firmed the plausibility of the explanation advanced in the previous chapter.
Although the DG Competition does not explicitly request a certain degree of
independence and does not officially intervene in the choices of the member
states, it may happen that the authorities themselves, or the actors support-
ing them, would try to attain an informal endorsement from the DG and use
it in the national arena. Concurrently, countries that have been members of
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the EU for a longer time are more likely to have «internalised» the assump-
tion that competition authorities ought to be independent. Nevertheless, it
is still unclear if one or the other mechanism operates, or rather a combina-
tion of both. The process that links EU membership and NCAs independence
certainly requires more in depth study.
Regarding the questions of the meaning and the impact of independence,
I have gathered a number of suggestions that I will make use of in the further
steps of this research. The importance of the budget in shaping the activity
of the authorities could be considered even trivial, but it still deserves to
be tested, especially in comparison with the importance of independence.
It is noteworthy that the impact of formal independence on the agencies’
performance has been considered as negligible by most interviewees. This
makes it even more urgent to test whether such a relationship exists. It
might seem strange that the members of NCAs themselves have not stressed
the importance of formal independence, as we would expect, at least in or-
der to justify the autonomy that they enjoy. However, it must be noticed
that the contested importance of formal independence was mentioned to-
gether with the very high relevance of budget. It is easy to imagine which
one NCAs would prefer to increase, if they could. In the next chapter, I will
employ the information collected in the interviews, in order to follow up
and strengthen the findings that have been observed so far.
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Chapter 5
Measuring performance
In Chapter 3, I have shown which factors influence the institutional inde-
pendence of competition authorities in the EU, whilst in Chapter 4 I have
investigated more in depth the mechanisms behind these causal relation-
ships with a series of interviews with experts. According to the empirical
analysis carried out, the main motivations that push legislators to give in-
dependence to the authorities are the weight of big firms in the national
economy (in combination with high political polarisation), the length of a
country’s EU membership, and the need for credibility. At first sight, none of
these motivations seems to be strictly related to the activity that competition
authorities perform: the influence of big firms pertains to forms of collusion
with powerful economic interests; the length of EU membership has mostly
to do with the long-run influence of the European legislation in the member
states and with the «rebounding Europeanization» phenomenon (McGowan
2005; see Section 3.5.1); the confirmation found for the credibility hypoth-
esis mainly signals that lawmakers want to send a «message» to the market.
In sum, there does not seem to be any purely functionalist reason in the
decision to confer independence on competition agencies.
This is puzzling particularly, given that independence is considered as
an important prerequisite for these authorities. It is often claimed (see
for instance OECD, 2002: 95) that independence per se would make IRAs
more efficient, because an autonomous body would pursue its goals without
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«playing a waiting game» to favour some firms and without being influenced
by the preferences of politicians. In the interviews as well, many experts ar-
gued that independence helps the agencies be more efficient in carrying out
their tasks. In the end, however, none have offered concrete facts or ex-
amples that support this claim, either in the academic literature or in more
policy-oriented works. In this chapter, I aim at empirically testing this hy-
pothesis, which − in the way in which it has been formulated thus far −
resembles much more an assumption.
5.1 How to measure performance
When it comes to measuring a vague and ambivalent value such as «perfor-
mance», it is very difficult to choose an indicator, or a set of indicators, that
correctly represent this concept. What is an «effective» competition author-
ity? The first possible answer to this question is that a competition authority
is «effective» if it investigates many cases and adopts many decisions. Quan-
tity is certainly an aspect to consider. On the other hand, it might also be
worth considering the content of NCAs’s decisions. What is their impact on
the economy? What are the net benefits for consumers? The difficulty in
defining performance was described well by the words of a member of the
Italian competition authority:
«An independent authority is certainly more willing to enforce and
promote competition, but its efficacy depends [...] on its ability to
adopt the correct decisions. [...] It is a sort of “art” [...], it is not a
mechanical application of rules, there are many discretionary choices.
It depends on how the authority is able to understand the problem, to
analyse it and to take the correct decisions».1
In some cases, decisions that are apparently taken in order to restore fair
competition conditions among the firms could, paradoxically, result in a dis-
advantage for the consumers. In an interview, an expert has addressed the
example of Google,
1 Interviews with members of the Italian competition authority, 19 July 2010.
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«[...] which is destroying the rather competitive market of web
search and advertising, and concentrating much power in its hands.
And on what basis? On the basis of legal distortions? No: Google does
not enjoy any particular legal privilege, [...] it is simply more innova-
tive; it has discovered a technology which the consumers appreciate
very much, and it satisfies a demand [...]. Being “the best”, it is cre-
ating a sort of de facto monopoly. But can you sue Google for abuse
of dominant position? In theory you can. [...] Can you “destroy” that
capacity, that service that Google offers to the market? A competition
authority could do that. But in the end, would the consumer be better
off?».
A corollary of this consideration was that competition authorities should be
very severe in breaking cartels, but they should be very cautious when it
comes to sanctioning abuses of dominant positions. The expert concluded
that «competition is not a static situation, but the constant creation of mo-
nopolistic advantages yielded by innovation». In some cases, by sanctioning
the leader of a market, competition authorities could be sanctioning the
most innovative company.2
To conclude this brief digression on the difficulty of defining what is
effective competition enforcement, we must mention the fact that, in some
cases, different competition enforcers have adopted different rulings on sim-
ilar issues. In this respect, the way in which the US Department of Justice
and the European Commission have dealt with the case of the alleged abuse
of dominant position by Microsoft is illuminating. In the US, Microsoft was
obliged3 only to disclose part of its application programming interfaces with
other companies: neither limitations to the tying of its software with the
Windows operating system were imposed, nor were fines charged. In a very
similar case ruled by the European Commission and by the European Court
of First Instance, a fine of 497 million Euro was imposed on Microsoft, and
the company was forced to provide a version of its operating system that did
not contain the pre-installed web browser Internet Explorer.4
2 A similar argument is developed by Segal and Whinston (2007).
3 US District Court for the District of Columbia, United States vs. Microsoft Corporation,
Final Judgement, 12 November 2002.
4 Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the
EC Treaty.
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Which antitrust enforcer has safeguarded competition in a better man-
ner? Both of them have investigated a case and reached a conclusion. Yet,
it is not easy to say which of them has produced the better impact on the
consumers’ welfare. This example and other cases that were mentioned
during the interviews (some interviewees argued that in some cases, para-
doxically, an authority might enhance the consumers’ welfare even by not
acting) suggest that, although performance is not just a matter of quantity,
assessing the quality of antitrust enforcement in a comparative perspective
is particularly problematic. From this point of view, the most advanced at-
tempt to empirically assess the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement has
been carried out by Dutz and Vagliasindi (2000). However, on the one hand
the authors employ micro-level data which are not available for all the EU
member states;5 on the other hand, they also rely on assessments of legal
practitioners and experts, which are not necessarily an accurate and compa-
rable source of information.
When measuring an abstract concept with an empirical indicator, in an
empirical analysis that embraces a relevant number of cases, some simplifi-
cation is needed. If one drew coherent conclusions from what legal scholars
and experts point out, every case dealt with by every authority should be
carefully scrutinised to ascertain whether it improved the consumers’ wel-
fare, and to what extent. Moreover, one would also have to agree on what
could be defined as an «improvement», which would open another Pandora’s
box. Moreover, as Carlton (2009: 89) claims, analysis of individual cases
cannot substitute for quantitative analysis, and the two are hardly compati-
ble. After some attempts to verify if such an operationalisation was feasible,
I have concluded that it is not for a number of reasons. First, it would be too
troublesome to reach a satisfying definition of what is «good performance»
and what improves or damages the consumers’ welfare. Second, even if that
were possible, classifying all the cases for all the countries included in the
empirical analysis on agencies’ independence would require an amount of
5 In particular, they used the World Bank enterprise-level survey
on the business environment and enterprise performance (BEEPS). See:
http://beeps.prognoz.com/beeps/Home.ashx
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time that is not compatible with the time frame of a Ph.D thesis. Third,
gaining in precision would imply anyway to lose in generality. Fourth, as
the result would still be a very generic operationalisation of the concept of
performance, I deem it would bring little benefit to the comprehension of
the phenomenon, and to the conclusions of this research.
Hence, this research will focus on quantitative data that can be more
easily compared, being conscious that they shed light only on one aspect of
performance. The elements of the agencies’ activity that I take into account
to measure the efficacy of the authorities are the number of investigations
started and the number of (envisaged) decisions issued by them. I have chosen
to focus on these two indicators for a theoretical and a practical motivation.
Theoretically, these indicators summarise the agencies’ activities related to
the enforcement of the articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the functioning
of the European Union – i.e. of the articles which all the EU national compe-
tition authorities apply indiscriminately in every country, and on which they
share their competence with the DG Competition. Therefore, these data are
homogeneous and can be meaningfully compared. This leads to the prac-
tical motivation for employing them. Since any investigation initiated and
any envisaged decision issued from 2004 on has to be communicated to the
DG competition, we have a reliable and accessible source for these two kinds
of acts.
5.2 Data on investigations and decisions
The statistics on investigations and envisaged decisions are available on the
DG Competition website.6 Unfortunately, they are not disaggregated by
year. Thus, I have chosen to consider the period ranging from when the
collection of these data started (2004, when Regulation 1/2003 came into
force) to the end of 2010. The data are illustrated in Table 5.1 and in Figure
5.2.1.
As we can see, there are huge differences between the authorities, both
6 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html
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Investigations
started
Envisaged
decisions
Decisions/
Investigations
ratio
Austria 27 6 0.22
Belgium 36 8 0.22
Bulgaria 12 4 0.33
Cyprus 3 0 0
Czech Republic 12 8 0.67
Denmark 62 33 0.53
Estonia 7 3 0.43
Finland 16 9 0.56
France 194 71 0.37
Germany 132 61 0.46
Greece 33 24 0.73
Hungary 81 20 0.25
Ireland 13 1 0.08
Italy 86 61 0.71
Latvia 10 3 0.3
Lithuania 13 7 0.54
Luxembourg 1 0 0
Malta 1 0 0
Netherlands 77 34 0.44
Poland 23 10 0.43
Portugal 35 12 0.34
Romania 21 3 0.14
Slovak Republic 9 9 1
Slovenia 26 13 0.5
Spain 81 38 0.47
Sweden 36 17 0.47
UK 54 11 0.20
Table 5.1: Number of investigations started and infringement decisions
(2004-2010)
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Figure 5.2.1: Investigations started and envisaged decisions per authority
(2004-2010)
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in the number of investigations started and in the amount of proceedings
concluded with decisions. France and Germany are the countries whose
competition authorities get the highest values in both the activities. The
Italian agency has started fewer proceedings, but it has a higher rate of in-
vestigations that are concluded with decisions. A great part of the variation
that we observe is undoubtedly due to the size of the countries’ economies.
In fact, the countries in the left part of the graph in Figure 5.2.1 are the
largest economies of the continent. They have more firms, more economic
activities, more consumers: therefore it is not surprising that their authori-
ties deal with a higher number of cases. Nevertheless, some cases look quite
strange at a first sight. The British authority, for instance, has initiated fewer
investigations in the 2004-10 period than the Hungarian agency, despite the
fact that the UK’s economy was more than ten times as big as the Hungarian
one.
It is worth remembering again that these data must be interpreted cum
grano salis. One the one hand, a smaller number of investigations could sim-
ply signal a more competitive economy, in which fewer interventions by the
competition authority are needed. Therefore, it will be necessary to control
for this source of variation. On the other hand, the statistics on decisions do
not include proceedings that are concluded with «commitments», i.e. when
the firm(s) subject to an investigation present(s) binding commitments to an
authority, which verifies that these are respected, and closes the proceeding
without a formal sanction. Unfortunately, only some competition authori-
ties issue statistics on the proceedings closed in this way, and it is difficult
to have a clear picture of their overall impact. In this chapter, I will assume
that the different kinds of conclusions in various investigations are equally
distributed among the countries. A last obvious remark regards the fact that
in this analysis investigations and decisions are simply counted, although
everyone knows that they all take a different length of time, and a different
amount of funds and personnel, to be concluded.
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5.3 Hypotheses
The main purpose of this dissertation is to establish a connection between
formal independence and performance of competition agencies. As ex-
plained in Chapter 1, independence is a «net loss» of control for the elected
bodies, and consequently also for the voters. Hence, independence is jus-
tified in terms of democratic accountability only if it brings some tangible
improvement in the performance of these IRAs. Various theoretical frame-
works assume that independence improves the way in which the authorities
operate, and from a more policy-oriented point of view, independence is of-
ten regarded as a positive characteristic for IRAs. However, no solid proof
has ever been offered with regard to the relationship between independence
and performance.
In this section, I will illustrate the hypotheses by which I aim to explain
the authorities’ performance. Obviously, formal independence is the main
factor whose impact I will test. Additionally, I will also take into consid-
eration two features of de facto independence, namely the budget and the
average duration of governments in a country. The first because, beyond
representing a natural limit to the agencies’ action, budget is a means to
hold the authority accountable; the second because, all else equal, there
can be informal influence of the government on the agencies only when the
two actors (executive and agency) play repeated games − a condition that
is hardly met where governments do not last long.
5.3.1 Formal independence
Almost everyone seems to agree on the fact that independence is a good
feature for regulatory agencies, and competition authorities are certainly
not an exception. But in spite of this common agreement, there has been
little theorising about the reasons for which independence would be good
and about how it would improve the agencies’ activity. A causal link is often
implicitly established between expertise and the ability to analyse concrete
cases, but no empirical tests have been carried out to test if a relationship
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between the degree of autonomy and the actual performance exists.
The few attempts that can be found in the literature do not suugest a
direct correlation between independence and performance. Majone’s theory
of credible commitment (Majone 1996) rather indicates that independence,
yielded by credibility, contributes to the better functioning of the market,
because the economic actors will be confident that the authority will strictly
sanction any violation of competition. In other words, independence creates
credibility, credibility creates trust, trust improves economic transactions.
Autonomy from the political power would have an intrinsic effect on the
expectations of the regulatees, but not necessarily on the performance of
the regulator.
Another academic contribution that suggests a relation between inde-
pendence and performance has been proposed by Bawn (1995, see Section
2.3.4), who argues that the optimal agency performance depends on the
balance between technical and procedural uncertainty. In other words, pro-
vided they have a certain amount of technical expertise, agencies should be
given as much discretion as possible, as long as this does not allow the au-
thorities to deviate too much from the preferences of the lawmakers. If the
«technical uncertainty» is the same for all the competition authorities in the
EU,7 we should observe a positive correlation between independence and
performance.
In the interviews that I conducted in 2010, I asked the experts whether
they thought such a relationship existed. The responses were mixed. Every
interviewee stated that, in principle, independence is regarded as positive
and that, therefore, it should improve the agencies’ performance, and their
ability to enforce antitrust law. However, no expert has given a clear descrip-
tion of this relationship. An Italian expert claimed that a certain amount of
independence is necessary, given the semi-judicial functions that the com-
petition agencies perform (see Section 4.3, p. 129).
This statement implies that a relationship between autonomy and per-
formance exists, but the effect would be on the quality of the performance
7 Since the policy that they enforce is the same, this is a reasonable assumption.
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rather than on the quantity. And such an effect, as argued before, is almost
impossible to analyse from a comparative perspective. A member of the
French competition authority argued that, when the government and the
parliament decided to increase the independence of the Autorité, they were
mainly interested in improving its power to advise the parliament; competi-
tion enforcement was not so much part of the goal.8
In general, except for a few rather vague statements, in most of their
responses the interviewees concluded that formal independence by itself can
hardly produce a good performance. According to the practical experience
of people who directly deal with competition regulation, we should observe
no concrete effects of independence on the regulatory output in terms of
number of cases investigated and sanctioned.
Nonetheless, I deem the relationship to be worth testing. As a matter
of fact, formal independence consists of many characteristics that may have
an impact on quantitative performance. With more formal independence,
the members of the authority are less likely to be «punished» or «rewarded»
for the decisions that they make, whether these decisions are opposed or
favoured by the political principals; the members are also less likely to
have had previous relationships with the firms they regulate; the author-
ity is more likely not to be told on which cases it has (or has not) to focus,
and so forth. I posit that a less autonomous body should show more self-
restraint in a number of potential competition violations, when economic
interests of important firms are concerned. I therefore hypothesise that:
HYPOTHESIS 1 («FORMAL INDEPENDENCE»)
The higher the independence of a competition authority, the higher the
number of cases that it will investigate and sanction
5.3.2 Informal independence: the budget
Another factor apparently related to the way in which the authorities op-
erate is the budget the parliaments set for them every year. The source of
8 Interview with members of the board of the French competition authority, 28 June
2010.
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the budget (whether the authorities are entirely dependent on government
funding or if they can also count on fees levied from firms) is a feature of
the index of formal independence described in Chapter 3, and whose impact
will be tested with Hypothesis 1. Nevertheless, the influence of the agencies
and of politicians on the budget is often considered as a component of in-
formal (or de facto) independence (see Gilardi and Maggetti 2011; Maggetti
2007). Similarly, theorists of congressional dominance (see Section 2.3.1)
convincingly argued that the budget is one of the instruments by which the
legislature controls the agencies: by bargaining every year with the agency
on the money that it will allocate for its activities, the government holds it
accountable.
The budget has been spontaneously mentioned in various interviews,
especially by members of the competition agencies. These were the words
of a member of the Italian competition authority:
«In the current period, especially because of the economic crisis,
we have experienced a considerable decrease in our budget. Although
the formal independence has remained the same, budget cuts repre-
sent a decrease in our de facto independence. [...] What is more,
whilst the budget has been decreasing, our tasks have been constantly
growing.»9
The substance of this claim is fairly simple: if the money available for the
agency is insufficient, the agency will have to investigate fewer cases, it
will probably discover fewer violations of competition law, and it will adopt
fewer decisions than if it had adequate funding. With this formulation, this
argument seems hard to reject: ceteris paribus, if the budget of an agency
is reduced, the resources that the agency can «invest» in discovering and
sanctioning violations of competition law are likely to diminish, and the
total output should vary accordingly.
From the point of view both of informal independence and of the prac-
tical availability of resources, we can hypothesise that:
9 Interview with member of the Italian competition authority, 19 July 2010.
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HYPOTHESIS 2 («BUDGET»)
The higher the budget of a competition authority, the higher the number of
cases that it will investigate and sanction
5.3.3 Informal independence: duration of governments
Another feature of de facto independence is the duration of governments.
Executives can have some influence on the NCAs’ activity by many means,
both formally and informally. Depending on the legislation of each country,
a government (or its parliamentary majority) may appoint the members of
the agencies or dismiss them, it may set the main objectives of the author-
ity’s action, it may scrutinise its activity and, as illustrated in the previous
subsection, set its annual budget. In principle, the average duration of gov-
ernments should not affect these practises, because they are supposed to
take place on a regular basis.
Nevertheless, an executive that remains in office for a longer time is
more likely to establish a «dialogue» with the authority: it may allocate the
money according to whether it deems that they agency spent it well or not
(it might punish or reward the agency), or it may modify some legislation
that affects the activity of the agency. More generally, the literature on bu-
reaucracy (see Section 2.3) has emphasised a crucial concept: governments
change, but bureaucracy remains. In normal conditions, bureaucratic offices
retain much discretion in carrying out their functions, and the legislature
can affect the final outcome only by using complex incentives (McCubbins
et al. 1987; Shepsle 1992). This is especially true for IRAs, which enjoy
more autonomy than normal bureaucracy.
In consequence of that, the more frequently parliamentary majorities
and governments change, the less they can be preoccupied with influencing
the agency and signalling their preferences to it. First, because it takes
some time for the government to assess how the agency works and how it
can be influenced. Second, because the authority itself will perceive itself
as more autonomous if ministers change before they can even get to know
their departments.
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It may be noted that there is a contradiction between this hypothesis
and the findings of Chapter 3 about the positive relationship between for-
mal independence and government duration. In that chapter, I hypothesised
that short-lived executives were afraid that future incumbents might over-
rule the decisions taken by them; therefore, the expectation was that longer
executives would allot less independence to the competition authorities. As
has been shown, the results demonstrate the opposite: short-lived exec-
utives tend to delegate less, because they most likely prefer to deal with
competition issues without the intervention of an IRA. In this chapter, for-
mal independence is just one of the explanatory variables, and government
duration is a proxy for informal independence. If independence in gen-
eral is positively correlated with performance, then government duration
(as an indicator of informal independence) should be negatively correlated
with performance. On the other hand, government duration (according to
the results of Chapter 3) is positively correlated with formal independence,
which is expected to be positively correlated with performance. This could
be seen as a contradiction, but it must be considered that government dura-
tion only has a limited effect on formal independence. Hence, it is possible
that such an indicator is negatively correlated with performance, although
it has a positive relationship with formal independence.
Following the same assumption as Hypothesis 1, we can hypothesise that
a competition authority that enjoys less informal independence (because of
longer average duration of governments) is more likely to «step back» in
situations in which the politicians oppose an intervention. In sum:
HYPOTHESIS 3 («GOVERNMENT DURATION»)
The shorter the government duration in a country, the higher the number of
cases that the competition authority will investigate and sanction
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5.4 Data and operationalisation
5.4.1 Dependent variable
In Section 5.2, we have seen that two indicators are available to measure
agency performance: the number of investigations initiated and the number
of decisions adopted. Are there reasons for preferring one over the other?
The number of investigations started is a proxy for the capacity of an au-
thority to discover potential violations of competition law: it signals to what
extent the agency actively looks for infringements and responds to com-
plaints and reports. On the other hand, the number of decisions indicates
the ability of an authority to bring proceedings to an end, sanctioning the
alleged violations.
Since neglecting one indicator in favour of the other would be very prob-
lematic to justify, I present a solution which includes both the variables,
creating a unified indicator.10 To do so, I have run a principal components
analysis, retaining the scores of the first component, which captures 97%
of the variance of the two variables. The frequency distribution of the two
variables is very skewed, as shown in Figure 4.2.1. Thus, a logarithmic
transformation of the original values has been performed.11 The values of
the principal component scores for the 27 competition authorities and their
logarithmic transformation are shown in Figure 5.4.1.12 As the frequency
10 If two regressions are run with investigations and decisions (respectively) as dependent
variables, the results are as follows. If the number of investigations is the dependent vari-
able, the coefficients of the explanatory variables, the F and R2 are the following: Formal
independence 14.07*, Average government duration -10.32°, Budget -0.10, GDP 52.48***,
Rule of law 15.41, Intercept 29.15°; F statistics 12.76***, Adjusted R2 0.69. If the number
of decisions is the dependent variable, the coefficients of the explanatory variables, the F
and R2 are the following: Formal independence 4.31, Average government duration -2.19,
Budget 0.36, GDP 20.89***, Rule of law 2.14, Intercept 8.70; F statistics 10.3***, Adjusted
R2 0.64.
11 The formula used for this transformation is the following:
P = log{p+ [−min(p)] + 1}
where:
P is the performance index used as dependent variable in this analysis;
p is the principal component score of investigations and decisions for each authority.
12 The principal component scores have been computed with the function princomp in R.
Guidi, Mattia (2012), Explaining and Assessing Independence: National competition authorities in the EU member states 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/46429
148 CHAPTER 5. MEASURING PERFORMANCE
distribution of the logged variable is much more regular, it is more suitable
for OLS and helps avoid heteroscedasticity problems.
5.4.2 Explanatory variables
The formal independence indicator is the independence index employed in
the previous chapter. The method followed in building this index is ex-
plained in Section 3.4. The dependent variable of the previous statistical
analysis becomes the main explanatory variable in this one. As regards the
second hypothesis, the value of the budget used in this statistical analysis is
the mean value, in millions of Euro, in the period 2004-2010. These data
have been mainly drawn from the annual reports on the authorities’ activity,
available on their website. When this information was not available, mem-
bers of the staff of the competition agencies were requested to provide it.13
The indicator for Hypothesis 3 is the average duration of governments, but
the conding is not the same as in the earlier analysis. In this case, the dura-
tion refers exactly to the period 2004-2010, and the average value is that of
the governments whose office terminated during these years.
5.4.3 Control variables
Besides the three indicators illustrated in the previous subsection, two con-
trol variables will be used. In fact, the total number of investigations and
13 The value of the British authority, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), has been corrected.
This has been necessary because the average budget of the Office of Fair Trading in the
period 2004-2009 seems too high when compared with the others − almost four times as
much as the Italian authority’s budget (the second highest one), five times as much as the
German Bundeskartellamt’s. After asking members of the staff of the OFT, I have been
told that the agency deals both with competition enforcement and consumer protection,
and that only 25% of the personnel works on competition enforcement. Therefore, I have
taken one fourth of the total budget as value for the OFT in this statistical analysis. A
minor correction has been done also for the value of the Dutch competition authority, the
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit. In 2007, the agency become also responsible for the
regulation of the transport and energy markets, and its budget was increased. In order to
control for this «spurious» increase, the proportional difference between 2006 and 2007 has
been subtracted from the last three years.
Guidi, Mattia (2012), Explaining and Assessing Independence: National competition authorities in the EU member states 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/46429
5.4. DATA AND OPERATIONALISATION 149
FRA GER ITA SPA NED DEN HUN GRE UK SWE POR SLN BEL POL AUT FIN CZE SLK LIT ROM BUL LAT IRE EST CYP LUX MAL
−
1
0
1
2
3
4
FRA GER ITA SPA NED DEN HUN GRE UK SWE POR SLN BEL POL AUT FIN CZE SLK LIT ROM BUL LAT IRE EST CYP LUX MAL
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
Figure 5.4.1: Principal component scores of investigations and infringement
decisions (above) and their logarithmic transformation (below) (2004-
2010)
Guidi, Mattia (2012), Explaining and Assessing Independence: National competition authorities in the EU member states 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/46429
150 CHAPTER 5. MEASURING PERFORMANCE
Range Mean St. deviation
DEPENDENT VARIABLE [0, 1.899] 0.673 0.519
FORMAL INDEPENDENCE [-2.15,1.805] 0 0.99
BUDGET [0.0165, 39.96] 8.082 8.92
AVG. GOV. DURATION [0.886, 5] 2.461 1.027
GDP [0.0076, 2.269] 0.435 0.618
RULE OF LAW [0.122, 1.951] 1.114 0.625
Table 5.2: Variables employed in the statistical analysis (descriptive statis-
tics)
decisions shown in Table 5.2.1 (from which the dependent variable is de-
rived) is very likely not to be caused only by the formal and actual inde-
pendence of the agencies. As said in Section 5.2, some authorities discover
and sanction more cases just because, to some extent, they operate within
economies where more firms work. To capture this difference, which is not
due to the main explanatory variables, and to control for it, I employ two
indicators: the gross domestic product and the perceived rule of law of the
country.
The gross domestic product value used in this statistical analysis is the
mean value in the period 2004-2010, in thousands of billions of purchasing
power standard at current prices (in 2010).14 This value is a rough indicator
of the size of an economy, and it is certainly useful in order to estimate how
much potential workload an authority has, depending on the country in
which it operates. The second control variable is a «rule of law» indicator.
This proxy, like the regulatory quality indicator employed in the statistical
analysis of Chapter 3, is provided by the World Bank,15 and it is based on
the perceptions that economic actors have about a country and the way in
which it enforces rules. It contains evaluations on whether there are losses
14 Eurostat data. The data have been converted from millions into thousands of billions in
order to show coefficients of reasonable magnitude.
15 See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp and Kaufmann et al. (2010).
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and costs due to crime, if there is trust in the judiciary system, if the judicial
process is responsive and quick enough, how adequate is the protection of
private property, what is the effectiveness of the police for the security of
people and goods, etc.16 Beside the gross size of the economy, this indicator
should allow us to control more accurately for the number of firms and
companies present in a country. Indeed, the more investors «trust» a country,
the higher is the economic activity. Despite what one might expect, this
indicator is negatively correlated with the formal independence one. This
demonstrates that the two variables do not belong to the same dimension.
5.5 Statistical analysis
The multiple regression models of the statistical analysis are shown in Ta-
ble 5.3. In Model 1, the three explanatory variables and the two control
variables have been included in the regression. As can be observed in the
table, among the explanatory variables, only FORMAL INDEPENDENCE has a
significant effect on the dependent variable. In accordance with Hypothesis
1, the variable has a positive effect on competition agencies’ performance.
AVERAGE GOVERNMENT DURATION has a negative effect on the dependent
variable, but its standard error is larger than that of FORMAL INDEPENDENCE.
Contrarily to what is claimed in Hypothesis 2, the BUDGET of the authorities
does not seem to affect the number of investigations and decisions. Both the
control variables are positively related to the dependent variable, as hypoth-
esised, but only GDP’s coefficient is significant. The value of the adjusted
R-squared shows that two thirds of the variance is explained by this model.
As a result of the removal of the budget indicator, Model 2 turns out to be
better specified than Model 1, as the higher F value proves. Moreover, AV-
ERAGE GOVERNMENT DURATION’s coefficient becomes statistically significant.
Overall, the variance explained remains almost unchanged. In Model 3, also
the RULE OF LAW indicator is removed.
16 A more detailed documentation can be found at the web address
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rl.pdf.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FORMAL INDEPENDENCE
0.129° 0.161* 0.134*
(0.067) (0.063) (0.062)
BUDGET
0.012
(0.009)
AVERAGE GOVERNMENT
DURATION (2004-2010)
-0.104 -0.134* -0.104°
(0.061) (0.057) (0.055)
GDP
0.493*** 0.585*** 0.621***
(0.121) (0.098) (0.098)
RULE OF LAW
0.116 0.161
(0.108) (0.104)
Intercept
0.512** 0.597** 0.681***
(0.179) (0.169) (0.165)
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.67 0.65
F 12.18*** 14.42*** 17.35***
Dependent variable: investigations initiated and decisions in the period
2004-2010 (principal component scores).
Method: OLS regression. N=27.
Estimators’ significance: <0.001 *** <0.01 ** <0.05 * <0.1 °
Table 5.3: Multiple regression models
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As regards possible violations of linear regression assumptions, no multi-
collinearity problems arise in this statistical analysis.17 Also heteroscedastic-
ity does not appear as a severe issue: the absolute values of the residuals are
not correlated with the fitted values, and the studentised Breusch-Pagan test
confirms that the error term has an almost constant variance.18 With respect
to the presence of outliers and influential observations, neither Residuals
vs. Leverage plots nor the Bonferroni t-test suggest particularly problematic
cases in any of the models. Nonetheless, specific tests have been carried out
on the impact of four cases: Germany, Netherlands, UK and Luxembourg.
The first two have a considerably high hat value,19 the latter have a Cook’s
distance higher than 4/N in Models 1 and 2 (UK also in Model 3).20 Run-
ning different regressions without these observations, however, does not
yield sensibly different results. Therefore, the models appear robust and the
estimation of the coefficients can be considered solid and can be confidently
interpreted.21
5.6 Discussion of results
The statistical analysis provides a confirmation for two out of the three hy-
potheses advanced in Section 5.3. Formal independence appears to posi-
tively influence the performance of the authorities. This means that inde-
pendence does not only yield a «reputation» effect, but it also brings an im-
provement in the objective performances of the competition agencies. The
17 No variable has a variance inflation factor higher than 2.2 in Model 1, higher than 1.22
in Model 2 and higher than 1.06 in Model 3. VIF tests have been performed with the package
car (Fox 2009) in R.
18 The hypothesis that the models suffer from heteroscedasticity are statistically signifi-
cant at 0.72, 0.59 and 0.98 respectively (Breusch-Pagan test performed with the command
bptest in the package lmtest in R (Zeileis and Hothorn 2002).
19 Germany’s hat-value is around 0.48 in all models, higher than twice the mean. Nether-
lands has a very high hat-value in the first regression (0.82) and a normal value in the second
one − this is due to the fact that the value of the dependent variable for the Dutch authority
is particularly abnormal compared to its budget (see Section 5.4.2, note 13).
20 Which, according to Bollen and Jackman (1990), indicates the presence of potential
outliers.
21 In particular, the main explanatory variable (FORMAL INDEPENDENCE) remains signifi-
cant in all the regressions run without the potential outliers.
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argument − always made as an assumption until now − that an indepen-
dent antitrust authority is more willing to prosecute competition violations
is empirically verified. Figure 5.6.1 provides a clear representation of this
relationship.
From the analysis of Chapter 3, we have drawn the conclusion that coun-
tries tend to give independence to their competition authorities depending,
among other things, on the need for credibility: countries that do not ex-
perience high polarisation and that already have a good reputation in en-
couraging and promoting private investments end up establishing less inde-
pendent agencies. Such a tendency is apparently due to the perception that
institutional independence serves a symbolic purpose. However, the statis-
tical analysis carried out here suggests that, while this may indeed be true,
formal independence plays an additional role, and it could have been under-
estimated to a great extent. The analysis also suggests that parliaments and
governments should regard it as a measure by which the loss of democratic
control can be compensated by significant improvements in policy output.
As concerns the budget hypothesis, its rejection is somewhat surprising,
because various experts and members of the authorities had described it as
the main constraint on their activity. Nevertheless, Model 1 shows that the
variable is very far from having a significant effect on the dependent vari-
able. Why is it so? Figure 5.6.1 helps us understand how the two variables
are related. Besides the remarkable case of the Netherlands, whose com-
petition agency has an unusually high budget, all the other countries are
«clustered», with no important differences in the budget and vast variation
in the level of investigations and decisions. Countries with a similar bud-
get can differ in a relevant way with regard to performance, and countries
with very different levels of funding can deal with a very similar number of
cases. Obviously, the fact that no significant relationship is found with these
data does not imply that budget does not affect the agencies’ activity. The
budget of the authorities covers several tasks that are not captured by the
dependent variable: merger control, regulatory activities shared with other
IRAs, ad hoc tasks. The agencies also employ a part of their budget in these
activities, and the amount of money that they spend beyond investigations
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Figure 5.6.1: Partial regression plot (FORMAL INDEPENDENCE vs. PERFOR-
MANCE, Model 2)
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Figure 5.6.2: Partial regression plot (BUDGET vs. PERFORMANCE, Model 1)
Guidi, Mattia (2012), Explaining and Assessing Independence: National competition authorities in the EU member states 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/46429
5.6. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 157
on cartels and other antitrust infringements may not be the same for all of
them.
The other indicator for de facto independence, the average duration of
governments, is instead positively correlated with the number of investi-
gations and decisions. All else equal, competition agencies operating in
countries where governments last less long tend to deal with more cases.
According to the hypothesis, this is the result of two concurrent processes:
on the one hand, shorter executives are less likely to interfere with the activ-
ity of the authorities, as they have less time for signalling their preferences
to the authority and engaging in a sort of «dialogue» with them; on the
other, the authorities themselves tend to act in a more autonomous way if
they are more stable than governments.
With regard to the control variables, GDP is positively related to the
number of proceedings dealt with by the agencies, as expected, and its co-
efficient has a strong statistical significance. This is not the case for the rule
of law indicator.
In order to find out what is the «net impact» of formal independence, I
have run 1000 bootstrapped simulations for two quantities of interest of this
explanatory variable: in the first set of simulations, the variable was set to
its first decile; in the second set, to its ninth decile.22 The average increase
in performance for a shift from the first to the ninth decile of formal inde-
pendence is 0.38, which equals about 20% of its total variation. This means
that politicians do have an instrument they can use to significantly enhance
the authorities’ performance. All the other variables in the model repre-
sent conditions or occurences over which politicians have little power and
which, in any case, they cannot regard as means to boosting the agencies’
performance: GDP, economic actors’ perceptions of the regulatory quality
of a country, and even the duration of governments, all these variables are
ultimately environmental characteristics, which do not depend on regula-
tory choices. The only variable over which the national legislators can have
22 The simulations have been run using the package Zelig (Imai et al. 2009) in R. For a
discussion of the logic and the implications of stochastic simulation, see King (1997: 141
ss.).
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a direct impact is formal independence: through that, they can noticeably
enhance the authorities’ performance.
5.7 Conclusions
The analysis presented in this chapter confirms the hypothesis that for-
mal independence positively affects agency performance, at least in terms
of regulatory output. This result was not easily predictable. As pointed
out previously, most literature on independence of regulatory agencies is
strangely silent when concerning the practical consequences of formal au-
tonomy. Supranational organisations like the OECD, as well as the Euro-
pean Union, often recommend that independence to IRAs be granted, but
they do so in rather vague and abstract terms, making it very hard to as-
certain whether such advice is given with the objective of improving IRAs’
performance, and to what extent. In the end, no formal requirement of
independence is imposed on the member states in the field of competition
enforcement, and this uncertainty reflects on the significant differences ob-
served among the EU countries.
If independence matters, then the EU should be more explicit in recom-
mending it, and national governments should commit themselves to confer
more autonomy on their agencies. However, this will happen only if execu-
tives and national lawmakers are genuinely convinced that having a strong
and credible competition authority is in their own interest. Unfortunately,
the analysis in Chapter 3 leaves us quite pessimistic in this regard, as it
showed that governments have mixed incentives, and that their institutional
decisions regarding antitrust agencies are not based on functional require-
ments, but rather on a blend of external constraints and attempts to meet
the needs of big firms.
This analysis also demonstrates that there is no «net loss» for lawmakers
and voters from the point of view of democratic accountability: the more
these agencies are set free from the constraints of public bodies − i.e. the
less they are accountable towards parliaments and governments − the more
actively they perform their tasks. If the loss of control is compensated by a
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gain in terms of policy output, then delegation in this field can be considered
a successful strategy, and it should be pursued with greater confidence.
Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that the duration of executives
has, not surprisingly, an opposed correlation with formal independence and
with performance. In Chapter 3, we saw that shorter-lasting governments
tend to give less institutional autonomy to competition agencies because of
their short-run perspective, but also because they perceive that government
instability already provides some sort of informal independence to these au-
thorities. In this chapter, this finding has been reinforced by the effect found
of average executives duration on performance: competition agencies that
operate with higher government instability are less tied to the incumbent,
and more likely to investigate and sanction violations of antitrust law. All
these findings make governments look more like an obstacle than as an aid
with respect to competition enforcement: they give independence only if
they are somehow obliged by the insufficient credibility of their country.
If there is high polarisation, they prefer to collude with big firms. They
enhance the authorities’ performance only, unintendedly, when they fail to
exert their influence upon them.
For legislators interested in improving their competition authority’s abil-
ity to perform its tasks, the findings shown in this chapter should be worth
examining. They suggest that these agencies do not work just as «boards
of experts» that employ their specialisation, nor are they like scarecrows,
which just need to be there in order to have an impact on the economy.
The performance of competition agencies depends, amongst other factors,
on how distant they are from the political power, both formally and in prac-
tice, as well as on how free they are to select their targets without being
influenced by lawmakers.
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Conclusions
This chapter offers an overview of the main contributions of this disserta-
tion and of its implications for future research. In the first section, I will
summarise the work carried out in this thesis. I will recall how the subject
and the research questions were selected, and how the literature has been
analysed in order to develop and test the hypotheses. I will then summarise
the main findings of the empirical analyses that have been conducted. In
the second section, I will examine the implications of this work for past
and future research, both from a theoretical and from an empirical point of
view. Finally, I will discuss what are the possible developments of this work,
considering what could be done to improve and refine the findings of this
dissertation, and how these findings could be tested in other research areas
or with different data.
6.1 Main arguments and findings
The idea for this dissertation stemmed from the literature on the establish-
ment of Independent Regulatory Agencies. From the very beginning, this
literature has highlighted the novelty represented by the establishment of
bodies which seemed to place themselves somewhat in between the three
traditional powers of the state. They were born (both in the US and in Eu-
rope) as administrative bodies, empowered to implement particular pieces
161
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of legislation. However, in many cases their functions entail the creation of
law (within the principles established by the legislature) and the power to
punish those who do not comply with the law they implement. In the US
they have existed since the end of the Nineteenth century. In Europe they
have spread only in the two last decades of the Twentieth century. In the US,
the study of «agencies» has been carried out within the broader literature
on bureaucratic control. In Europe, instead, a specific branch of political
science literature on IRAs has developed in the 1990s, and it has focused
more distinctly on the reasons for the diffusion of such agencies.
The decision to focus on competition agencies was made because they
are among the most important IRAs (as they regulate the whole economy),
though no relevant study has dealt with them so far. In particular, competi-
tion authorities guarantee fair access to the market for all economic actors,
and ensure that no one abuses dominant positions. The rationale behind
antitrust enforcement is that cartels and other distortions of the market not
only put the economy, but also democracy itself at risk.
If competition authorities are in and of themselves a stimulating object
of study, they become primarily interesting if studied in relationship to the
European Union, i.e. with the creation of the single market and with the
evolution of antitrust legislation and antitrust powers of the Commission.
In fact, in the field of competition there is now a unified EU law, applica-
ble in every member state. Competition enforcement is carried out by the
Commission in coordination with national competition authorities, which
act as subordinates of the EC: they must communicate every investigation
they initiate, and every decision they wish to take on a case. Moreover, the
Commission has the power to take up cases whether or not NCAs are already
investigating them.
The puzzle that led me to formulate the first research question of this dis-
sertation derived from two (apparent) contradictions we can observe among
NCAs. The first was that, in this field, there had been an extensive delega-
tion of powers to the EU, especially as to the definition of the policy enforced
by national authorities, and, at the same time, the states had remained very
free to determine the degree of independence of these bodies. The second
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contradiction lays in the fact that very different bodies perform the same
functions, as if independence had (almost) nothing to do with the tasks
assigned to NCAs.
The second research question stemmed from a more empirical and policy-
oriented interest. This study has sought to test, at least in a general fashion,
whether independence affects agency performance. The reason for this test
was that only the presence of such a relationship would justify taking cer-
tain policies away from the political arena. The fact that the parliament
and the government cannot discuss or question the activity of a particular
administrative body (like NCAs) means that, on this issue, the voters are
also prevented from evaluating and, ultimately, deciding. The most impor-
tant consequence of the establishment of IRAs − a consequence that is often
underestimated or neglected − is that the range of decisions that can be in-
fluenced through democratic procedures is reduced. This reduction, I have
argued, is justified only if it improves the general welfare. Therefore, it be-
comes crucial to assess whether more independence results in more active
competition enforcement.
In the third chapter, all the contributions that could help answer the
first research question better have been reviewed, whilst the works concern-
ing the second research question, being very few, have been dealt with in
Chapter 5. The review began with a branch of economics literature (the
«economic theory of regulation») that represents the first serious attempt
to theorise the establishment of regulatory agencies, though it does not ex-
plicitly try to explain their autonomy. Then I reviewed the political science
literature on delegation and control by the US Congress − often labelled as
«congressional dominance» literature: the work of scholars like Fiorina, Mc-
Cubbins, Noll, Weingast (among the others), who studied the way in which
the Congress controls bureaucracy (and agencies in particular). After that,
my attention turned to two other theories of delegation devised by Amer-
ican scholars reacting to the theory of Congressional dominance. The first
is the contribution given by Moe in some of his articles, where he claims
that institutions are set up in order to allocate power for the future. In this
framework, the creation of independent agencies can serve the purpose of
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making it more difficult for future incumbents to change particular policies.
The other work that has been examined is that of Epstein and O’Halloran,
who (studying delegation in the US) established that there is more delega-
tion when the Congress and the Presidency share the same preferences.
The three other approaches reviewed in that chapter were the theory
of «credible commitment», the veto players theory and the Europeanisa-
tion theory. The theory of credible commitment was developed by Majone
(building upon the work of scholars like Kydland and Prescott, and Rogoff),
and it states that delegating some tasks to IRAs is, for a country, a means
to gain credibility in a particular policy domain. The veto players theory,
developed by George Tsebelis, links policy choices to the number of veto
players present in a political system. The prediction of this theory is that
the more veto players have to agree on a change of the status quo, the more
the policy output will be stable. Finally, I have reviewed the literature on
Europeanisation, according to which the participation of a country to the
European Union can trigger processes of domestic change influenced by the
policies formulated at the EU level.
Although the theories taken into account differ widely in the way they
account for delegation to IRAs, they are all compatible with the assumption
of bounded rationality. They all assume that actors (countries in this case)
decide on the basis of a cost-benefit assessment. Of course, this assessment
can be inaccurate, because the information available is not enough to take
the decision and because it is impossible to foresee all the potential conse-
quences of a particular choice. All the theories maintain that the choice of
delegating depends on both the preferences of the actors and environmental
constraints, though some stress more one over the other.
In the theoretical framework tested in Chapter 3, I have kept this distinc-
tion, identifying some common preferences of the countries and analysing
how the presence of different exogenous factors affect the final outcome. In
this respect, it must not come as a surprise to the reader that, given all the
environmental constraints, the actors are subject to contrasting incentives:
some push to give more independence to the NCA, others do the contrary.
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From the theories reviewed in Chapter 2, six hypotheses1 were derived and
tested with several OLS regression models. Some contributions could not be
translated into testable hypotheses with this particular population. This has
been the case with some theoretical frameworks developed by US scholars,
that could not be applied to European countries.
In the first statistical analysis, the operationalisation of the dependent
variable was the most critical step. Several ways to calculate indices of inde-
pendence were available, but none of them completely satisfactory. There-
fore, after having collected information on all the features concerning for-
mal independence of NCAs with a survey, I employed a standard method
of latent trait analysis to derive the value of formal independence for each
authority.
The results of the analysis in Chapter 3 showed that the presence of big
firms results in negative effects on the independence of NCAs, in correla-
tion with political polarisation: the higher the polarisation, the greater the
effect of big firms. Also the length of EU membership proved to be an im-
portant determinant of NCAs independence. Moreover, the countries’ cred-
ibility in promoting private investments is positively correlated with formal
independence. Also an (unexpected) positive correlation between average
government duration and formal independence was found.
The main purpose of the qualitative analysis carried out in Chapter 4
was to cross-check the findings of the first statistical analysis and to get
feedback and suggestions on the testing of the second research question.
This has been achieved by conducting several interviews with members of
the DG Competition and with members of NCAs, experts and politicians in
France, Belgium (DG Competition, Brussels), Italy and Greece.2 The inter-
views proved useful in confirming the plausibility of the causal mechanisms
hypothesised in the theoretical framework. In some cases, I obtained an-
swers that corroborated the assumptions of the hypotheses. In other cases,
the interviews made less notable contributions. However, no interview find-
1 In fact the hypotheses are eight, because for Hypotheses 1 and 5 I have formulated two
alternatives.
2 In Greece I have interviewed only two members of the competition authority.
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ings plainly disconfirmed the theoretical framework. As regards the sugges-
tions on the testing of the second research question, the main one was that
of including the budget among the factors that explain the performance of
NCAs.
In Chapter 5, I conducted a statistical test of the relationship between
formal independence and performance. Besides the main explanatory vari-
able (the independence index developed in this work), two features of in-
formal independence of NCAs − namely, budget and government duration
− and two control variables − GDP and rule of law − were included. The
theoretical framework for this analysis is less elaborated upon, and the find-
ings are not necessarily definitive. This is for two reasons. On the one hand,
for what concerns this research question, there has been almost no previous
theorising. On the other hand, the dependent variable in this analysis was
more complicated to measure. For simplicity’s sake, I focused on the number
of investigations and decisions, but it is evident that these data measure only
a part of what agency performance is. In particular, this approach forced me
to neglect both the content of the decisions and their effect on the economy.
It must be said, however, that measuring whether a certain decision renders
the economy more competitive (and to what extent) is a complex exercise.
In as much, the results of this analysis are preliminary, but certainly useful
and worth exploring more in depth.
6.2 Main contributions
This dissertation contributes both theoretically and empirically to the re-
search on IRAs and competition policy. Aiming at simplifying this distinc-
tion, one may say that the first research question has a mainly theoretical
value, whilst the second one is particularly important for its empirical con-
tribution. Speaking more in general, this work tries to establish a dialogue
between theory and practice. Both these aspects of the two research ques-
tions are crucial. Understanding the reasons for which NCAs are provided
with more or less independence helps better define the theory of delega-
tion, and at the same time it helps clarify what is true and what is not in
Guidi, Mattia (2012), Explaining and Assessing Independence: National competition authorities in the EU member states 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/46429
6.2. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 167
the public discourse about these authorities. Finding out whether indepen-
dence affects agency performance is important in order to assess whether
these bodies make our societies better off or not.
6.2.1 Theoretical contributions
The most important theoretical contributions can be found in the third chap-
ter of this thesis. In particular, amongst the hypotheses that have been con-
firmed, there are two which had never been formulated before: the «big
firms» and the «EU membership». Although both of them are derived from
previous theories and approaches, the way in which they are framed in the
present work is original.
As for the «big firms» hypothesis, it is an attempt at translating cap-
ture theory in a field where there is no «traditional» capture − because
the firms are many, and there is no day-to-day relationship between regu-
lators and regulatees. That said, what was borrowed from the literature on
capture theory is nothing but the concept of capture itself. In developing
the hypotheses, attention was paid particularly to clarifying who could be
captured and by whom, as well as for which reasons. The literature is am-
biguous about whether «special relationships» are established by firms with
politicians or with regulators. «Traditional» capture theorists (Stigler 1971,
Becker 1983, Peltzman et al. 1989) do not analytically distinguish between
politicians and regulators (or «bureaucrats»), assuming either that the lat-
ter are agent of the former (and so that they implement policies according
to the preferences of the principals)3 or that they can both be captured by
firms, with similar means and results.4 Moreover, these authors do not put
3 See for instance Peltzman et al. (1989: 6): «For clarity and simplicity, Stigler ignores
both the fact that regulators are usually agents of an executive or legislature rather than
agents of voters and the many problems of stability and existence of equilibrium political
modeling. He assumes that regulators do the bidding of a representative politician who has
the ultimate power to set prices, the number of firms, and so on».
4 See Becker (1983: 396): «Politicians and bureaucrats are assumed to carry out the po-
litical allocations resulting from the competition among pressure groups. Just as managers
of firms are hired to further the interests of owners, so too are politicians and bureaucrats as-
sumed to be hired to further the collective interests of pressure groups, who fire or repudiate
them by elections and impeachment when they deviate excessively from these interests».
Guidi, Mattia (2012), Explaining and Assessing Independence: National competition authorities in the EU member states 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/46429
168 CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
capture in relationship with independence. Other authors (Maggetti 2007;
Gilardi and Maggetti 2011), instead, explicitly model capture as a «lack of
independence» from the regulatees, opposed to independence from politi-
cians.
My approach has been to first look at the policy. As has been stressed sev-
eral times throughout this work, IRAs differ vastly one another, and it makes
little sense to test theories that do not match the empirical conditions. In
the case of NCAs, once acknowledged that regulators could hardly be cap-
tured through offers of «revolving doors», I tried to establish a link between
the two approaches above. I related capture to independence, but without
treating politicians and regulatees as if they were ex ante independent from
each other. As the decisions on independence are made by politicians, the
theoretical focus was on their preferences and incentives, and on those of
the big firms. As the purpose of this work was to analyse a legislative choice,
it was assumed that the preferences of the regulators could not affect this
choice.
In the model, the preferences of big firms and politicians are held sta-
ble. What changes is the relative strength of each: big firms are stronger
when more numerous; politicians are stronger when less polarised. The
analysis of the interaction between the «strength of the big firms» and the
«strength of the politicians» proved to be particularly insightful. This model,
in its simplicity, provides a good understanding of the reasons for formal in-
dependence of NCAs. In a field which has first seen the predominance of
economics-based theories, and then the rise of politics-centred ones, mine
is an attempt at taking both into consideration. Especially in economic reg-
ulation, both politics and economics matter, and neither can be neglected.
The second original hypothesis presented in this work, which links for-
mal independence of NCAs to the length of EU membership, is also inno-
vative and promising for future research. This is so, in so far as that none
of the scholars studying Europeanisation have hypothesised the length of
EU membership affecting the extent to which a policy is implemented at
the domestic level. The stress has been put on different local conditions and
«traditions». EU membership was considered as a constant among the mem-
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ber states. In the case of the present work, instead, it was hypothesised that
there are different «degrees» of EU membership, and that they influence the
position a country has on a specific issue (the formal independence of its
competition authority in this case) at a specific point in time.
For the two original hypotheses that were already mentioned, further
verifications are certainly welcome. They can be applied in the explanations
of similar phenomena and can be confirmed, refined or improved. In addi-
tion to this original contribution, my dissertation also tested other theories
that had been previously formulated and verified. In particular, the con-
firmation of the «credible commitment» hypothesis demonstrates that this
explanatory framework is solid and appropriate when interpreting the dele-
gation of powers to IRAs. In the test of this hypothesis there has also been
an original contribution, as credibility has been operationalised as related
to competition policy for each country, and not as a sector-specific variable.
The results shown in Chapter 3 should encourage other scholars to try simi-
lar operationalisations, which are more rigorous and closer to the rationale
of the theory they want to test.5
Two theories that were tested found no confirmation in this work: veto
players theory and legislative/executive alignment. As regards the first, this
test surely does not challenge the theory’s general validity. It is plausible
that the number of veto players does not affect this particular decision, or
that its impact is so thin that it is not detected as being significant. We must
bear in mind that in principle the number of veto players is supposed to
affect every decision taken in a political system. There can be differences,
however, as to the intensity of the effect in different policy domains. The
best way to test veto players theory is by comparing countries as whole
entities, and not sub-sectors of their legislative activity. Turning to the leg-
islative/executive alignment hypothesis, which was inspired by the work of
Epstein and O’Halloran, its rejection probably confirms that the theoreti-
5 This theory is based upon the work of scholars like Rogoff (1985) and Barro and Gordon
(1983) on the expectations of economic actors about monetary policy. If the same theory is
going to be tested in another policy domain, credibility has to be «measured» with respect to
that policy.
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cal framework proposed by the two authors works only in the US, with its
particular configuration of divided government and non-cohesive political
parties.
6.2.2 Empirical contributions
The most relevant empirical contributions can be found in the testing of the
second research question of this thesis. The statistical analysis has confirmed
that a relationship between formal independence and performance exists
for NCAs. As it measures performance only from a quantitative view point,
this test is neither definite nor complete. It is, nevertheless, very relevant,
because it represents the first attempt to systematically link independence
and performance. At the same time, also in answering the first research
question, I attempted to highlight the empirical implications of that analysis.
The widespread and sudden creation of IRAs has so far led scholars not
to focus on their performance, but rather on other aspects concerning these
bodies, such as the establishment of IRAs itself, its historical, social and
political causes, the goals of these authorities. Much has been written on
why and how these agencies have been created, on who promoted them, as
well as on the purposes of the creators. However, as, for most authorities,
several years have passed since the establishment, it was the purpose of this
work to look back at the reasons which motivated their creation, and to see
if the results matched the expectations.
Both the empirical analyses (and the second one in particular) aim to
compare what is publicly said by politicians with what we observe in real-
ity. In the case of the first research question, the answer points out that
most of the variation in formal independence amongst NCAs is due to rea-
sons that are not spelled out in the public discourse: big firms’ influence
and political polarisation are never said to influence the choice regarding
agency autonomy. The contrary happens with credibility, which is often in-
voked when discussing IRAs. The second research question is even more
important: whatever the reasons are for the establishment of NCAs, does
their independence pay off? The answers provided here can be interesting
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and useful both for politicians and for citizens who aim at holding their
representatives accountable.
As said before, the main empirical contribution of this work lies in the
second research question, because that is a point which deserves more at-
tention than any other, in the study of «independent» agencies. In principle,
there is nothing wrong with taking a number of issues away from the deci-
sion domain of alternating political majorities. There are policies in which
elected politicians would tend to supply some public goods in a quantity
that is not efficient, leading to suboptimal equilibria. Monetary policy is one
of these. In general, there are cases in which the politicians’ preferences
must not influence policy enforcement. There are policies which are better
enforced if there is no direct influence of the parliament on them. How-
ever, my argument was that such feature cannot be exclusively determined
ex ante. In many situations, the creation of IRAs has been seen as a natural
development of the changes in economic regulation, and the choice of in-
dependence has appeared to be consequent. In other cases, IRAs have been
established because of diffusion processes (Jordana et al. 2011) between
countries and sectors. The question put forward is whether the creation of
an independent regulatory agency is always the best choice. The answer is
that, very likely, it is not. Therefore, an ex post assessment of the «added
value» provided by formal independence is necessary.
In the literature review, we have seen that some agencies can be estab-
lished because politicians want to shift the blame for unpopular measures.
In the first quantitative analysis, it was confirmed that not all the reasons
for establishing IRAs are related to the functions they have. If, for instance,
an IRA is created just because politicians do not want to be held account-
able (and responsible) for a certain policy enforcement, and if the autonomy
of the agency does not improve the way in which such policy is enforced,
then social welfare is not increased by this decision to delegate. The citi-
zens are not better off, because they do not receive any economic or social
advantage, whilst at the same time they are prevented from judging their
representatives on certain issues.
As regards competition agencies in Europe, we have seen that formal
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independence has a positive impact on − at least − the number of investi-
gations that they commence and the number of decisions they make. What
was proved is that independence makes them «more active». Further analy-
ses on the way in which NCAs carry out their tasks, and on the results they
obtain, will certainly make this finding more robust.
Another finding that has a strong empirical value is the lack of relation-
ship between performance and budget. Since such a relationship had been
suggested by members of competition authorities themselves, my expecta-
tion was to confirm it in the statistical analysis. Instead, the effect is not
confirmed among all the members. This means that not all the authorities
use their budget in the same way. It can be that some of them mainly «in-
vest» it in discovering cartels and antitrust violations, whilst others spend
most of their money on other activities. It is also possible that some author-
ities are more efficient than others, being able to carry out more cases than
others with the same amount of funding. In-depth analyses of single cases
are most likely the best way to learn more about this finding.
6.3 Further steps
This work has potentially opened a new field of research, and many of the
issues dealt with in this thesis deserve further investigation. The next steps
that might be taken can be classified in two groups. On the one hand, there
are further analyses that could be carried out on the data used in this dis-
sertation, in order to improve and refine the findings of this work. On the
other hand, the hypotheses developed and the approaches and techniques
that were employed could be applied to study other agencies or other sec-
tors.
6.3.1 Further analyses on the data used in this work
As regards the first empirical analysis, one of its limitations lies in the fact
that it does not properly examine the temporal dimension. Since only one
point in time was available for the dependent variable, I adopted a «static»
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research design, though I introduced variables that also take into account
time.6 An equally interesting approach would be to replicate this analysis
with a time series research design. In fact, for some authorities the degree
if independence has not remained stable through time, and this raises the
question of why and under which conditions autonomy is increased or de-
creased.
To answer this question, it would be necessary to «map» the changes in
independence for every year in which an NCA has existed. Similarly, yearly
data should be gathered for the explanatory variables. Then, it would be
possible to discover what factors cause changes in independence once an
authority has already been established. It would certainly be worth testing
the same model as was tested in Chapter 3 − adapting the indicators to the
new research design − and verify how long it takes for each factor to give
rise to an institutional change. Very likely, some of the indicators used in the
analysis of Chapter 3 remain fairly stable through time, whilst others may
vary.
A potential problem of this approach could be the long time span that
would need to be covered, as well as the fact that the creation of competition
authorities in EU member states is not normally distributed through the
years. The first competition authority created in Europe was the German
Bundeskartellamt in 1958; the British Office of Fair Trading was established
15 years later, in 1973; then, after 13 years, it came the French Conseil de
la concurrence. From 1988 onwards, there was an impressive acceleration,
with 20 competition agencies created in 10 years. Such a distribution would
imply that for many years there would be only one or two cases, which
is certainly not ideal. If one decides to pursue this approach, it must be
carefully considered how to to deal with this unbalanced distribution.
With regard to the second empirical analysis, the most significant im-
provement would consist of finding a more complex and comprehensive
way to measure performance. The number of investigations and decisions is
one aspect of the agencies’ activity, but there are others which deserve closer
6 The «EU membership» and the «Year of establishment» variables serve this purpose in
that analysis.
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attention. For instance, performance could be measured with respect to the
effect that NCAs exert on the economy that they regulate: one could analyse
whether more independent authorities make the economy more competitive
(lower prices of goods and services) or if they cause companies to have less
market power (fewer concentrations and fewer dominant positions).
It would be interesting also to verify what is the effect of formal inde-
pendence on the way in which NCAs carry out their tasks, i.e. if they focus
their attention on big or small companies, if they tend to investigate more
cartels than individual violations of antitrust law, how long their investiga-
tions last, how often they make use of leniency. In other words, how they
employ their sources, with respect to both targets and time. This could help
improve comprehension of how they use their budget, and why some NCAs
seem to use much more money than others.
6.3.2 Tests of the findings in other sectors
Throughout this dissertation I have advocated the analysis of regulatory
agencies sector by sector. I have argued that we should aim at develop-
ing hypotheses which relate to the policy enforced by each kind of agency.
Motivations such as the need for credibility, blame shifting, EU influence,
can be present in one policy sector and not in another one, and they must
be operationalised differently in different sectors and countries. Not paying
attention to this crucial point may lead one to making serious mistakes in
the research design. If one wants to operationalise variables like «need for
credibility» across countries and sectors, the only way is to code the degree
of credibility by country (as if a country were credible to the same extent
in all sectors) or by sectors (as if all the countries, regardless of their dif-
ferences, had the same credibility in a given sector). In the study of IRAs,
scholars have often chosen the second option, attributing more «need for
credibility» to some sectors rather than to others.7
7 Gilardi (2002: 891), for instance, argues that sectors like «electricity, telecommunica-
tions and financial markets», being part of what he defines «economic regulation», require
more credibility than sectors like «food safety and pharmaceuticals», as the latter belong to
«social regulation». Therefore, he operationalise such categorisation as a dummy variable,
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The present work demonstrates that it is possible to develop theoretical
frameworks and hypotheses which take into account the policies enforced
by the agencies we analyse. In this way, we avoid studying independent
agencies as such − which is not always meaningful − and instead we study
independent agencies as policy enforcers. Why do agencies need to be inde-
pendent in order to enforce a particular policy? How is this useful? I would
welcome any attempt to transpose, in other sectors, the approach adopted
in this dissertation.
More in particular, it would be very important to test in other sectors the
two original hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, the «big firms» and the «EU
membership». As for the first, it should be easier to map the number of firms
and their size in specific market sectors, like energy, telecommunication or
pharmaceuticals, rather than in a whole country. Another very interesting
sector (and very salient these days) is the stock exchange regulation, for
which the data on the companies in each country are almost available off-
the-shelf. If the data are easier to collect for sectoral regulation, it should
also be possible to examine the evolution of the market, and the effect of the
formal independence of regulators on market structure. As regards the «EU
membership» hypothesis, it need not be adapted and could be tested as it is.
Furthermore, there could be other ways (though not necessarily alternative)
to operationalise the effect of membership in the EU, such as measuring the
compliance of a country with EU law.8
With regard to the second empirical analysis, it would be advisable to ex-
tend this kind of test to as many sectors and agencies as possible. This could
really constitue a major development for this branch of political science,
and it would be extremely interesting for academics, practitioners and po-
litical actors (voters included). In every sector or domain in which there has
coding the agencies in the first group as 1 and the agencies in the second group as 0. The
assumption of this approach is that all the countries need the same amount of credibility in
a given sector. Moreover, the author also assumes that sectors like electricity or telecom-
munications do not have any difference as to credibility, whatever is the country in which
the authority operates. It is evident that this kind of approach risks to be too simplistic and
inaccurate.
8 That could be done by counting the infringement procedures initiated by the Commis-
sion against that country.
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been a delegation of powers to IRAs, and in which enough time has passed
for the authorities to take effective decisions, it should be possible to verify
whether independence helps the agencies to better enforce policies or not.
The research design should be similar to the one adopted in this thesis: first
it would be necessary to build an index of independence of the authorities,
then their performance should be compared in a statistical model. The only
method that allows one to verify whether independence makes a difference
is to compare authorities enjoying various degrees of autonomy.
The aim of such a research, which could be conducted across many coun-
tries and sectors, would be to make sure that independence is really needed
in every domain in which it has been used. It would also be interesting to
adopt a country-centred approach and see if all the countries benefit from
independence to the same extent. There could be countries where particular
institutional or political characteristics make delegation to IRAs not neces-
sary and not useful, at least not in every sector. A deeper comprehension
of the effects and implications of regulatory independence will help IRAs
themselves to remain successful.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have summarised the main premises, theoretical frame-
works and findings of this dissertation concerning the explaining and as-
sessing of independence of NCAs in the EU member states. I have illustrated
what I deem can be learnt from the results of the empirical analyses, both in
theoretical and empirical terms. Finally, I have outlined the possible further
steps that might be taken in order to take full advantage of the contribution
offered by this work.
IRAs still offer an enormous amount of material for political scientists to
research. With my thesis, I have focused on one type of regulatory agency –
competition agencies – because this brings about a more rigorous approach,
more precise hypotheses and more salient findings. As independent author-
ities cease to be a novelty in modern democracy, and become an ordinary
channel of policy enforcement, thus also the study of their causes and ef-
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fects must become more defined, detailed and sharpened. Since they are
now deeply embedded in our societies, we ought to be particularly aware
of their function, of their strengths and weaknesses. Hopefully, new studies
in this field can contribute to a reconsideration of the role IRAs are meant
to play. We might need to encourage or strengthen delegation to IRAs in
certain policy domains and diminish it in others.
This dissertation stresses that we must not underestimate the political
costs of delegation, in terms of loss of control for parliaments, parties and
voters, and loss of accountability for some branches of public administra-
tion. Such costs must be constantly compared to the benefits that IRAs pro-
vide. In conclusion, discovering that independent regulatory agencies are
not the best recipe for every occasion should not be regarded as a failure,
but as a remarkable achievement.
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Survey on the formal
independence of national
competition authorities in the
EU
I − The Head of the Authority
1) Does the head of the authority have a fixed term of office?
Yes
No
2) If there is a fixed term, how long is it?
< 4 years
5 years
6 years
> 6 years
3) Who appoints the head of the authority?
One or two ministers
The prime minister
The government collectively
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The government and the head of the state
The head of the state
The legislature
The presidents of the chambers
The legislature and the government combined
4) Does the law contain explicit provisions about the dismissal of the head
of the authority?
Yes
No
5) Can the head of the authority be dismissed?
Can be dismissed for reasons related to policy
Can be dismissed only for reasons not related to policy
Cannot be dismissed
6) Does the law contain explicit provisions about the incompatibility of the
head of the authority with other public offices?
Yes
No
7) Can the head of the authority hold other offices in government?
Yes, with permission of the government
Yes, in some cases specified by the law
No
8) Is the term of the head of the authority renewable?
Yes, more than once
Yes, once
No
9) Is political independence a formal requirement for the appointment of
the head of the authority?
Yes
No
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II − The board of the authority
1) Does the authority have a board?
Yes
No
2) Do the members of the board of the authority have a fixed term of office?
Yes
No
3) If there is a fixed term, how long is it?
< 4 years
5 years
6 years
> 6 years
4) Who appoints the members of the board of the authority?
One or two ministers
The government collectively
The government and the head of the state
The legislature
The presidents of the chambers
The minister consulting the head
The head of the authority
5) Does the law contain explicit provisions about the dismissal of the mem-
bers of the board of the authority?
Yes
No
6) Can the members of the board of the authority be dismissed?
Can be dismissed for reasons related to policy
Can be dismissed only for reasons not related to policy
Cannot be dismissed
7) Does the law contain explicit provisions about the incompatibility of the
members of the board of the authority with other public offices?
Yes
No
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8) Can the members of the board of the authority hold other offices in
government?
Yes, with permission of the government
Yes, in some cases specified by the law
No
9) Is the term of the members of the board of the authority renewable?
Yes, more than once
Yes, once
No
10) Is political independence a formal requirement for the appointment of
the members of the board of the authority?
Yes
No
III − Formal relationship of the authority with the parliament and
the government
1) Is the independence of the authority explicitly stated in the law?
Yes
No
2) What kind of autonomy is the authority granted? [multiple answers
possible]
Decisional autonomy
Organizational autonomy
Financial autonomy
3) What are the formal obligations of the authority vis-à-vis the govern-
ment?
The authority must present reports more than once a year for approval
The authority must present only one annual report that must be approved
The authority must present an annual report for information only
The authority has no formal reporting obligations
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4) What are the formal obligations of the authority vis-à-vis the parlia-
ment?
The authority must present only one annual report that must be approved
The authority must present an annual report for information only
The authority has no formal reporting obligations
5) Who, other than a court, can overturn an authority’s decision?
The government, in specific circumstances
A specialised body
None
6) What is the source of the authority’s budget?
Government funding only
Fees levied on firms subjected to the authority’s action and government
funding
7) Who controls the authority’s budget?
The government alone
Both the authority and the government
The accounting office or court
The authority alone
8) Who decides on the authority’s internal organization?
Both the authority and the government
The authority alone
9) Who is in charge of the authority’s personnel policy?
Both the authority and the government
The authority alone
IV − Other prerogatives of the authority
1) What are the powers of the competition authority vis-à-vis sectorial
agencies in case of competence overlapping?
Sectorial agencies have priority over the competition authority
None has priority: agencies have to coordinate
The competition authority has priority over sectorial agencies
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2) Does the authority have the power to set up its own rules of procedure
in its activities?
No, never
Only in some activities
Yes, in every activity
3) Does the authority have the power to adopt precautionary measures
during investigations?
No, never
Only in some domains of investigation
Yes, in every domain of investigation
4) What kind of sanctions can the authority impose?
It can impose fines
It can impose changes in the undertaking’s governance
It can close the undertaking
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